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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
OVERVIEW
The topic of this dissertation is the fact-finding
stage of Oregon's public sector impasse resolution procedure.

The use of fact-finding has dramatically increased

because of the recent and rapid growth in public sector
collective bargaining, and the resulting increase in public sector strikes.
Beginning in 1962 with John F. Kennedy's Executive
Order 10988, a series of federal and state laws were passed
granting and expanding collective bargaining rights to public employees.
Many of the state laws resemble the private sector
model provided under the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947 (Taft-Hartley);

1

however, the use of the strike as a

weapon to enforce bargaining in good faith and resolution
of conflict has been limited for public employees because
of the potential threat of disruption of public services and
interference with the sovereignty of the government. 2

Such

anti-strike legislation, however, has not prevented public
employee strikes.

2

Public employee strikes are of particular concern to
urban areas for it is within them that the vast majority of
population resides, where public employees are concentrated,
and where public services are vital to health, safety, and
welfare of the citizens.

3

A major area of controversy and challenge to the public
sector, then, is to develop political substitutes for the
strike (which is basically an economic threat) that are compatible with the collective bargaining and labor rights
guaranteed the private sector, yet at the same time protect
government functions from serious disruptions.

4

These sub-

stitutes usually have taken the form of mediation,

fa~t-

finding, mandatory cooling-off periods, and interest arbitration.

However, the variety of ways in which these forms

have been developed reflect the controversy over which form
and/or combination of forms is the most viable method of
.
.
5
lmpasse
reso 1 utlon.

The state of Oregon is no exception to this endeavor.
In October 1973 the Oregon State Legislature passed a comprehensive public employee collective bargaining act which,
unlike the vast majority of states, includes the right to
strike for all public employees, except those in the protective services of fire, police, and institutional guards.

6

The law also sets up specific steps for impasse resolution should collective negotiations break down.

The steps

form a procedure that is viewed as a filtering down process,
with each step contributing significantly to the orderly

3

resolution of disputes, and reducing the possibility of public employee strike.

The steps follow the familiar pattern

of mediation, fact-finding, and a cooling-off period.

If

these steps are unsuccessful they may be followed by strike,
or compulsory interest arbitration for the protective

.

serV1ces.

7

Now with over four years of experience, the factfinding phase of Oregon's impasse resolution process has
become quite controversial.
management, and neutrals

The personal views of union,

(mediators and fact-finders) differ

considerably as to whether fact-finding does what it is intended to accomplish.

There have been recommendations pre-

pared for presentation to the next legislature that would
abolish the fact-finding step in this elaborate impasse
procedure.

8

The controversy in Oregon reflects the controversy
among the experts nationally, and the same situation with
respect to academic research in this area prevails; that is,
there has been little systematic investigation into the
fact-finding process.

9

THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this study is to analyze the purpose,
nature, and effectiveness of Oregon's fact-finding phase of
impasse resolution.

Because of the impact the home rule is-

sue has had on the use of Oregon's impasse procedures, this
study will focus on those sectors where use of fact-finding

4
has been extensive, consistent and unaffected by the home
10
.
ru 1 e ~ssue.
This analysis of fact-finding represents the
first comprehensive and systematic assessment of the impasse
procedure to be undertaken in the state since the 1973 law
was passed.

Such analysis will identify the significant

variables in the efficacy of fact-finding and will bring
together practitioners' views on the viability of the process.

This latter dimension is critical in that the opin-

ions of these participants in the labor relations field will
likely affect and shape future legislation on fact-finding.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
There are three ways in which this studl' is significant.

First, heretofore, little systematic research and

analysis of fact-finding in Oregon has been undertaken.
This study will establish a basic data base and serve as a
basis for future research in Oregon and in other states using this type of impasse model.

Secondly, this study will

add to the base of knowledge accumulated nationally upon
which further studies and models of public sector impasse
resolution can be built and tested.

Thirdly, the study will

be of importance to Oregon policy makers who will be considering changes in the present portion of the state law relating to impasse procedure.
These contributions should be placed within the context
of the present and potential impact of collective bargaining
and strike on the urban area.

Because the growth of public

5

sector employee organization, collective bargaining and
strike has been recent and rapid, the total political and
economic impact is not known.

However, the burden of strike

on the public health, welfare and safety has been experienced throughout the nation.

It is of prime importance then

to develop impasse resolution procedures and steps that contribute to good faith bargaining while at the same time protect the public from the disruption of vital public services.
It is within this context that this study is seen as significant and as a contribution to the public debate over the
continuation of the fact-finding step in Oregon's impasse
procedure.
The Implication For Urban Areas
The implication of public sector collective bargaining
and the strike for urban areas may be seen as being derived
from three areas of concern:

(1) financial,

(2) political,

and (3) provision of vital services.
First, the fiscal impact of bargaining is significant.
This is because 60-75 percent (or more) of urban budgets
consist of labor costs.

ll

This is not to suggest that bar-

gained wage increases are the sole, nor necessarily the most
important cause of increased local governmental expenditures; but that bargained wage and salary increases have had
a significant impact on urban budgets.

12

Demetrois Caraley

points out in his book City Government and Urban Problems
that city services are declining in quality, although

6

expenditures are increasing.

He attributes this to the im-

pact of inflation, and the collective bargaining power of
public employee unions.

His rationale is that collective

bargaining has increased labor costs while productivity has
remained unchanged; the result being a decrease in the quality of services and degeneration in the quality of urban
l 1' f e. 13

Second, there is concern as to the impact of collective
bargaining on the political process.

Sterling Spero and

John M. Capozzola express their concern, in The Urban Community and Its Unionized Bureaucracies, that public employee
unions are co-determining public policy by exercising their
power either through the route of collective bargaining or
by their increased political influence on public offi-

. 1 s. 14
Cla

Arvid Anderson observes the same phenomena, but

he expresses optimism about its impact.

He believes that

the collective bargaining process is "changing the establishment of government by orderly means," and has the potential of improving public service, and, therefore, society.15
Third, is the concern over public employee strikes
which can cause interruptions in the delivery of vital services to urban citizens.

Robert Walsh edited an anthology

on the subject of public sector collective bargaining and
the strike; he entitled it, perhaps appropriately, Sorry
. No Government Today, Unions vs. City Hall.

16

Recent

well published examples of such strike activity are the 1975
New York interns' strike, the 1978 Memphis firefighters'

7

strike, and the 1976 New Orleans "Marti Gras" police strike.
The scope of the impact of collective bargaining and
the strike on urban areas can be viewed in terms of the
growth in public employment, public employees organization
and work stoppages over the last ten years.
In 1955 less than one million government employees were members of labor organizations; by 1965
this figure had reached l~ million. However, by
1975 this figure had jumped to close to 6 million
-- a 4-fold increase in just 10 years. Proportionally the number of public workers organized
is virtually double that of their private sector
counterparts -- 45 percent versus 22 percent.
In terms of numbers, government employees today
reflect almost one out of three organized American
workers, though comprising onl one-sixth of the
non-institutional labor force. 7

1

As of October 1974, 4.7 million of the nation's 9.2
million full-time state and local government employees (or
51.5 percent) belonged to employee organizations.

This is

a dramatic increase from 1962 when only 20 percent of the
then 8 million state and local employees were unionized or
..
18
b e 1 onge d to assoclatlons.

Education has the largest degree of organization, with
over 72 percent of all full-time teachers in independent
school districts organized by 1974.

This has an affect on

the total numbers of organized employees because teachers
accounted for about one-third of all full-time state and
local public employees. 19
In Oregon over 45.2 percent of the 621 state and local
governments (except special districts) engage in collective
negotiations and meet-and-confer discussions.

The inclusion

8

of special governmental bodies (e.g. water, port, and rural
fire districts) would increase the potential number of governmental units involved in collective bargaining to
1,447. 20

This study will generate more data as to the pres-

ent and potential penetration of governmental units by public employee organizations in Oregon.
As stated before, most state laws prohibit the strike,
however, work stoppages, nonetheless, have been increasing
at a rapid rate.

Samuel M. Sharkey, Jr., points out that

The public employee strike is the fastest-growing
phenomenon in the labor relations field. About
every three days in the first half of 1970, some
21
city or county was hit by a walkout of its workers.
Nationally, in 1960 there were 36 public sector strikes
involving 28,000 workersj by 1972 this figure had increased
to 381 strikes involving 130,871 workersj22 and by 1976
(after a high of 490 strikes in 1975) 377 strikes occurred
resulting in 1.7 million days of idleness and involved
167,136 employees.

23

During this period virtually every type of municipal
service suffered strikes.

24

These strikes have interrupted

essential services of the urban population, have caused
"eleventh hour"

settlements that have resulted in burden-

some wage settlements, and high-handed tactics by labor and
public employers alike -- much to the detriment of the urban citizen and the social fabric.

25

It is within this

context that this dissertation is considered significant to
the urban area and within the discipline of urban studies.

9

METHODOLOGY
This study is to be exploratory in method and is designed to analyze the characteristics of the fact-finding
system, the major actors, their actions, and attitudes.
It is structured to provide more precise information on
fact-finding, to generate additional questions and isolate
and explore problems regarded as important by professionals
working in the field.

26

The approach is empirical but is

not intended to explicitly hypothesize causal relationships
nor lend itself to prediction.

The methods used will allow

explanation about certain aspects of Oregon's public employee collective bargaining process and its impasse
procedures.

27

In short the study will try to answer the major policy
question of whether the fact-finding step should be retained in Oregon's impasse resolution process.

Because it

is within the context of a political problem, action and
change, and because the findings are formulated for utility
and may be useful to Oregon policy makers, this study is
' 1 -po l'lCy researc h . 28
conSl'd ere d
to b
e SOCla
This study is multi-operational in that more than one
method has been used to form the basis of the analysis.

29

The following discussion is intended to provide an overview
of the methodology; details may be found in the appropriate
chapters and in Appendix A, entitled:

Methodological Notes.

10

I.

General Aggregate Data Collection
In order to gain information on the actors involved,

their actions, external factors, and the association between the selected variables, data were collected from the
fact-finding records of the Oregon State Conciliation Service.

The study covers all fact-finding cases under the

new Oregon law from 1974 through 1977 and involves twohundred and thirty-nine fact-finding cases (n=239).

The

data were categorized into 19 variables within limits of
available data, time, and monetary considerations, and their
potential usefulness to this study (according to the survey
research and discussion with practitioners).

Analysis of

the aggregate data was conducted by utilizing univariate
and bivariate statistical techniques.

More specific infor-

mation regarding the aggregate data may be found in Chapter
V, and in Appendix A.
II.

Elite or Authoritative Survey
Data generated from this method were used to translate

pratitioners' knowledge and attitudes about fact-finding
into a form which can be utilized as part of the literature.

30

A personal interview was used to administer the

survey, and the questionnaire consisted of both closed-ended
and open-ended questions.

The sample included mediators,

fact-finders, and labor and management representatives.
The sampling technique employed in the interview schedule
was non-random because the universe of fact-finding cases

11

was known and it was assumed that all persons and/or categories of experts were not equally experienced nor important;
and, indeed, some have more insight into the process and much
,
'
31
more lmpact
on po I'lCY f ormatlons.

' 1 e d exp 1 anatlon
.
De tal
re-

garding these interviews may be found in Chapters VI and VII,
and in Appendix A.
III. Fact-Finding Reports
The author gained access to fact-finding records and in
many instances copies of the completed reports.

These re-

ports provided information as to the types and numbers of
issues involved and the parties' actions.
SUMMARY AND FORMAT
This study will describe the fact-finding process in
terms of the actors and their actions.

It presents a cen-

sus of the opinions of practitioners in the field to ascertain their views on the effectiveness of the process.
Furthermore, it will provide conclusions as to how the process may be improved.

The usefulness of this study will be

in terms of its contribution to the current information base
upon which further investigation can occur, and in particular, to policy makers who will be considering changes in
the present state law.
The format of this study consists of seven chapters
(excluding the Introduction) as outlined below:
Chapter II provides the historical background that

12
places current trends in public sector collective bargaining,
impasse resolution, and the strike into national context.
This chapter discusses the pros and cons for public sector
collective bargaining, important federal and state laws, and
statistical data on the public sector unions and the role of
the strike in the public sector.
Chapter I I I explains Oregon's public sector labor relations act and provides information regarding the present and
potential penetration of governmental units by bargaining
units in Oregon.
Chapter IV discusses the nature, purpose and theory of
public sector impasse resolution, and places emphasis on the
role of fact-finding and its place in impasse resolution.
Chapter V describes Oregon's impasse procedures and
provides an analysis of the fact-finding stage in terms of
its use, the parties involved, their actions, and some external factors.
Chapter VI presents and analyzes the views of the neutrals (mediators and fact-finders)

that are involved in

Oregon's fact-finding process.
Chapter VII presents and analyzes the views of the
parties (both labor and management) involved in Oregon's
fact-finding process.
Chapter VIII relates the conclusions and evaluations
regarding the success of Oregon's fact-finding process.
Furthermore, recommendations are suggested that may aid in
making the process more effective.

CHAPTER I NOTES
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CHAPTER II
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
THE NATIONAL SCENE
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an historical
background of public sector collective bargaining and a basis for comparison for the remaining chapters.

This will bE

done by looking at the nature and importance of public sector collective bargaining and impasse resolution nationally.
This chapter will deal with such basic questions as:
is collective bargaining?

What

What are the major philosophical

objections to extending collective bargaining rights to public employees?

How has the growth of public employment af-

fected employee organization?

What has been the evolution

and impact of Federal and state legislation permitting public sector bargaining?

And, finally, what role does the

strike play in public sector bargaining?
The General Aspects of Collective Bargaining
The U. S. Department of Labor defines collective bargaining as:
. . . negotiations in which both management and
employee representatives are equal legal parties
in the bargaining process and decisions are
reached jointly through bilateral negotiations.
The end result of collective negotiatioys is a
mutually binding contractual agreement.
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The purpose of collective bargaining is to establish
and maintain mutually acceptable rules and practices to
guide the parties' actions and obligations in work-related
situations.

The resulting written agreement, or contract,

becomes the basic rules governing the relationship between
management and employees.

Collective bargaining is an al-

ternative to unilateral control by management.

In the U. S.

the parameters of collective bargaining are set by law and
the parties bargain within that legal framework.
ported advantages of the process are four-fold.

The purFirst, it

encourages mutual understanding by both sides, thus reducing conflict and disruption of production.
way of achieving democracy in the workplace.

Second, it is a
This is be-

cause the process allows for participation of the workers in
their own governance.

Third, employee organizations are a

vehicle for worker political representation.

Fourth, the

process is a way to equalize power between employer and employees.

That is, it is seen as a way to insure fairness

between labor and management.

2

THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE OVER PUBLIC
SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The arguments for withholding from public employees
the legal right to engage in collective bargaining have
traditionally rested on three major aspects unique to the
public sector:

(1)

the sovereign nature of the state,
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(2) the separation of powers doctrine, and (3) the structure
of government financing.
Sovereignty
The sovereignty argument rests on the reasoning that in
our democratic republic, ultimate power and authority {sovereignty} is vested with the people and exercised in trust
by and through the government.

Government, then, has sole

authority that cannot be shared with a segment of the people
without violating the trust for all people.

Some restriction

of this authority is necessary in a democracy in order to
"3
aV01"d oppress1on.

iJith respect to public employee labor relations, this
logic leads to the ideological view that collective bargaining with a small portion of the people consists of relinquishing sovereignty (authority) and the renouncement of
responsibility (trust) by the government.

This argument is

also used for practical reasons by those who fear the impact
of collective bargaining on government efficiency, management prerogeratives, and possible work stoppages.

4

Opponents of the sovereignty argument point out that
the government has long exercised the traditionally recognized right to enter into contract with individuals (e.g.,
doctors and teachers), and to argue that government cannot
contract collectively is difficult to defend.

Furthermore,

it is pointed out that if government really has sovereignty,

19

it can do what it wishes, including bargaining with
employees. 5
In spite of its inherent logic and ideological attractions, the sovereignty issue has been put to rest for practical reasons.

The current position of the Federal and many

state governments is that they can agree to bargain when
given a mandate from the people in the form of specific legislation.

Such legislation is seen as a practical means

of avoiding public employee labor strife, and disruption of
public services.
Separation of Powers
This technique of governing diffuses power among three
levels of government (federal, state and local), and three
branches at each level (executive, legislative and judicial).

This is in contrast to the private sector where

power to formulate and execute company policy resides with
central management.
The practical problem posed by separation of powers is
illustrated by the question:
organization bargain?

with whom does the employee

The legislative branch determines pay

and other economic benefits, and adopts basic civil service
and personnel rules.

The executive branch administrators

have much discretion over administration of personnel policies.

The civil service has had jurisdiction over the merit

system of hiring, firing and promotion.

The courts may

override any of these units if misapplication of law is
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involved.

Furthermore, various levels of government affect

employee wages and working conditions; for example, pensions
may be set at the state level for all public employees within the state, safe working conditions may be set by Federal
law, while salary levels for local government employees are
set at the local level.
In short, the separation of powers doctrine provided in
our system adds confusion and makes collective bargaining
difficult at best.

6

There are also related concerns with respect to public
finance.
Public Finance
There are differences between the financial and market
structures of the public and private sectors.

Some think

these differences are significant enough to warrant prohibition of a full transplant of the private sector collective
bargaining model into the public sector.
Winter present

Wellington and

this view in a most cogent and comprehensive

manner in their book The Unions and the Cities. 7
The argument centers on the idea that in the private
sector market competition restrains excessive labor demands.
If increases in labor benefits are greater than productivity
increases, prices of the product will increase, the final
result is a decrease in quantity demanded and a decrease in
employment.

Also the substitution effect means that exces-

sively high cost labor will be replaced by lower cost
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capital (machines) as management seeks their ultimate goal of
profit.

Furthermore, management can seek non-union labor in

other parts of the country or overseas.

Thus, according to

this view, excessive union demands and social costs are constrained in the private sector by market forces. 8
The economic structure of the public sector, according
to Wellington and Winter, differs

from the private sector

in two ways that lead to different results.

First, the de-

mand for city services is inelastic as the city has a monopoly on those servies; and, second, the separation of
powers doctrine leads to public management being fragmented.
The results are that unions have the capacity to develop an
abnormal amount of power compared to other segments of the
con~unity

due to the following reasons.

First, the union

can exert political pressure (e.g. lobbying) because it is
an interest group involved in the political process.
Second, because the demand for public services is inelastic,
the citizen (consumer) has no choice but to suffer if a
strike occurs.

In fact, citizens may push the public of-

ficials for a quick settlement in order to avoid discomforts
caused by a strike.

Third, even if a strike occurs, the

citizen still has to pay for the service.

Thus, substitu-

tion is not possible without undue hardship on the citizen's
standard of living.

Fourth, public management cannot easily

search for capital to replace high cost labor because of the
political problem posed by unemployment, the lack of the
profit motive, as well as the inability to borrow
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satisfactory technologies.

Fifth, generous pension plans

may be given in order to forestall immediate budgetary problems, which, in turn, may contribute to future budget crisese

Because of all of these conditions, unions in the

public sector are seen to have a disproportionate share of
power relative to other interest groups, which is a threat
to the power structure as we have known it.

9

There is the opposing view that the differences in the
economic, social, and political costs of collective bargaining in the public and private sectors are not substantial
enough to warrant the two being treated differently.
mary of the major points of the argument follows.

A sum-

10

First, in terms of economic power, the U. S. economic
structure is oligopolistic rather than competitive; that is,
~

few firms dominate every major market.

These firms do not

engage in serious price competition, rather they compete in
advertising, packaging and service.

These firms deal with

national unions that are usually industry-wide.

Negotia-

tions then, cover most firms, thus concessions to labor are
passed on to the consumers, who have no real substitutes
"
"'
S1nce
most f1rms

1 a b or costs an d
"
""1 are 11
pr1ces
are S1m1

The point is that the social costs of collective bargaining in the private sector are much more significant than
many

0 f

ten conS1"dere 12

Therefore, it seems neither rational

nor reasonable to deny privileges to public employees under
the guise that social costs and forced redistribution of
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income through public sector collective bargaining are much
more significant than in the private sector.
Second, the assumption that the profit motive is foremost in private management minds, and results in efficiency
and resistance to labor, is questionable.

Much research

shows that although profit is a goal, maximum profit is not.
Other goals such as company growth, prestige, and market
stability lead management to make decisions that do not maximize profit and do not promote maximum efficiency.

Thus,

in the private sector, the profit motive does not promote
the efficiency and resistance to labor demands to the extent that is suggested. 13
Third, the concept

t~at

private sector labor privileges

would give public labor too much power reflects a particular
value and bias.

There are volumes of respectable data docu-

menting the abnormal political power wielded by the business
sector.

Many political economists who reflect the position

of J. K. Galbraith's The New Industrial State would welcome
more labor power and view it as positive and "counteravailing"

to abnormal management power, thus strengthening the

.
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d emocratlC process.

In short, while it is true that col-

lective bargaining would give public employees more power,
the question of whether this is undesirable is open to
debate.
Fourth, is the pressure of public opinion.

The pub-

lic's willingness to tolerate abuse of public employee
unions is limited.

In fact, one can further suggest that
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the separation of powers can hurt unions as much as help
them because even if management negotiates too much away,
public pressure could force re-negotiation.
Fifth, the potential staying power a public agency
possesses can be a significant hindrance to the abuse of
power by a public employee union.

This is because the pub-

lic agency is a monopsony (one buyer) that will still receive general tax revenues in spite of the disruption of
services.
Sixth, it may be that the only way to prevent strikes
in a democratic society is to embrace and improve upon the
collective bargaining process, and provide acceptable alternativesto the strike. IS
Thus it is felt that the assumptions underlying the
view that would deny collective bargaining rights on a financial basis are not as realistic, and the implications
drawn from them not as useful as they purport to be.

Cer-

tainly the issue of strike is one that has to be coped with
in innovative ways to prevent serious employee unrest and
disruption of public services.

However, this has also be-

come true for the private sector as the economy has become
more sophisticated and private employees and unions strive
to protect themselves against the full cost of a strike. 16
Alternative Views
There is the alternative view that powerful public employee collective bargaining may force many long needed
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reforms.

When more is given, more can be legitimately asked

in return (e.g., smaller classes may be allowed, but teacher
accountability required).

Faster application of technology

to public services may also occur as management is forced
to consider efficiency.
abolished.

Tenure systems may be modified or

Employees of higher quality can be demanded.

More professional input into decision-making can maker services better and more successful.

Innovative and more re-

sponsible budgeting techniques and planning have to be
adopted by management to promote fiscal stability.

Finally,

more involvement of employees in the process can promote
overall efficiency.17

Private enterprise has already dis-

covered that the paternalistic, hierarchical organization
models are proving unable to cope with the rapidly changing,
highly technological world in which we live.

18

In sum,

there is good reason to think the pressures of powerful
public employee collective bargaining may provide more posi.
th an negatlve
.
tlve
resu It s. 19
This philosophical debate, however interesting, does
not detract from the reality that public sector bargaining
does exist and has become a topic of great interest and
concern to all levels of government, the public, and labor
relations experts.

This interest and concern stems from the

recent and rapid growth in public employment and the changes
in public sector collective bargaining law and increased
employee organization.
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THE GROWTH OF PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT AND REASONS
FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION
Public Employment
Presently there are about 15.4 million civilian public
employees.

The state and local levels of government account

for over 12.5 million employees, and the federal level for
2.8 million.

Nearly one-half (5.1 million) of the full-

time employment at the state and local level is in the education sector. 20
Local governments account for 7.6 million, or 72 percent, of the full-time employment total.

This is a dramatic

increase from 1967 when the local government full-time employment was 5.5 million.

The average percentage increase

in state and local government employment between 1967 and
1977 was 3.5 percent per year.21

Along with this extensive

and explosive change in the numbers of public sector employees, carne change in their relationship with the public
employers.
General Reasons for Public Employee Organizations
The increase in public employee unionism may be attributed to a series of forces that culminated in the
1960's.

These forces are briefly discussed below.

First, economic inequality between private and public
employees became more pronounced and obvious with the increase in demand for public services.

This demand dramati-

cally increased the numbers of public employees, many of
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whom were younger and more militant.

Without an equivalent

rise in public expenditure, the result was a lag in labor
compensation between the public sector and private industry.
Second, the effectiveness of confrontation tactics in the
political sphere by the civil rights and peace movements,
and organized labors' step-up in recruitment and work stoppages (such as the New York City teachers' strikes of the
early '60's and the U. S. Postal strike of 1970), demonstrated to public employees that the traditional union approach could be effective in improving their lot.

Third,

was the general acceptance of unionism in society and the
increased sympathy of the public toward extending the same
labor rights to public employees as had been enjoyed by the
22
private sector since the Wagner Act of 1935.
Fourth,
there is no doubt that John F. Kennedy's 1962 Executive
Order 10988 was a landmark decision in encouraging public
employee unionism, as it had spill-over effects on state and
local legislation beyond the Federal level for which is was
intended. 23
THE EVOLUTION AND IMPACT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW
Federal Law
Executive Order 10988 was the first overall official
Federal level policy on union-management relations.

While

some agencies such as the Postal department and TVA had well
developed collective bargaining systems since the 1930's,
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most federal bargaining dates from this 1962 Executive
Order.

B. V. H. Schneider summarizes what appear to be the

Order's most important contributions:
• • • [it] formalizes practices already in existence in ~any departments; grants rights to employee organizations and makes these rights
effective by various compulsions on management;
reduces considerably the possibility of discrimination because of union activity; strengthens
grievance procedures; creates a central labormanagement policy; lays down uniform rules for
all departments, and clearly delineates lines of
management authority and responsibility within
agencies and between agencies and the Civil
Service Commission. 24
Although E.

o.

10988 was a landmark in public sector labor

relations, it gave "federal unions little more than 'meetand-confer' discussion rights. ,,25
After several years of experience, both labor and management expressed dissatisfactions with parts of E.
10988.

o.

As a result of recommendations by President

Johnson's 1968 "Wirtz Committee," and President Nixon's
1969 "Special Study Committe," further amendments were made.
The suceeding Executive Order 11491 issued by Richard Nixon
in 1969 (and further amendments in 1971) made important
changes in E.

o.

10988.

Eugene C. Hagburg and Marvin J.

Levine summarize these changes:
It instituted exclusive recognition as the only
form of union recognition.
It also removed from
the individual federal agencies and departments
much of the authority they had retained for labor
management affairs during the seven years of E. o.
10988, vesting this authority instead in a coordinated federal labor relations system, with the
Department of Labor now playing much the same role
in the Federal sector as does the NLRB in the private sector.
Executive Order 11491 also broadened
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the scope of negotiability in several areas of
working conditions. It also permitted agencies to
negotiate agreement providing for binding neutral
arbitration of employee grievances. Other types
of third party intervention now include mediation,
fact-finding and binding interest arbitration supervised b~ the FMCS and the Federal Service Impasse
Panel. 2
In 1975, Executive Order 11838 was issued was President
Ford.

This order further amended E. O. 11491.

It broadened

the scope of negotiations, and mandatory subjects of bargaining.

It also changed procedure to encourage agency-

wide bargaining, and added vigor to negotiated grievance
procedures. 27
The Impact of Federal Law
These Executive Orders encouraged union organization,
and by 1975 more than one-half of all federal employees were
represented by labor organizations holding exclusive representation rights.

The six largest unions involved at the

Federal level are the American Federation of Government
Employees (AFGE}i the National Federation of Federal Employees (NFFE) i the National Treasury Employees Union
(NTEU); the National Association of Government Employees

(NAGE}i the Metal Trades Council (MTC) i and the International Association of Machinists (lAM).

Table I indicates

that by 1975 these six unions were involved in labor agreements covering approximately 3,000 recognized unions and
some 960,000 federal employees.
The growth in federal sector collective bargaining can
be seen in Table II.

It shows that federal employees in
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TABLE I
Exclusive Recognitions and Agreements by Major Union, November 1975
Union

Recognition
Units

Employees
Represented

Units Under
Agreement

Employees
Covered

Percent
Covered

1. AFGE

1,724

1,223

589,613

88

2. NFFE

690

521

116,465

86

3. NTEU

101

100

83,778

100

4. NAGE

333

670,029
(WG 205,496)
(GS 464,533)
136,071
(WG 32,674)
(GS 103,397)
83,868
502)
(WG
(GS 83,366)
77,878
(WG 33,484)
(GS 44,394)
58,629
(WG 55,382)
(GS 3,247)
32,859
(WG 29,392)
(GS 3,467)

236

72,134

93

49

58,560

100

90

32,362

98

5. MTC

51

6. lAM

96

TABLE II
Total Employees in Exclusive Units and Covered by Agreement, 1963-1974
Employees in Exclusive Units

Wage System
Employees

Total Employees

General Schedule
Employees

----_._--Year a

Total

Percent

1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

180,000
230,543
319,724
434,890 b
629,915
797,511
842,823
916,381
1,038,288
1,082,587
1,086,361
1,142,419

12
16
21
29
40
42
48
53
55
56
57

Number

226,150
338,660
400,669
426,111
429,136
437,586
427,089
404,955
406,000

Employee,
Covered by
Agreement
--.-----~

Percent

40
54
67
72
81
84
83
84
82

Number

179,293
291,255
396,842
416,712
487,245
600,702
655,498
681,406
736,419

..

Percent

Number

P.rcen,

15
21
28
29
·35
42
46
47
48

110.573
241,850
291,532
423,052
556,962
559,415
601,505
707,067
753,247
837,410
984,553

6
12
14
20

21:1

2R
31
36
39
43
49

a 1963-1966 statistics are based on figures as of midyear; 1967-1974 figures are as of November.
UWage system ann Qeneral schedule combined dn oM equal total due to unavailability of information.

.

-

Source: Cited in Eugene c .. Hagburg, and- Marvin J. Levine,
Labor Relations (St. Paul: West, 1978), pp. 177-178.
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exclusive bargaining units increased from 180,000 in 1963,
to 1,142,419 by 1974.

Presently over one-half of all eli-

gible federal employees are covered by collective agreements, and there are indications that this percentage could
increase within the near future.
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Furthermore, the union

activity at the federal level has had spill-over effects on
the state and local levels of government.
state Laws
Before 1962 no state had passed a law granting comprehensive labor rights to public employees as guaranteed the
private sector under the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts.
a result of E.

o.

29

As

10988, its succeeding amendments, and the

general reasons previously mentioned, a series of state laws
and succeeding amendments have been passed that, unlike the
federal government, resemble the private sector model provided under the National Labor Relations Act. 30
A detailed analysis and comparison of various state
laws will not be presented in this dissertation.

Rather,

summary information is presented to show the recent development of public employee bargaining legislation in various
states, the wide variety in philosophy, scope, and coverage
of their laws, and the impact of such legislation on public
employee unionism and bargaining.
Presently forty-one states (82 percent) have some type
of labor relations policy that recognize all or some of public employees' right to organize and be represented for the
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purpose of collective bargaining.

In virtually every state

in the Union and the District of Columbia there are public
employee organizations engaged in collective negotiations
·
.
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an d/ or meet-an d -con f er d lSCUSSlons.
In the absence of Federal law or guidelines, the laws
of each state vary.

In 1978 Hagburg and Levine summarized

them as follows:
Ten states have enacted "comprehensive" statutes
covering all public employees, state, county and
municipal: Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon and
Pennsylvania . .
Sixteen states (Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Wisconsin) have comprehensive laws mandating broad-scope collective
bargaining on wages, hours, and conditions of employment for state and local government employees . .
Five states (Michigan, Nevada, Oklahoma, Vermont,
and Washington) have mandatory, comprehensive, fullscope bargaining laws for local government employees
alone . . .
One state (Alaska) has a mandatory, comprehensive
full-scope bargaining law for state employees, while
leaving local government bargaining to the option 0
political subdivisions . . . .
Three states (Delaware, Vermont, and Washington)
have a limited form of collective bargaining for
state employees which excludes wages and fringe
benefits from the scope of bargaining .
Delaware has a comprehensive law for local government whose governing bodies opt for coverage . .
Three states (California, Kansas, and Missouri)
have mandatory meet-and-confer laws covering state
and local government employees . . .
A number of
states have laws for selected groups such as teachers, firefighters, police and nurses.
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The remainder of states have either permissive
meet-and-confer laws or else lack labor legislation for public employees. A few, like Ohio with
its punitive Ferguson Act, have no strike la~~ but
make no provision for collective bargaining.
The variation in state laws has resulted in a broad range of
approaches to the scope of bargaining, union security,
grievance disputes, neogitations, and impasse resolution.
The few states' laws which have given public employees a
limited right to strike (Alaska, Pennsylvania, Hawaii,
Montana [nurses], Vermont and Oregon [excluding protective
services]) also vary in terms of their approach to work
stoppages. 33
The Impact of State Laws
The impact of state legislation on public employee
unionism and bargaining is demonstrated in the Tables 111VIII.
Table III provides membership data on the three largest
unions at the state and local level.

It does not include

the National Education Association (NEA) which is the largest state and local employee organization.
al association has 1.8 million members.

This profession-

The largest union

is the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME), with 750,000 members, followed by the
American Federation of Teachers (AFT) with 475,000 members
and the International Association of Fire Fighters, with
175,000 members.

Table III also shows that AFSCME and the

AFT more than tripled membership in the 1964-1976 period.

34

One of three state and local employees belong to one of
these t h ree

.

un~ons.
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TABLE III
MEMBERSHIP OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIONS, 1964-1976
(in OOO's)

UNION

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

AFSCME

234.8

281.3

364.5

444.5

529.0

648.2

750.0

AFT

100.0

125.0

165.0

205.3

248.5

444.0

475.0

NAFF

115.4

115.0

132.6

146.1

160.3

171.7

175.0

TOTAL

450.2

521.3

662.1

795.9

937.8

1,263.8

1,400.0

Source: U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1976, Washington Post, September 8, 1976.
Table IV provides data on the percent of full-time
state and local government employees who belong to employee
organizations.

It shows that in 45 states between 25 and

70 percent of full-time public employees, including teachers, are organized.

Table V indicates that distribution of

organized employees is skewed heavily toward local governments, as over 3.7 million or 79 percent of the organized
employees are at the local level.
Table VI considers the full-time employees organized by
function and level of government.

It indicates that at the

local level, fire protection and teachers have the highest
proportion of organized employees, with 71.6 percent and
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TABLE IV
DISTRIBUTION OF STATES BY PERCENT OF
FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES ORGANIZED

Percent of full-time
employees organized

Number of States 1 by type
of employee

All
employees

Teachers
. only

All other
employees

51.

51

51

Total ••••••••
Less than 25 •••••••
39.9 •••••••••
54.9 •••••••••
69.9 ••.•.•.••
84.9 •••.•••••
more •••••••••

-

3
22

25 to
40 to
55 to
70 to
85 or

22
8
12
7
2

1
6
26
13
5

11

12

4

-

-

- Represents zero.
lIncludes the District of Columbia.

TABLE V
ORGANIZED FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES, BY
LEVEL AND TYPE OF GOVERNMENT
Level and type of
government

Organized full-time
employees
Number

Percent

Total •••••••••••••••

4,736,962

100.0

State govelnments •••••••••

991,634

20.9

Local governments •••••••••

3,745,328
502,163
1,075,727
124,208
119,035
1 924 195

79.1
10.6
22.7
2.7
2.5
40.6

Counties ••••••••••••••••

Municipalities ••••••••••
Townships •••••••••••••••

Special districts •••••••
School districts ••••••••

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Labor Management Relations in State and Local Governments:
1976 (Washington,
D . C . : GPO, 1978), p. 1.

36
72.1 percent respectively, of full-time employees belonging
to employee organizations.
Table VII provides data on governments with a labor relations policy.

It shows that 12,327 local governments

(15.8 percent of the total) have labor relations policies
and are engaged in collective negotiations and/or meet-andconfer discussions with employee representatives.

This

figure increases to 21 percent when special districts are
excluded as they are not heavily involved in collective
negotiation and/or meet-and-confer discussions.

Table VIII

provides data on state and local government labor management
agreements by type and level of government.

It shows that

over 96 percent of the labor-management agreements occur at
the local level.
In summary, presently 41 states and 9,064 local governments have 25,242 bargaining units as of October, 1976.
These 25,242 bargaining units represent some 4.7 million
employees or almost 50 percent of the full-time state and
local government employees.

School districts have the most

agreements and organized employees, while special districts
have the least.
The political and economic impact this recent surge in
collective bargaining has had, and will have, on state and
local government is not yet totally understood.

One spe-

cific issue that has generated considerable concern and
controversy centers on the rights of public employees to
strike.
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TABLE VI
PERCENT OF FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES ORGANIZED,
BY FUNCTION AND LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT

Function

Total ••••••••••••

For selected functions:
Education ••••••••••••
Teachers •••••••••••

Other ••••••••••••••
Highways •••••••••••••
Public welfare •••••••
Hospltals •••• ~ •••••••

Police protection ••••
Local fire protection
Sanitation other than
sewerage ••••••••••••
All other functions ••

IBtate and
local
governments

state
governments

Local
governments

49.8

38.2

54.1

58.3
68.6
37.9
44.3
41.3
39.5
54.3
71.6

28.6
34.3
25.6
53.5
39.3
47.7
51.8

64.9
72.1
44.8
36.0
43.0
30.3
54.7
71.6

49.2
36.9

-

36.2

49.2
37.3

- Represents zero.

TABLE VII
GOVERNMENTS WITH A LABOR RELATIONS POLICY,
BY LEVEL AND TYPE OF GOVERNMENT

Level and type of
government

Number of
governments

Government.
reporting a labor
relations policy
Number

Percent

Total •••••••••

78,268

12,368

15.8

State governments •••

50

41

82.0

Local governments •••
Counties ••••••••••
·Municipalities ••••
Townships •••••••••
Special districts.
School districts ••

78,218
3,044
18,517
16,991
23,885
15,781

12,327
671
2,175
840
654
7,987

15.8
22.0
11.7
4.9
2.7
50.6

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Labor Management Relations in State and Local Governments:
1976 (Washington,
D. C.: GPO, 19 78), P . 1- 2 .

TABLE VIII
LABOR-MANAGEMENT AGREEMENTS, BY LEVEL AND TYPE OF GOVERNMENT

Total

Contractual
agreements

Level and Type
of Government

Memoranda of
understanding

Number

Percent

Number

Percent

Number

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27,418

100.0

20,922

100.0

6,496

100.0

State governments ........

1,052

3.8

708

3.4

344

5.3

Local governments ........

26,366

96.2

20,214

96.6

6,152

Counties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2,204

8.1

1,750

8.4

454

94.7
7.0

Muni ci pa Ii ti es . . . . . . . . .

6,154

23.8

4,939

23.6

1,575

24.2

Townships . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2,559

9.3

2,286

10.9

273

4.2

Special districts ......

1,017

3.7

705

3.4

312

4.8

School districts .......

14,072

51.3

10,534

50.3

3,538

54.5

Percent

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Labor-Management Relations in State and Local
Governments:1976, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978), p. 4.
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THE ROLE OF STRIKES
Public sector strikes have been deemed inappropriate
(unlawful) by the Federal and most state governments.

These

laws, however, have not prevented strikes, and recently it
has become one of the most pressing issues in public sector
labor relations.

35

The question persists whether public em-

ployees ought to have the right to strike, and if not, what
substitute institutions or procedures can be developed that
will lead to a balance of power between employee and employer, yet still protect the public interest and democratic
process.
Theoretical Background
In the private sector the strike has long been accepted
as the last stage in an exercise in power by the employees
to secure increased wages and improved working conditions.
It is seen as an instrument of force that brings about a
balance of power between employer and employee and thus
strengthens the cGllective bargaining process.

Furthermore,

it allows the parties to impose the economic costs-of disagreement on one another, as the termination of work adversely affects workers' incomes and the production and
sales schedule of the employer.

It is the economic loss,

or threat of economic loss, posed by a strike that induces
both parties to alter their stances and adopt more reason..
36
a bl e b argalnlng postures.

40

Because of market forces and the fact that strikes are
seldom industry or nationwide, the spill-over costs to
society are generally seen as not seriously burdensome.

37

There are, however, circumstances when private sector
strikes can be detrimental to public health and safety.

Be-

cause of those circumstances private sector strikes can be
enjoined under the national emergency provision of the TaftHartley Act.

Thus, the private sector does not have an un-

, , d r1g
' ht t
l1m1te

0

s t r1'k e. 38

Labor relations experts conclude that the strike is
necessary in the private sector in order to balance power
between employer and employee, and in order to be consistent with the democratic ideal of voluntarism.

Further-

more, it is concluded that generally the strike is not an
overriding burden to the public interest.

However, this

view does not prevail for the public sector.

39

Rationale for Prohibition of Public Sector Strikes
Many of the arguments against public employee strikes
follow the same reasoning as those against public employee
bargaining, which were discussed earlier in this chapter.
Briefly, because there are no substitutes for public services (such as water, sewer, garbage, fire, and police) the
demand is inelastic, and therefore, a strike would place
unusual burdens on the citizens.

This gives the union

power beyond what they would have in the private sector
where the market prevails.

Also because of the separation

41

of powers, the union and public can exert political pressure
on city officials.

This pressure curbs the staying power of

the agency involved, leads to quick settlements, and results
in an imbalance of power to the union's advantage. 40
There are those who also argue that a strike (seen as
an economic weapon) is not "sportsmanlike" in the public
arena, where politics determines the allocation of scarce
public resources.

41

And, of course, there is the sover-

eignty argument which stresses that public employees should
not be able to strike because of possible threat to the
sovereignty of the government.

42

counterarguments
The arguments that advocate the right to strike for
public employees are just as persuasive.

First, in our

democratic republic all citizens are to have the same opportunities, and to treat public employees as "second
class" citizens is not at all consistent nor is it acceptable to democratic ideals and the people.

43

Second, there

are no reliable studies that show that there is a significant difference between the elasticity of public and pri.

vate sector goo d s an d serVlces.

44

Third, private sector

strikes result in social and economic costs, just as public
sector strikes do.

Either both should be legal or illegal,

as it makes little sense to separate them on the basis of
.

soclal costs.

45

Fourth, the private sector does exert po-

litical pressure as well as economic pressure during strikes

42

as well as in their everyday decision-making; to believe
otherwise would be naive.

46

Fifth, there appears to be no

marked difference between the ability of public and private
sector officials to accept long strikes.

47

Sixth, it is

claimed that without the right to strike, a balance of power
cannot be accomplished between public employees and public
employers; that is, if the employer in the end can say "take
it or leave it; but if you strike, you go to jail," then the
whole purpose of collective bargaining is destroyed.

48

Probably because both sides' arguments contain grains
of truth, middle-of-the-road positions have emerged that
purport to encourage good faith bargaining by the use of
some negative pressures.

One such view does not condone

public sector strikes carte blanc, but seeks political substitutes for the strike such as mandatory mediation, fact' d'lng, an d POSSl'bl e compu I sory lnteres
'
t ar b't
f ln
1 ra t'10n. 49
Another view suggests that public employee strikes should be
allowed according to the degree of vulnerability of the public.

For example, protective services (police and fire)

should not be allowed to strike; however, teachers could.

50

Still another approach would be progressive work stoppages,
where the numbers of employees and hours involved in a public employee strike would increase in specifically designated stages so as to progressively exert pressure on both
' It to t h e pu bl'lC. 51
Sl'd es Wl'thou t a severe JO
Presently, only six states give a limited right to
strike to public employees.

Most states have adopted the

43
middle-of-the-road position, legislating various combinations of "political" substitutes for the strike.
activity persists.

Yet strike

However, before reviewing strike activ-

ity an alternative view shall be considered.
An Alternative View

In the author's opinion the mainstream of labor relations experts have bogged themselves down in a futile debate.

The

u. s.

economic structure is highly complex,

inter-related, and concentrated.

The role of government is

so pervasive, and there are so many relationships between
the private and the public sector that it is very difficult
to tell where one begins and the other ends; and therefore,
where the general public interest begins and ends.
Strikes in both sectors cause externalities (spill-over
effects) beyond their immediate realm (e.g., coalminers'
strike of 1977-1978, or the Memphis firefighters' strike of
summer 1978).

Because of these externalities, it is becom-

ing increasingly apparent that the strike, whether in the
private or public sector, is an outmoded means of settling
labor disputes.

This is why political substitutes such as

impasse resolution techniques, are being sought to replace
the strike, or at least make the strike the last rather
than the first resort.

52

At the root of the problem is the push by employees for
more participation in the decision-making process both in
the private and public sectors.

Therefore, political

44
substitutes for the strike are stopgap measures that help
avoid chaos, but do not deal with the root of the problem.
The challenge then, in the long run, is developing institutional arrangements that incorporate labor into the decision-making process, thus de-emphasizing and even eliminating the role of strike (and strike substitutes), since labor
views and needs would have been recognized before major conflict arose.

This view is in its infancy; however, there

are public and private administration practitioners and
"
"d
t h eorlsts
attemptlng
to eve 1 op suc h po 1""
lCles. 53

Recent Strike Activity
As stated before, most state laws prohibit strikes;
however, work stoppages have been increasing at a rapid
rate.

For example, nationally, in 1960 there were 36 pub-

lic sector strikes involving 28,000 workers; by 1972 this
figure had increased to 381 strikes involving 130,871
workers, and by 1976 (after a high of 490 strikes in 1975) ,
337 strikes occurred resulting in 1.7 million days of idle54
ness, and they involved 167,136 employees.
Table IX relates 1976 data on state and local government work stoppages.

It reveals that school districts ex-

perienced the largest number of strikes, 155 or 41 percent
of the total stoppages, and the most days-of-idleness
(638,878).

Municipalities had 121 strikes or 32 percent

of the total stoppages, that involved 66,839 employees and
resulted in 524,515 days of idleness.

TABLE IX
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT WORK STOPPAGES, BY LEVEL AND TYPE OF GOVERNMENT

Employees involved
Level and type of government

Number of
work
stoppages

Total

Average
per
stoppage

Duration (days)

Total

Average
per
stoppage

Days of idleness
(employees x days)
Total

Average
per
stoppage

Total ••••••.•••••••• _••••••

377

167 J 136

443

3,320

8.8

1 J 653 J 791

4 J 386.7

State governments ••.•••••••••••••

27

28,125

1,042

293

10.9

124,458

4,609.6

Local governments ••••••••••••••••
Coun ties •.•.•.•....•••••.••••••

350
40
121
9
25
155

139,011
13,305
66,893
174
10,086
48,853

397
333
553
19
403
315

3,027
377
716
100
292
1,542

8.7
9.4
5.9
11.1
11.7
9.9

1,529,333
163,514
524,515
1,269
201,157

4 J 369.5
4,087.9
4,334.8
141.0
8,046.3
4,121.8

MUnicipalities •••••••••••••••••

Townships ••••.••.••••••••••••••

Special districts ••••••••••••••
School districts •••••••••••••••
-----------

638 J 878

Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Labor Management Relations in State and Local
Governments: 1976 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978), p. 5.
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Table X shows that education was the government function most affected by strike; however, virtually every type
of service seems to have been affected to some degree.
Most work stoppages during this 12 month period occurred during the renegotiation phase of an existing labor
contract and three-fourths of all stoppages concerned disputes of an economic and/or hours-of-work nature (similar to
issues in the private sector).

The most frequently-used

method to resolve these disputes (38.3 percent of all cases)
was direct negotiations between the parties.

Resolution in-

volving a third party ended 25.5 percent of all stoppages
{the majority by mediation}; slightly less than 15 percent
of all cases were ended by court injunction, and about 21
percent by other means such as volunteer return by employees or dismissal of employees engaged in the work
stoppage.

55

Given the rate and magnitude of public sector strike
activity, and the resulting damage to the urban citizen and
social fabric, labor relations experts have developed political procedures that are intended to replace the strike.
These substitutes, referred to as impasse resolution procedures will be discussed at length in Chapter IV, after an
examination of the legal setting and extent of public sector collective bargaining in Oregon in the next chapter.

TABLE X
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT WORK STOPPAGES BY FUNCTION

Employees involved
FunCtion

Number of
work
stoppages

Total

Average
per
stoppage

Duration (days)

Total

Average
per
stoppage

Days of idleness
(employees x days)
Total

Average
per
stoppage

Total ••••••••••••••••••••••

377

167,136

443

3,320

8.8

1,653,791

4,386.7

Education ••••••••••••••••••••••••
Teachers •••••••••••••••••••••••
Other ••••••••••••••••••••••••••

184
146
98

84,466
58,230
26,236

459
399
268

1,740
1,355
1,061

9.5
9.3
10.9

915,725
595,210
320,515

4,916.8
4,016.8
3,270.6

Highways •••••••••••••••••••••••••
Public welfare •••••••••••••••••••
Hosp! tals •...•...•...•..••.••.•••

65
17
17
27
21
40
118

6,619
7,796
25 , 513
3,004
1,181
3,107
35,450

102
459
] , 501
111
56
78
300

590
195
242
132
51
239
i,010

9.1
11.5
14.2
4.9
2.4
6.0
8.6

62,021
81,843
123,039_
7,430
2,641
18,285
436,801

954.2
5,161.2
7,237.6
275.2
125.8
457.1
3,701.8

Police protection ••••••••••••••••

Fire protection ••••••••••••••••••
Sanitation •••••••••••••••••••••••
~ll

other functions ••••••••••••••

Source: U. S- Bureau of the Census, Labor Management Relations in State and Local
Governments: 1976 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978), p. 5.
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CHAPTER III
TIlE LEGAL SETTING AND EXTENT OF PUBLIC SECTOR
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN OREGON
In spring 1973, the Oregon State Legislature passed
a comprehensive public employee collective bargaining act
which included a limited right to strike.

The intent of

this act was to provide a uniform basis for collective bargaining among all state and local public employees while
protecting the public from the interruption of government
services.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the evolution, the purpose, the major provisions, and the major legal
controversies surrounding the law.

This discussion will be

followed by a description of public sector employment in
Oregon, and a study of the present and potential penetration of collective bargaining in Oregon's various governmental units.
Evolution of the Law
Oregon's present collective bargaining law is a result
of an evolutionary process.

As early as 1959, the Oregon

legislature passed an AFL/CIO-sponsored bill that would give
~

extended collective bargaining rights to public employees
and allow public employers to bargain with employees.

This
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bill was vetoed by Governor Hatfield.

Again in 1961, a per-

missive collective bargaining bill was introduced that provided for use of the State Conciliation Service in the
event of negotiations impasse.

This bill did not get out

o f comml"t tee. 1
In 1963, an AFL/CIO-sponsored bill was passed that becarne the forerunner of present Oregon law.

This bill was

permissive in that it did not mandate, but authorized, collective bargaining for public employees.

It also authorized

parties to use the State Conciliation Seivice in case of an
impasse in negotiations and prohibited strike by public employees.

2

The bill provided no new mechanics for employees

to select their bargaining agent, and its permissiveness resuIted in the establishment of very few bargaining units in
local government, and none in the state service.

3

In 1965, the Oregon Education Association (OEA) , a
National Education Association (NEA) affiliate, sponsored a
bill to remove school teachers from the 1963 statute and
place them under a meet-and-confer law.

This bill became

law and encouraged employee organization and collective bar""
" sc h00
I d "~strlcts.
"
4
galnlng
ln

During the same session, the

legislature passed an amendment to the 1963 law that was
backed by the Oregon State Employees Association (OSEA).
This act required any unit of government that had a civil
service commission to establish and administer procedures
for certification and elections of bargaining units. 5
in effect mandated collective bargaining in the state

This
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government and five counties that had civil service commissions.

By mid 1966, OSEA had established itself as bargain-

ing representative for about 9,400 state employees in 37
agency-wide units, and had arrived at collective bargaining
agreements with the state.

However, collective bargaining

at the local level was a confused issue, and only one civil
service city (Milwaukie) adopted procedures under the 1965
amendment. 6

The more populous cities such as Portland and

Eugene, adopted their own ordinances covering public employee collective bargaining.
In 1969, the State Civil Service Commission was abolished, and state-level personnel management was centralized
in a personnel division under the Governor's Executive Department.

A new agency, the Public Employees Relations

Board (PERB), was given responsibility to administer quasijudicial review functions over the administration of the
merit system.

PERB was also given responsibility for admin-

istering the collective bargaining law for state employees
and for local government who chose to place themselves under
state law.

PERB also inherited the State Conciliation Serv-

ice from the State Bureau of Labor. 7

Further proposed

amendments included changes in definitions of "collective
bargaining" and "employment relations" similar to the TaftHartley Act.

Also PERB was to have jurisdiction over unfair

labor practice and contract violations complaints, as well
as settlement of negoitations impasse, including factfinding with recommendations.

A last minute change in the
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definition of "public employer" resulted in the bill being
interpreted as permissive by local governments.

The impact

was that collective bargaining at the local level was not
considerably stimulated.

8

The 1971 legislature broadened the subjects that were
covered under the teachers' meet-and-confer law, and placed
classified school employees under that law.

By this time

several local governments were bargaining with their employees under a variety of local ordinances, while some local
governments refused to bargain with their employees.

9

The Redden Committee
Because of the lack of uniformity among city and county
ordinances, and the recognition that public sector collective bargaining was here to stay, Governor McCall appointed
a three-man task force in 1972 to study the problem of collective bargaining at the state and local level and to develop legislative recommendations for the 1973 legislature.

10
This task force (The Redden Committee) presented its

recommendations in the form of House Bill 2263

(R. B. 2263),

to the House and Senate Committees on Labor and Industrial
Relations in the spring of 1973.

The task force's most sig-

nificant proposed changes in the 1969 law were:

First, that

all public employees and all State and local governments
(including school and special districts) would have the
right to bargain and enter into bargaining agreements.

This
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reflected the committee's thought that public employees
"should be welcomed to the world of the first class citizen"
and that a single inclusive act would produce more rational
methods to deal with public employee relations.

ll

Second, a

number of unfair labor practices were specified and a board
granted authority to rule on complaints and seek court enforcement of its orders.

Third, the machinery was provided

for bargaining-unit determination and impasse resolution.
The committee proposed positive legislation as the "best way
to harness and direct the energies of public employees,
. ,ln t h
'
eager to h ave a VOlce
elr
wor k'lng con d'1 t 'lons. ,,12

H. B. 2263 emerged from the house committee considerably amended and liberalized.

It provided for major changes

in the 1969 law and reflected considerable research on other
state laws (in particular Michigan, Wisconsin and Hawaii).
It incorporated a very progressive labor relations philosophy and procedure because it used much language from the
Taft-Hartley Act.

13

By summer 1973, the legislature had passed H. B. 2263
with amendments that included a limited right to strike for
all public employees except those in protective services.
It was considered by many labor relations experts to be a
model law.

An attempt was made to refer the law to the pub-

lic for a referendum vote; however, the attempt failed.
law became effective in October, 1973.

14

The
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The Purpose of the Law
The intent of the law appears in the legislature's
policy statement under ORS 253.656.
th~t

First, it declares

the people of the state have a fundamental interest in

the development of harmonious relations between qovernment
and its employees.

Second, it is recognized that collective

bargaining is one way to alleviate labor problems.

Third,

it embraces the concept that in both the private and public
sectors protection of labor rights and negotiations by law
safeguards the public from the impact of uncontrolled labor
strife.

Fourth, it states that a redress of power between

public employers and employees was in order.

Fifth, it ac-

cepts the state's obligation to protect the public from disruption of governmental services.

Sj.xth, it is intended to

provide a uniform basis for organizaticn recognition, nego..
.
.
15
tlatlons
an. d lmpasse
reso 1 utlon.
In summary, the Oregon State Legislature passed a law
that provides a uniform basis for
employ~es

~ll

public employers and

to engage in collective bargaining as a means to

promote improvement of labor relations and to protect the
public interest.

The purpose of the following section is

to discuss the major features of the law.
Major Provisions of Oregon Law
The law grants the Employee Relations Board (ERB) the
power to administer the law.

The composition of the board
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was changed by an amendment in June, 1977.

This amendment

(H. B. 2676) was in response to the need for full-time ERB
members, in lieu of part-time members, to handle the increased workload and provide more professional and careful
consideration of the decisions required by the board.

The

amendment reduced the ERB from five part-time to three fulltime members, who are trained or experienced in labor management relations.

It also requires the Governor to con-

sider the interests of labor, management, and the public in
·
.
rna k lng
appolntments

0 f

.
16
t h e memb ers an d c h alrpersons.

Representation Matters.

If a question of representa-

tion exists, and a valid petition from an employer, a labor
organization or public employees has been received, the ERB
must conduct a hearing to determine the bargaining unit,
conduct secret ballot elections, and certify the winner as
the exclusive bargaining representative.

The hearings may

be waived if all parties agree to the bargaining unit and
17
·
consent to an e 1 ec t lon.
In order to request an election, a labor organization
must represent 30 percent of the employees.

Any other union

wishing to be on the ballot must represent at least 10 per.
18
cent of the employees.
The law prohibits an election for
one year from the time of the last election in order to insure reasona bl e sta b 1'l'lty. 19
Unfair Labor Practices.

The law charges the ERB to in-

vestigate any complaint of an unfair labor practice committed by a labor organization or a public employer.

If,
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in the board's opinion, such a practice may exist, a hearing
is held within 20 days of the written complaint.

The board,

after the hearing, has the power to issue orders of cease
and desist, reinstate employees with or without back pay, or
..
I.
dlsmlSS
th
e comp
alnt. 20
Negotiation and Scope of Bargaining.

The law requires

the certified labor organization and the public employer to
meet at reasonable times and bargain in good faith over economic benefits and employment relations.

2l

"'Employment re-

lations' includes, but is not limited to, matters concerning
monetary

benefit~,

hours, vacations, sick leave, grievance

procedures, and'other conditions of employment."

22

The law does not attempt to establish negotiation time
limits that coincide with the July to July fiscal year budgetary deadlines that are required by laws of public employers.

Problems relating to this will be discussed in later

chapters.
Miscellaneous Provisions.

The law provides that the

parties may agree to submit to binding arbitration on grievances and conditions and terms of a contract.

23

It man-

dates a dues check off and permits fair-share agreements and
the agency shop.

24

Impasse Resolution.

The· law sets up mandatory steps

for impasse resolution should collective negotiations break
down.

The steps follow the familiar pattern of mediation,

fact-finding, and a cooling-off period.

If these efforts

are unsuccessful they are followed by compulsory arbitration
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for the protective services, or strike for all other public
employees.

Mediation services are provided by the State

Conciliation Service which is under the auspices of ERB.
Fact-finding and arbitration services are paid for by the
parties.

The Conciliation Service maintains fact-finding

and arbitration lists and administers the selection process
when such services are needed. 25

Figure 1 is a flow chart

showing the basic steps in the impasse resolution process.
Details of this process will be discussed in Chapter V.
STRIKE

/
,....?'
MEDIATION

~

COOLING-OFF
PERIOD
................ __ .\

FACT-FINDING

or

~

INTEREST
ARBITRATION
(For Protective
Services)

IMPASSE

,,-?f

NEGOTIATIONS
Figure 1.
Strike.

The Oregon Impasse Resolution Process

Oregon's law grants a limited right to strike

to all public employees, except those in the protective
services (police, fire, and institutional guards).

Thirty

days after a fact-finding report has been made public, and
10 days after notice of intent to strike has been submitted,
emp 1 oyees may strl'k e. 26
When a strike is occurring or is about to occur, a public employer may petition the circuit court for an injunction, provided it is demonstrated such a strike is a "clear
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and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public."

If the court issues an injunction, it

must submit the dispute to final and binding arbitration
27
within 10 days of the injunction.
The law prohibits certain types of strikes.

Employees

not in the appropriate bargaining unit involved in the dispute are prohibited from striking.

Employees cannot strike

without first utilizing the impasse procedure (mediation,
fact-finding, the 30 day cooling-off period, and 10 day intent to strike notice).

Also, strikes over a grievance of

" I a b or practlce
"
un f alr
are pro hOb"
1 lte d . 28
Major Legal Controversies Surrounding the 1973 Law - The
Home Rule Issue
Application of the law has resulted in much controversy.

The controversy centers on the home rule issue.

The Oregon Constitution prohibits the State Legislature
from enacting, amending or repealing any city charter,29 and
prohibits state legislation on matters of "county concern."

30

In Heinig v. Milwaukie, the Oregon Supreme Court

held that the State Constitution prevents state legislature
enactment on matters of "local concern."

This decision in-

validated a statute which would have required all cities to
establish a civil service system for firemen.

"Unfortunate-

ly, the opinion provides minimal and conflicting criteria
for determining 'local concern' in other situations.,,31
This case has provided a basis for local governments to
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challenge the application of the State Legislature's 1973
collective bargaining act.
In 1974, the City of Beaverton filed suit challenging
application of the state collective bargaining law to cities
and counties that have horne rule status.

The city argued

that although its local labor relations ordinance was in
conflict with state law, collective bargaining was a matter
of local concern and that the state law was unconstitutional
as it applied to a city.

The case was remanded back to the

Employees Relations Board in order to attempt to determine
what areas of labor relations are of predominantly local
concern an d t h e ones t h at are

0 f

state-wl. d e concern. 32

ERE conducted and completed hearings of this subject by
April, 1976.

However, an ERB order was not issued due to

another Supreme Court decision to set aside, on technical
grounds, a similar case involving the city of Hermiston.
This case is still pending.

33

During January 1978, the Supreme Court ruled on another
case (involving employee pensions) that established a new
standard with respect to horne rule when, in LaGrande/Astoria
v. PERB, it was held that
. a state 1aw with social, economic, or other
regulatory objectives would prevail over local law
if it does not interfere with the local c~rnrnunity's
freedom to choose its own pol~tical form. 4
The court agreed to reconsider this case and heard oral argument.

Since that reconsideration the decision has been

seen to address itself to the horne rule issue as it applies
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to retirement and insurance for police and fire workers, and
.
b argalnlng.
..
35
not to co 11 ectlve

Because this series of Supreme Court decisions did not
result in a definitive ruling, many ERE rulings involving
unfair labor practices and representation disputes were not
issued because until the home rule issue was resolved, any
such rulings would be opinion and non-binding.

As a result,

Oregon's collective bargaining law is accepted only by those
home rule counties and cities that want to accept the law.
However, ERB acts as if it has authority and exercises its
powers unless its actions are appealed.

Some home rule

counties and cities have-utilized the mediation and factfinding services of ERB by mutual agreement of the parties,
and on a voluntary basis.

36

Because no outstanding court ruling has decreed this
law unconstitutional, the ERB recently issued a backlog of
orders to several home rule cities in cases involving unfair
labor practices and representation disputes.

If these

orders are challenged or ignored by the cities, the court
will probably be asked again to rule on the constitutionality of the law.

37

In the meantime, labor has worked and

continues to work within these constraints until the issue
is settled.
The consensus of local officials is that their major
concern is not collective bargaining rights or the right to
strike, but rather, the portion of the law which mandates
compulsory binding arbitration for police and fire

65
scrvices.
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Although these court actions have not stopped

organizational growth and effective collective bargaining,
they may have been slowed in areas such as special districts
and small cities.

Furthremore, until the court makes a

definite ruling on the constitutionality of the law, public
employee labor policies will not be as comprehensive nor as
consistent as the legislature intended.
OREGON'S PUBLIC SECTOR
Composition
Following the national trend, public employee organization and collective bargaining have been increasing in Oregon since the passage of the state's comprehensive bargaining statute in 1973.
Table XI provides data on public employment in Oregon
by level of government and function from 1974 through 1977.
While the total state and local government employment increased by 16,700 through these years, or almost 12 percent,
that pattern of increase was n6t uniformly found in all
areas.
Non educational employment at the state and local level
showed the greatest growth during this period, with increases
of 19 percent and almost 18 percent respectively.
Educational employment grew just over 2 percent at the
state level and almost 9 percent at the local level; both are
below the 12 percent average growth for all public
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TABLE XI
NUMBERS OF OREGON PUBLIC EMPLOYEES:
BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT AND FUNCTION
DECEMBER 1974 - DECE~1BER 1977 *

Level of
Government

'74

'75

'76

'77

Percentage
Change
74-77

State Total

46,800

49,900

51,000

52,000

11.1%

State Education 22,100

22,900

23,300

22,600

2.3%

State NonEducation

24,700

27,000

27,700

29,400

19.0%

95,000

100,300

103,200

106,500

12.1%

Local Education 60,300

62,900

64,800

65,600

8.7%

Local NonEducation

34,800

37,400

38,400

40,900

17.5%

141,800

150,200

154,200

158,500

11.7%

26,200

26,900

27,004

27,000

3.0%

YEAR

Local Total

State and Local
Total
Federal

Source: Phone interview with Don Stewart, Chief, Research
and Statistics, Oregon State Employment Division, 11 April
1978.
*Annual average including part-time, temporary, CETA and
seasonal employees.
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employment in Oregon.

This perhaps reflects the passage of

the post WW-II baby boom and the changing composition of
demand for educational services.

This also may be one fac-

tor that is contributing to the relatively high degree of
public sector unionism in the education sector of Oregon
that will be explained in the next section.
In summary, Tably XI shows that Oregon's public sector
labor relations law covers over 150,000 public employees;
some 50,000 are at the state level, while over 100,000 are
at the local level.
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By function, education represents the

greatest number of those employees, as 62 percent of local
and 44 percent of state employees are involved in the education sector.
Organized Employees
Recent Bureau of Census studies show a substantial number of Oregon's public employees are organized.

Table XII

presents data on the percent of Oregon public employees who
belong to labor organizations.

These statistics show that

57.5 percent of state full-time equivalent (PTE) employees
and 61.8 percent of local PTE employees were organized in
1975, whereas the percentages were 50.1 percent and 66.3
percent in

1976~

This reflects a 9.5 percent decline in

state and an 8.2 percent gain at the local level.

The larg-

est percent increase in organization during the 1975-76
period came in special districts at the local level -- over
20 percent increase -- and in municipalities over 15 percent.

TABLE XII
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ORGANIZED EMPLOYEES, BY TYPE OF GOVERNMENT,
OCTOBER 1975 AND OCTOBER 1976
Full-tlae eaployees who belong to an employee

o~anlzatlon

Tbtal full-time eaployment

October

1975

October
1976

I

Percent
change

I

!iWllber

I
I

Percent

October 1976

October 1975

State and type of iovernaent

Percent

NUilber

c.:han~e

October
1975 to
October
1976

Percer. t

OREGON
STATE GOVERNMENT • •
LOCAL GOvERN'~NTS • • •
COUNTIES • • • • •
MUNICIPALITIES ••
SPECIAL DISTRICTS.
SCHOOL DISTRICTS •

Source:
ment~:

Note:

311 386

• ••
• • •

76
12
12
5
45

707
929
647
619
512

35
77
12
12
6
ij6

72ij
290
608
3'6
006
340

3.9
0.8
-2.5
-2.5
6.9
1.8

19
-.7
5
6
2
32

780
373
867
ij'l'
55ij
509

57.5
61.8
ij5.ij
50.9
ij5.5
71.ij

17
51
57
3
35

896
259
5261
'117
076
2ijO

50.1
66.3
'I3.B

60.1
51.2
76.0

I

I

-9.5
8.2
-5.8
15.1
20.'1
8.'1

U. S. Bureau of Census, Labor Management Relations in State and Local Govern1976 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978), p. 15.
Data are Bureau of Census estimates.
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The latter increase is especially significant given the 2.5
percent decrease in municipal employment for the same
period.
Table XIII compares organized employees by function.
This table shows that in Oregon, teachers were the most
organizec at the local level in 1976 (78.8%), followed by
firefighters (68%) and policemen (61%).

At the state level

the most organized workers in 1976 were non-teaching education workers (72.1%), followed by highway personnel (66.4%),
hospital employees (53.7%) and teachers (51.1%).

The great-

est growth in employee organization at the local level in
the 1975-76 period was in hospitals with an incredible 254
percent increase!

At the state level, the greatest gain was

in police protection (state police) -- 66.7 percent; all
other functions experienced a decline in employee organization.
Table XIV provides an overview of the impact of collective bargaining in Oregon.

It shows the state and local

governments with labor relations policies, bargaining units
and represented employees by type of government in October,
1976.

Of the 1,447 governments in Oregon (including school

and special districts), 312 are engaged in collective negotiations and/or meet-and-confer discussions.

This involves

612 bargaining units, and results in 624 labor agreements.
These data reveal the significance of public sector collective bargaining in Oregon.

In order to assess the potential

TABLE XIII
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ORGANIZED EMPLOYEES, BY FUNCTION,
OCTOBER 1975 AND OCTOBER 1976
rull-Ilile' ecployepJ: _bo beolong to an ~.ployC'e Ofl(anlEaUOD
I

Total full-t.t . . e.plo)'JMnt
S ta t

p

October 1975

and type 01 iovel13JlOll t

'----------,-----------r-------1----------lr---------t-----------r--------loe.Obrr
~
'0 lV75
Octobf.r
1975

Percent

I

OREGOH
STATE GOVERNMENT • • • •
EDUCATION.
.
TEACMERS ••
OTHER • • • •
HIGHWAYS • • •
PUBL IC ;VELf" ARE
HOSPITALS • • •
POL IC E PIIOTECT ION.
ALL OTHER f"UNCTIOHS.
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.
EDUCATION ••
TEACHERS • • •
OTHER. • • •
HIGHWAYS • • •

31! 3B6 I
9 9171
I! 3811

I

5 533 1
33 11110
69B
'I

• • • • •

528

1151

111 6BB

76 7071

• • • • •

115 512,
31 7951
• ,

• •

PUBLIC WELf"ARE •
~OSPITALS. • • • • • • • • • • •
POLICE PROTECTION • • • • • • •

13 717

3 635
'1711

2 DOl!
II 310

rJR£ PROTECTION • • • • • • • •

SANITATION OTHER THAN S~ERAGE •
ALL OTHER f"UNCTIONS • • • • • • •

Percent
chana.,

Octo~r 1976

2 722

• ••••

2611
17 786

35 7211:
9 921 I
'I 292 I
5 629 i
) 5110
3 902
II 61121
1 155
12 5611
77 290
116 3110 f
32 B2B

I

I

13 512
3 575
liB'!
1 693
II 079
2 650

llO

1B 139

).9 I

i

IZI I
-2.1
1.7
-4.3 i

2.5 "
13.'1
3.6
7.51

I
1.B ,

O.B

3.21

-1.5
-1.7

2.1
-15.5

-5.11
-2.6
25.0
2.0

19 7BO
6 59"
2 262
/I

'J2

2 5ll
1 967
2 802
3

5 881

117 373
'2 509
'179
9 030
2 1118
120
1611
2 672
2 02'
180
7 557

23

Huaber

I

Percent

57.51
66.5.
51.6\
78.3,
68.5
57.2 i
61. 9 1
0.3
50.)

17
6
2
II
2

61.8
71.4
7'.8
65.8
59.1
25.3
8.2
62.0
711.3
68.2

51 259

'12.5

896
255
195
060
350

1 593
2 1191
5

5 202

'5 2110 I
25 862
9 378

2 OBI
160
581
2 IIB3
1 BO'
199
8 712

October 1878

50.1
63.0
51.1

n.l

66.11
110.8 1
53.7
0.11
111.'1

66.)
76.0
78.8

69.11

58.2

)J.l
311.3
60.9

68.0
60.3
118.0

-9.5
-5.1
-3.0
-6.J
-7.2
-19.0
-11.1
66.7
-11.5

8.2

8."

10.1

J.9

-3.1
ll.J

2'".'

-7.1
-10.9
10.6

15.'

Source: U. S. Bureau of Census, Labor Management Relations in State and Local Governments :. 1976 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978), P. 28.
Note:

Data are Bureau of Census estimates.
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TABLE XIV
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LABOR RELATIONS POLICIES, BARGAINING UNITS, AND
REPRESENTED EMPLOYEES, BY STATE AND TYPE OF GOVERNMENT: OCTOBER 1976
Itell

Stot .. Ind
local
governments

Locil governm .. nts
Sht ..
gov·.. rnment

~'un1Cl

Counties

Tohl

TOlr'nships

pIli ties

Spec 10 1

Idistrict.
Schoo I

districts

OREGON
~uMSER

C' GOVERNMENTS, 1972.

1 ijij7

wITH LABCR RELATIONS
POLICIES, TOTAL
••••••

1 '1116

36

231

826

353

311

28

39

)1

213

61

111'1
61

16

23

17
II

88
52

107

106

10

1)

10

7)

7 551
6 006

bDVERNME~TS

)12

By TYPE OF POLICYI
COLL~CTIVE NEGOTIATIONS ONLY • • •
~EET ANU CONFER DISCUSSIONS ONLY •
BOTH CO~LECTIVE ~EGOTIATIONS AND
MEET AND CONFER DISCUSSIONS • • •
TOTAL EHDLOY~ENT • • • • ••
FULL-TIME EHPLOYEES ONLY.
AvERAGE OCTOBER EARNINGS OF FULL-TIME
t~?LOYE£S • • • • • • • • • • •
EMP~CVEES COvERED BY CONTRACTUAL
AGREEHE~TS. • • • •
, • •
~u~6ER OF BARGAINING UNITS , , •
OF EMPLOYEES IN BARGAINING
• • • • • • • • • • • • ••
IN GOVERNMENTS nITM COLLECTIVE
~EGOTIATIONS ONLY • • • • • • •
IN GOVERNMENTS ~ITH HEET AND CONFER

~uH~ER
U~ITS

HII

156 237

PERCENT OF EMPLOYEES IN BARGAINING
UNITS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
IN GOVER~MENTS WITH COLLECTIVE
NEGOTIATIDNS ONLY • • • • • • • • •
IN GOVERNMENTS WITH MEET AND CONFER
ONLY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
IN GOVERNMENTS WITH BOTH COLLECTIVE
NEGOTIATIONS AND MEET AND CONFER ••

2

)

11) 01~

51 586
35 nil

1011 651
77 290

111 285
12 608

15 260
12 336

1 058

1 1113

1 01'1

97ij

1 0.,8

1 111

80 02ij
612

21 131
63

58 893
549

7 375
70

7 001
116

2 957
37

III

5(,0
326

87 185

25 566

61 619

8 019

7 380

2 996

~)

2211

ij2 690

ij2 690

'I 568

ij 7211

1 307

32 091

ljij7

'Iij7

21

I'll

19

2(,6

2 515

670

10 8('7
611.0

ONLY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

IN GOVER~HEhTS WITH BOTH COLLECTIVE
NEGOTIATIONS AND HEEi AND CONFER. ,

1

ijij

(,7

555
ij6 3110
1 000

0~8

25 566

18 1182

3 '130

55,8

'19.6

58.9

56.1

'18.'1

39.7

27.3

110.8

32.0

31.0

17.3

117.5

0.3

0.'1

0.1

0.9

0.3

. 0.11

17.7

211.0

1('.5

22.1

16.1

28.2

ij9.6

- represents zero
Source: U. S. Bureau of the Census, Labor Management Relations in State and
Local Governments: 1976 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1978), p. 52.
Note: Data except for bargaining units are census bureau estimates.
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number of possible bargaining units, an impact or penetration study has been generated.
Impact Study
To aid in assessing the importance and potential

im~

pact of collective bargaining in Oregon, it is useful to
compare actual bargaining units with the number of possible
bargaining units.

Because there is no centralized bureau

in Oregon that calculates this information, and because
census data are usually two years out of date, and because
census data are based upon samples rather than a full count,
this study has provided estimates of penetration information.

The information sought is the potential numbers of

bargairiing units by level of government, considering functions at each level, and the percent of those potential
bargaining units that have been organized.

The percentage

is referred to as the percent or degree of penetration.
Some assumptions about the number of potential collective bargaining units in each type of governmental unit have
been made in order to calculate the degree of penetration.
These assumptions are based upon the practical knowledge of
experienced practitioners in Oregon labor relations and on
the population of each unit.

Furthermore, actual bargaining

unit data is based upon the most recent Oregon figures,
practitioners' estimates, and in some cases the 1976 Bureau
of Census report.
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Assumptions are made regarding the potential number of
bargaining units in state, county, city, school district,
IED, community college, and higher education, based on functions in each of these government, units.
1.

The state has an actual 83 bargaining units with a po-

tential of 108 units.
2.

Counties are categorized by population size into three

groups and have potential units as follows:
Counties
under 50,000

2 units (e.g. sheriff and all
other)

over

4 units minimum and 5 units
maximum (e.g. sheriff, nurses,
parks, roads, clerical, and
health)

50,000

Within SMSA's

3.

Number of Bargaining Units

5 units minimum and 7 units
maximum (e.g. sheriff, parks,
roads, clerical, health, corrections, and court employees)

Cities are categorized by population and have potential

units as follows:
Cities

Number of Bargaining Units

under 1,500

zero units

1,500-2,500

1 unit

2,500-10,000

2 units (fire and police)

10,000-50,000

4 units minimum and 5 units
maximum (e.g. fire, police,
parks, roads, and clerical)

Salem (83,170)

4 units minimum and 6 units
maximum (e.g. fire, police,
parks, roads, and clerical)
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Cities

4.

Number of Bargaining Units

Eugene (100,450)

4 units minimum {e.g. fire,
police, parks, roads and
clerical}

Portland (384,500)

12 units (actual)

School Districts are categorized by Average Daily

Membership (ADM):
Districts

5.

Number of Bargaining Units

ADM under 9,000

2 units (faculty and staff)

ADM over 9,000

2 units minimum and 3 units
maximum (e.g. faculty, staff
and patrol)

Portland

has an actual of 4 units with
a potential of 6.

Intermediate Education Districts (lED) are categorized

by the population of the counties in which they are located:
Districts
In counties under
50,000

1 unit

In counties over
50,000

2 units

Within SMSA's

6.

Number of Bargaining Units

2 units minimum and 3 units
maximum

Community Colleges have a potential of two units

{faculty and staff}.
7.

Higher Education (which is included in the state

figures) has a minimum and maximum of two units per campus
(faculty and staff) in the state colleges, and a maximum of
five units per campus in the universities (e.g. faculty,
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staff, graduate students, supervisors, and other miscellaneous groups such as T.V. operators, guards or nurses).
8.

Special Districts are categorized by the population of

the area in which they exist.
Within SMSA's

1 unit minimum and 2 units
maximum.
(This is conservative as some have much more
than that. e.g., Port of
Portland negotiates 8 contracts)

All others

1 unit

Data Sources
The categories and numbers of each type of government
are taken from a computer printout from the Department of
State dated 11/03/75.
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Population categories were deter-

mined by use of the July 1, 1977, Population Estimates of
Counties and Incorporated Cities of Oregon, published by
the Center for Population Research and Census, Portland
State University, Portland, Oregon.
Actual .unit estimates reflect the most recent data and
estimates from agencies and labor relation practitioners in
Oregon.

Where this is unavailable, the most recent U. S.

Bureau of Census estimates are used.
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The Results
The aggregate data generaged from these assumptions are
reflected in Table XV.

This table compares the potential

number of bargaining units with the actual number of units
by the type of government and population.

The last column

TABLE XV
ACTUAL AND POSSIBLE BARGAINING UNITS BY TYPE OF GOVERNMENT, BY POPULATION IN OREGON

~LP~C>f

Number
in
Category
__Gc-"e_rn:nent

I

_~19 ~l_u~i ~s

State Total
(includ~ng

Possible Individual Units
Least
I Most
!
Possible
Total
Possible
Total
ndividual
Least
Individual
Most
_____
ts
Possible

I

Po_ss).b~eE~ni

Actual
Units

I

Estimated
Percent Penetration

197B

Highest
Penetration

Least
Penetration

1

85

B5

lOB

lOB

B3

98%

77%

36
23
7
5
1

lOB
46
2B
25
9

65%

56%

2
5
7
9

125
46
35
35
9

70

2
4
5
9

253
0
37
92
104
4
4
12

2B3
0
37
92
130
6
6
12

116

46%

41%

0
1
2
5
6
6
12

734

700

97\

95%

higher

education)
Counties Total
Und"r.50,OOO
Over 50,000
Within SMSA
Multnomah
City Total
under 1,500
2,500
1,500 2,500 - 10,000
10,000 - 50,000
Salem (B3,170)
Eugen<:> (loa, 450)
Portland (384,500)

239
127
37
46
26
1
1
1

Education Total
(PS + lED)

369

Public Schools
ADM under 9,000
ADM over 9, 000
Portland
UD

In co. ur.der

50,OGO
In co. over
50,000
Within SMSA
Conrnunity College
Higher Education
(Counted in State)
Special Districts
Total
Within SMSA's
All Others
Port of Portland

340
333
6

0

1

2
4
4
4
12

721

2
2
4

29

6B2
666
12
4

2
3
6

39

690
666
18
6
44

19

1

19

1

19

5
5

2
2

10
10

2
3

10
15

13

2

26

2

26

26

100%

100%

B

2

16

3

24

15

94%

63%

930
201
728
1

937
201
728
8

10i

8%

2
1
1

l,13B
402
728
8

93

1
1
8

All State and Local
Government Total 1,596

-...J

0\

2,141

2,348

1,103
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shows the percentage of penetration.

The table shows the

minimum number of individual public employees bargaining
units at the state and local level to be about 2,100, with
a conservative maximum figure of about 2,400.
The education sector has the highest percent of penetration by collective bargaining units.

Specifically, pub-

lic schools have between 95 percent and 97 percent of the
potential bargaining units already bargaining; community
colleges are 100 percent penetrated, and higher education
at least 62 percent penetrated, and possibly as high as 94
percent penetrated.

With the exception of higher education,

there is little if any room for collective bargaining growth
in Oregon's education sector.

This level of organization

may be due to several factors, including the national power
of the NEA, decline in enrollment, and the long experience
with meet-and-confer laws that stimulated school districts
bargaining years before the other sectors.
The state is second highest with at least 77 percent
and possibly 97 percent penetration.

This is due to the

1965 law that encouraged collective bargaining at the state
level.
Counties have the third highest rate of collective bargaining, with a minimum of 56 percent and a maximum of 70
percent of the potential bargaining units already in existence.

It is expected that when, and if, the Oregon Supreme

Court makes a definite ruling in favor of the constitutionality of the 1973 state law, that county penetration will
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increase very rapidly.
and population is

~ot

Although data relating penetration
available, it is theorized that the

more populous counties (such as Multnomah, Washington and
Clackamas) presently are organized to a higher degree than
the less populous counties, thus future increases in organization and collective bargaining would most likely take
place in counties that are not presently within a Standard
Metropolitan Service Area (SMSA).
Cities are between 41 percent and 46 percent penetrated.

This is most likely due to the impact of the horne rule

issue.

It is expected that once this issue is resolved,

a very rapid increase in organization and bargaining units
will take place at the city level.

It might be further the-

orized that because the cities have resisted complying with
the law that it is within the city sector that many future
labor relations problems may exist.
Table XV shows that special districts have the least
amount of penetration by bargaining units, with about 10
percent.

Because many are so small, and diverse, it is

expected that special districts will remain relatively the
least organized, even when substantial growth is considered.
Implications
The amount of resources needed by public employers in
Oregon to engage iri collective bargaining, and all its aspects, is substantial (especially considering the costs of
negotiation and impasse resolution).

When one considers
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the changes in management techniques necessary, along with
budgetary aspects, one can appreciate the concern over the
effectiveness of Oregon's collective bargaining law and the
vast changes it is bringing about.
Of particular concern to Oregon, as with the rest of
the nation, is the effectiveness of the impasse resolution
procedure as away to avoid public sector strikes.

The next

chapter will deal with the theoretical aspects of impasse
resolu·tion so that Oregon's impasse procedure may be placed
in a theoretical or philosophical context.
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CHAPTER IV
THE GENERAL NATURE AND THEORETICAL BASIS OF
IMPASSE RESOLUTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
This chapter will investigate the purpose, theory, and
nature of impasse resolution.

The three basic types of im-

passe resolution -- mediation, fact-finding, and interest
arbitration -- will be covered, along with a brief discussion on various combinations and hybrid forms of the three.
However, the emphasis will be placed on fact-finding -- the
central topic of this dissertation.
The Purpose
Impasse is defined as:

"A situation in collective bar-

gaining which occurs when the employer and the union, both
negotiating in good faith, fail to reach agreement."

1

In

the private sector such disputes, or impasses, have traditicnally been resolved through use of mediation services or
by the exercise of economic power in the market place, with
the unions' ultimate weapon being the strike and the employers' the lockout.
Because of its negative impact on the public interest,
use of the strike has almost universally been deemed inappropriate in the public sector.

The challenge has then been

to develop procedures that will facilitate reaching a settlement of an impasse, within the framework of voluntary

84

collective bargaining between public employers and employees.

2

Impasse resolution procedures, then, are designed to

encourage the resumption of good faith bargaining and progressively introduce a higher level of intervention by some
neutral third party.3

Legislators considering impasse reso-

lution are advised by Roy Wesley not to "make impasse resolution machinery too attractive, available and unrisky or
the parties will give up on the hard work of bargaining and
turn their dispute to others. ,,4

His statement reflects our

nation's commitment to free collective bargaining as a vehicle operating within a framework of law for the parties
to resolve their problems voluntarily, rather than to submit to government imposed settlements.
In short, impasse resolution procedures have been developed as political substitutes for the strike, with the
intention of protecting government functions from serious
disruption and at the same time granting public employees
similar labor rights guaranteed private sector employees
under the Taft-Hartley Act.
Before discussing the modes of impasse resolution, it
must be emphasized that even under the best of conditions
impasse procedures will not always work and that the public
must accept the fact that some public sector strikes will
occur.

Recent United States experience has shown that out-

lawing public sector strikes has not prevented them.

This

suggests that the strike should be ullowed as a tool of
last resort after all alternatives have been fully explored.

5
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The three basic forms of public sector impasse resolution are mediation, fact-finding, and interest arbitration.
These terms are defined below:
Mediation, often referred to as conciliation,
"mean[s] the use of a neutral third party(s) as
intermediary to assist in the resolution of a
dispute without the authority to impose a
~ettlement."6

Fact-finding, "involves the appointment of a respected, neutral third party who is chosen to
study the facts underlying a dispute and to issue
a report with specific recommendations for a fair
settlement. "7
Interest arbitration occurs when a neutral third
party adjudicates over the terms and conditions
of employment and where the decision is binding on
both the contending parties. 8
These strike substitutes, or alternatives, take a variety of
forms which reflect the level of government, state laws, and
the controversy over which form and/or combination of forms
is the most viable method of impasse resolution.

9

IMPASSE RESOLUTION LAW
Federal Sector impasse resolution procedures, which
cover employees of the Executive Branch (excluding postal
employees), are set forth in Section 16 and 17 of E.O.
11491.

10

Section 16 charges the Federal Mediation Service

(FMCS) to "provide services and assistance . .
resolution of negotiation disputes .

.

. in the

. and under what cir-

cumstances and in what manner it shall offer services."
These services include preventive mediation (assistance by
a neutral third party prior to impasse) and mediation.
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Section 17 provides further procedures if mediation fails.
In this case the Federal Service Impasse Panel (FSIP), may
at the request of either party or on its own initiative,
consider the matter, and may determine that fact-finding or
arbitration is necessary as a final step.

Federal employees

are prohibited from striking by section 19 of the same act.
In the case of fact-finding,

the FSIP makes recommen-

dations based upon the fact-finders' report; and if the
parties do not accept their recommendations or settle within thirty days, the FSIP can require binding arbitration.

ll

Because the parties do not know in advance exactly what
mechanism the FSIP will recommend, the parties are encouraged to continue to bargain rather than to rely on a third
d"lspute. 12
"
party to reso 1 ve t h elr

The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 allows postal
employee unions and the federal government to adopt their
own procedures for impasse resolution; however, if such
procedures are not established or are ineffective, the FMCS
will establish a tripartite fact-finding panel that reports
findings with or without recommendations.

If no agreement

is reached after fact-finding and the parties have not decided upon arbitration, a tripartite arbitration board will
" d"lng d eC1Slon.
""
13
ren d er a b ln
Anthony V. Sinicropi and Thomas P. Gilroy summarize
federal level impasse resolution by stating that:
. . . E. O. 11491 and the Postal Reorganization Act,
stress the use of voluntary arrangements by the
parties supported by the use of mediation, fact-
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finding and arbitration where voluntary arrangements fail.
The postal procedures rely heavily
upon the "outside neutral" while the Executive
Order includes the use of a permanent impasse
~tructure through the use of the FSIP and the
FLRC.1 4
State legislation dealing with impasse resolution, as
mentioned before, reflects a wide diversity of institutional
arrangements.

A Department of Labor Publication reported in

1972 that:
. at least thirty-four states had enacted legislation with interest dispute procedures in
public employment . . .
[They] range in employee coverage from one specific occupational
group, such as teachers to statutes with comprehensive coverage . . . . At least twenty-five
states provided in some way for mediation of negotiation disputes . . . . The provisions for
mediation differ among and within states with
respect to how the procedure is initiated, who
provides the service, the use of one mediator
or a panel, the relationship of mediation to
other impasse procedures, and provisions for
payment of costs . . • . At least twenty-three
states authorize the use of fact-finding~ . . .
As with mediation, there is considerable variation in the relationship of fact-finding to
other procedures within states . . . . Twentythree states had legislation authorizing voluntary or compulsory arbitration for the resolution. of some or all outstanding issues in
certain public sector disputes . . . . Eleven
states • . . provided for compulsory arbitration of certain interest disputes. lS
Appendix D summarizes the type of state interest disputeprocedures provided by various state laws.
The diversity of state impasse procedures is reflected
in the differences between

th~

three West Coast states.

Oregon law provides a uniform impasse procedure that requires mediation, fact-finding, and a cooling-off period;
these are followed by compulsory interest arbitration for
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the protective services and strike for all other public em16
ployees.
The state of Washington has an extremely fragmented
legal framework for public sector collective bargaining.
The impasse procedures vary greatly among the eight laws
that cover different categories of public employees.

The

Washington State Public Employment Relations Commission
(PERC) does not administer all of the laws. 17

For example,

non-uniformed personnel in cities, counties, and special
districts are required to use PERC mediation, while uniformed personnel (police and fire)

are required to use

mediation, and may invoke a fact-finding panel, and may
invoke interest arbitration.
granted.

18

The right to strike is not

State community colleges may use PERC mediation

and fact-finding services upon consent of both parties.
·
Th ere lS
no re f erence to a strl. k e po 1·lCy. 19

In t h e

Washington State Ferries System either party may invoke
PERK final and binding arbitration,20 while there is no reference to impasse· procedure covering state civil service
.

.

employees.

21

In short, in the State of Washington collec-

tive bargaining laws and impasse procedures differ according to governmental levels and function.
California, like Washington, does not grant the right
to strike to public employees, and the impasse procedure
varies with the type of government.

22

For example, parties

involved in municipal disputes may appoint a mutually agreeable mediator,23 while teachers are required to use the
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state mediation and fact-finding services.

24

In California

disputes involving state employees are covered by a Governor's Executive Order.

The governor's representatives issue

a written report on differences between the parties and this
report is made public.

25

This brief overview of the Oregon, Washington, and
California approaches to impasse resolution serves to demonstrate that states are experimenting with wide varieties of
types and combinations of impasse resolution.

These exper-

iments are based upon particular characteristics that 'each
type is purported to possess.
CHARACTERISTICS OF IMPASSE RESOLUTION
Mediation
Mediation, which is also used extensively in the private sector, is the most non-controversial and acceptable
form of impasse resolution procedure because it is compatible with voluntarism.

It is at the mediation stage of im-

passe resolution that most disputes are resolved.

26

The

mediator serves as a go-between who "has no power of compulsion but only of

persuasion~

and therefore aids parties

in reaching their own compromises through the collective
..
'27
b argalnlng process.

In order to fulfill this role, the mediator meets with
both sides, jointly or separately, in order to assess the
issues, explore possible compromise, and advise the parties
on how to sell proposals to their constituents.

Roy Wesley
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states that "He [The mediator] is not concerned with fairness or justice of the solution.

His objective is to reach

one, period.,,28
In order to accomplish this goal, a mediator must have
the confidence of the parties.
upon a

m~diator's

neutrality.

Their confidence is based

ability to assume a posture of complete

Robert G. Howlett, when discussing the role of

the mediator, concluded:
A mediator did not force anyone to do anything.
He shared, but never betrayed confidences. Like a
closed-mouth mistress, he eased frustrations; and
like the experienced lady of the brothel, did not
need the passion of an advocate. 29
Mediation, however, is not always successful for two
reasons.

The first involves the shortage of competent med-

iators, the second the parties' attitudes.
Arnold Zack attributes the shortage of competent mediators to the lack of familiarity of public sector problems by
private sector mediators.

The shortage is aggrevated by the

cyclical pattern of public sector bargaining, which results
in many negotiations reaching impasse in the same state at
thE: same time.

30

Such shortages of competent mediators may

leave the parties in a position where a mediator is not
available, or worse yet, where the mediator causes more
problems than he helps solve.
The second problem is summarized by William Bo' Gould,
who states that "mediation cannot achieve anything if the
parties refuse to budge from their respective positions.
The best of mediators cannot unsnarl recalcitrant parties
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and untractable issues."31
There are several alleged reasons for such extreme
positions.

First, the uniqueness of the public sector gives

both employer and employee more staying power than in the
private sector.-

Second, because collective bargaining is

relatively new to the public sector, both parties may be
inexperienced and naive about the process; and in the employers' case, even hostile toward collective negotiations
with the employees over whom the public employer previously
has had unilateral control.

32

Third, both parties may be

encouraged to hold back settlement in hopes that factfinding or arbitration will bring a more favorable settlement.

33
When the mediator is unable to persuade the parties to

reach a settlement, he may recommend or invoke fact-finding
or another procedure (depending on the local or state law).
Fact-Finding
Like mediation, fact-finding, is an extension of
the consultation process since it keeps open the
possibility for voluntary settlement between the
parties. However, the process goes beyond mediation and involves formal recommendations. The
recommendations are not binding on the parties,
but are designed to serve as the basis for further
consultation and agreement. 34
The process of fact-finding has received much attention
and has been the recipient of much controversy, in part because there has not been extensive experience with it in
the private sector, and because only recently has it had
heavy use and evaluation in the public sector. 35

Although
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this heavy use is recent, fact-finding did not originate
with the public sector in the 1960's.

Jacob Finkelman

states that "fact-finding became part of the labor-management process in Canada as long ago as 1907.,,36

In the U. S.,

present fact-finding procedures are derived from the Emergency Board procedures that cover the private sector under
the Railway Labor Acts of 1926 and Taft-Hartley Act of
1947.

37

Presently some thirty states require fact-finding

in one form or another. 38
The theory behind the fact-finding process is that of
the issuance of findings and recommendations along with public pressure will force the parties to drop extreme positions and to settle voluntarily.

George Hilderbrand views

fact-finding as a very effective mechanism because the hearing provides a public forum to discuss the issues and air
differences, and the recommendations serve as a guide to the
parties and as an information source to the public, who may
influence governmental leaders toward rational decision
.
39
rna k l.ng.

However, fact-finding may occur under several different
circumstances that yeild different results.

One circum-

stance is fact-finding without .recommendation, another circumstance is fact-finding with recommendations.
occur before or after an impasse.

40

Each may

These different cir-

cumstances relegate the fact-finding process to the nebulous
category of "neither fish nor fowl."

On the one hand,

fact-finding may more resemble mediation if the hearings
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are informal, the fact-finder engages in mediation as well
as finding facts, and especially if no recommendations are
issued.

41

On the other hand, it may more resemble arbitra-

tion if the hearings are formal or quasi-judicial, mediation
is absent, and recommendations are issued.

42

William B.

Gould states that "the fact-finding process necessarily partakes of both the mediatory and judicial disciplines .
The process is a fluid one about which drawing of hard and
fast lines is still an audacious act.,,43
Because of this fluidity, there is much controversy
about what fact-finding is and ought to be, and what it does
and does not accomplish.

The issues involved in this con-

troversy will now be discussed.
Structural and Process Issues in Fact-Finding
Recommendations or Facts.

This issue refers to the

concept that the word "fact-finder," in its purest sense,
would limit the fact-finders' role to finding and publishing
the facts.

The reasoning is that once the fact-finder makes

recommendations, his role shifts from that of a finder-offacts to one of interpreting facts and exercising value
judgements.

44

Because of this shift in role, it has been

suggested that fact-finding involving recommendations be
called "advisory" arbitration (because judgement is involved
and recommendations are not binding) .
Be that as it may, it is generally accepted that factfinding without recommendations (in an impasse situation) in
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both the private and public sectors is not likely to be very
successful.

This is because the establishment of facts does

not necessarily provide a basis for compromise between the
parties, and the publication of facts may not be of much
interest to the public, given the complexity of most labor
'
45
d lsputes.

Fact-Finding Without Recommendations.

There are, how-

ever, circumstances where fact-finding without recommendations may prove to be very useful.

One circumstance would

be in a situation where a neutral party would be appointed
well in advance of negotiations to develop factual background. for use by the bargainers.

Fact-finding in this case

is seen as potentially very useful because as the scope of
bargaining expands and the issues become more complicated
and technical, competent experts are needed in whom both the
' h ave con f'd
partles
1 ence. 46

Another such circumstance would be fact-finding without recommendation on issues, but with procedural directions.

This would be useful to aid parties, in light of the

facts, in getting back on the road to negotiations by rEvis'h
lng
t e structure

0

f

b argalnlng.
"
47

In cases that involve impasse, however, Robert G.
Howlett reflects the general feeling in his now often quoted
statement that "fact-finding without recommendations is
about as useful as a martini without gin.,,48
Fact-Finding with Recommendations.

The rationale behind

fact-finding with recommendations involves three principles.
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First, the impact of public opinion, whether real or potential, is more likely to be brought to bear upon the parties
after a respected neutral makes recommendations for a "fair'
settlement.

Because neither party desires public hostility,

rejection of such a report may invite criticism from newspapers and other sources; thus the parties feel a push behind the fact-finder's recommendations.

49

Whether this is

realistic will be discussed later.
Second, the fact-finders' recommendations allow parties
who have taken extreme positions to back down without losing
face.

In this case the fact-finder collects his fees, leaves

his report, and becomes (in the words of practitioners) a
"scape goat" or "per deim fall guy."

This role occurs when

the negotiators explain to their constituents that the factfinder recommended something other than their bargaining
position; the parties, then, may appeal to their constituents (the public and union members) that it would appear to
be unreasonable if the fact-finders' report is rejected; and
thus both sides are able to compromise without losing face.

50

Third, the fact-finders' recommendations can be equitable and innovative enough to gain support by both parties,
thus ending the impasse without the use of the strike.

51

From this stem two other major issues involving the factfinders' actions and the type of recommendations the factfinder makes.
Adjudication or Mediation.
expressed by the question:

This issue may be simply

"Ought the fact-finder to engage
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in mediation during the fact-finding process?"
Robert Howlett is convinced that if there has been effective mediation, the role of the fact-finder should be
primarily judicial because mediation efforts by fact-finders
have the following negative impacts:
(1)
It destroys the confidential nature of mediation; (2) some qualified fact-finders (arbitrators),
who have no collective bargaining experience, are
not skilled in mediation; and (3) our mediators felt,
quite properly, that mediation by an ad hoc mediator
after a staff mediator had completed his work carried
an implication that the staff mediator had not performed his job . . . .
The debate over whether to combine mediation and
fact-finding appears to arise principally from those
jurisdictions that do not have an established, competent mediation staff . . . . 52
Harold P. Seamon also supports the view that factfinders should generally not engage in mediation.

However,

he would allow the fact-finder to encourage the parties to
resume negotiations (and even recess the hearing for that
purpose) if the fact-finder senses that the parties may be
able to settle certain issues by themselves.

53

There are, however, some who think fact-finders should
and, indeed, have to mediate.

William Simkin states "Where

fact-finding has been successful, I would suggest, but cannot
prove, that the fact-finder has mediated -- deliberately, instinctively, or surreptitiously.,,54

James C. Hill in refer-

ence to contract disputes, supports Simkin by saying:
. . . . [fact-finding] is essentially an extension of
the mediatory process, in which the fact-finder
seeks to fashion a recommendation which is acceptable to the parties, or at least within the area
of their expectations. 55
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In discussing the Michigan experience with fact-finding,
Bejamin W. Wolkinson and Jack Stieber report the parties
were generally opposed to fact-finder mediation and

conclud~

that unless the parties request mediation or mutually agree
that further mediation would be useful, fact-finders should
°
56
aVOl°d me dOlatlon.

In the process of attempting to conclude this debate,
Robert J. Jossen found that most states' statutory language
did not provide a clear indication as to the nature of factfinding, and that just because most fact-finding reports are
written in the form of an adjudication procedure, one should
not assume that

m~diation

was not involved.

Jossen also

found that the role of the fact-finder varies depending upon
a number of variables, including the fact-finder's background, bias, and perception of what his role ought to be.

57

Jean T. McKelvey, concurring with this view, further suggests that lilt [fact-finding] may often be a mixture of both
[adjudication and mediation] with a large infusion of political and strategic considerations. lisa
It is apparent that this disagreement among experts as
to whether fact-finding ought to be adjudication, mediation,
or both, depends upon the states' law, socio-economic structure, quality of mediation service, and the fact-finders'
own philosophies.

However, few would take the position that

mediation is always inappropriate.

Therefore, the general

view is within a range of degree with respect to the encouragement of mediation occurring during fact-finding.
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Recommendations:

Just or Acceptable.

This issue re-

fers to the nature of the fact-finders' recommendations.
Some

~rgue

that the recommendations should stress justice;

that is, reflect what is fair and equitable rather than what
.
lS

. I e. 59
accep t aD

James C. Hill questions the three basic assumptions
behind the theory of judicial fact-finding.

First, he is

unsure whether public pressure is significant once the facts
are known; second, he questions whether there are standard
criteria that can be used to determine wages and other conditions of employment; and third, in new contract conditions, a fact-finder (like an arbitrator), for pragmatic
reasons, must seek a solution which is acceptable.

60

Arnold Zack avoids the argument by equating acceptability and public interest, and by placing community responsibility on the parties, not the fact-finder.

He sums up his

view when he states "If both agree to a settlement, it must
be concluded that community responsibility has, been met.,,61
Because

t~e

fact-finders' role is to bring the parties

together voluntarily in order to avoid strike, others put
great emphasis on the fact-finders' report reflecting acceptability.

Donald H. Wollett bluntly states that "The

fact-finders are not expected to dispense justice; they are
expected to arrange peace.,,62
Practically speaking, a fact-finder in this position
must consider the relative bargaining power of each party
and make recommendations accordingly.

Because of this,
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some experts, such as Robert E. Doherty, fear that "a fair
settlement has corne to mean that sort of bargain one has the
power to secure, ,,63 rather than one reflecting a sta.ndard 0'::
fairness and the public interest.
The moderate view, as expressed by Harold Seamon,
recognizes a need for balance between what is just and
acceptable.

64

This view is supported and summarized by Tim

Bornstein when he says "This is not to say that the factfinder should make recommendations based solely on what he
senses the parties will take, but it is to say that he must
be conscious of his role."65
It becomes apparent that the acceptability vs. justice
issue also reflects a wide range of opinion; and perhaps one
might conclude, as Gould did in a previous quote, that it
would be audacious to draw hard and fast lines.

There is,

however, an issue that is not surrounded by as much vagueness, and which is at the core of the usefulness of factfinding.

That issue is the impact which fact-finding has

on negotiation and mediation.
Undermining Negotiations and Mediation.

This issue

refers to the possibility that the parties may assume and
maintain extreme positions during negotiations and mediation
in anticipation that the fact-finders' recommendations will
bring them to a compromise near their perceived last offer.
The results of such action is an erosion of the collective
bargaining process and an undermining of mediation efforts.
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William Simkin likens fact-finding to a "one-play ball
game," where "with adequate tenacity and ability, some play
will succeed.,,66

Jean McKelvey's concern, in reference to

the Railway Labor Act, is that "fact-finding may become an
addictive habit,

[that is], the first and not the final

step in collective negotiations.,,67

Arnold Zack concurs

with this concern when he states "Fact-finding has, in fact,
come to be accepted as yet another appeal beyond media'
,,68
t 1.on.

However, others claim it may not harm negotiations or
mediation because parties are aware fact-finding can yield
inexact and unpredictable recommendations, and that they are
therefore encouraged to settle themselves.

69

It is known

that some mediators use this argument as a threat to parties in order to pressure a settlement in mediation.
Krinsky found in a Wisconsin study that inti tal use of factfinding improved the bargaining relationship by contributing to the education of the parties.

This is because the

report provided them with a neutral perspective of what was
a reasonable solution, and the experience made them understand that they should be able to reach the same point as
the fact-finders' recommendation through negotiations, thus
avoiding the time and monetary costs involved in the fact' d'1.ng process. 70
f 1.n

Other studies show conflicting conclusions.

For ex-

ample, Wolkinson and Stieber concluded in their Michigan
study that "Evidence suggests that the bargaining posture
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[hold-back] is not widely maintained, "71 while Yaffe and
Goldblatt reported in their New York study that "Parties
'wait' for fact-finding ann 'hold-back.,"72

Tim Bornstein

supports this view and further suggests that unions are perhaps more prone to rely too heavily on fact-finding than
employers; he states "because unions normally cannot strike,
they sometimes reason that they have everything to gain and
nothing to lose by going to fact-finding."73
In an effort to encourage negotiations and make mediation more attractive, Arnold Zack proposes several suggestions that are intended to make fact-finding less accessible and more final.

These suggestions are:

parties pay for the cost of fact-finding,

(1) that

(2) that fact-

finders not have access to mediation information in order
to make their findings less predictable and not to undermine the confidentiality of the mediator,

(3) that unfair

labor practice penalties be imposed on those who do not
negotiate in good faith, and (4) that the fact-finder assume
an adjudicatory role so parties cannot expect a "split of
the differences."

Zack further emphasizes that improvement

of the fact-finding step, rather than extensions of the process such as super-mediation, is desirable in order to make
fact-finding the final step in the process and short of a
legal or illegal strike.

74

However, even with these re-

forms, there are questions as to whether fact-finding can
work well, given the lack of public pressure.
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Public Pressure.

This issue reflects concern over

whether the publication of fact-finding recommendations does
in fact marshall public opinion to the extent that the parties feel pressured into accepting the fact-finders' report.
William Word reports that in the case of New York and
Wisconsin, public opinion did not seem to be very influential,75 and Donald W. Wollett bluntly says that it is "a
romantic delusion" to think the public will comprehend and
respond constructively to a fact-finders' recommendation.

76

The lack of public interest and pressure may be due in part
to the fact that the reports are not readily available, nor,
at times, understandable to the general public.

77

Allan W.

Drachman further suggests that even if the public is interested, "public opinion has very little impact if either
the municipal employer or the union is in a weak bargaining
position relative to the opposing party.,,78
Other Issues.
to fact-finding.

Several other issues arise with respect
Time is another doubled edged sword.

On

the one side, if too much time lapses between the request
for the hearing and when it actually takes place, the union
may become more prone to strike, or the budget submission
f urt h er 1n
' fl eXl' b 1' l'1 t y. 79
d ate may pass, causlng

0 n the o th er

side, this time-lapse gives both parties the opportunity to
reassess their positions and to let their emotions calm.
Even the question of whether fact-finding should be
conducted by a tripartite panel or a single individual stirs
debate.

Jerry Wurf states thcLt a tripartite panel consisting
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of one labor, one management, and one public representative,
"provides for true neutrality.II

BC

On the other hand, it

may encourage a mediation approach rather than adjudication
approach, which might be less likely where there is only one
neutral.
The effectiveness of fact-finding is also questioned
even though there are studies which, utilizing systematic
investigation, indicate the effectiveness of fact-finding.
For example, Yaffe and Goldblat concluded that although imperfect as a strike substitute, fact-finding in New York
State offered "more promise than illusion as a mechanism to
facilitate the resolution of interest disputes in public
sector negotiations. IIBI

In their Michigan study Wolkinson

and Stieber stated that the process is a "viable mechanism
for dispute resolution that should be continued and
strengthened. ,,82
However, this evidence has not quelled the controversy
because of its impact on negotiation strategy and mediation
efforts.

Krinsky, in his Wisconsin study, does concur that

fact-finding was very effective in settling disputes and
avoiding strikes, but he seriously questions its ability to
accomplish "just" gains from the employee's standpoint.

B3

Again there exists a diversity of opinion as to the effectiveness of fact-finding,

just as there is on most issues

surrounding fact-finding.
One reason for this diversity of opinion is the difficulity in comparing fact-finding among states because of
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differences in state laws, impasse procedures, socioeconomic structures, and administrative philosophies.
Another reason is the shortage of systematic investigation
and analysis of the process.

Thus, more research and ex-

perience is needed before most experts would be willillg to
fully endorse the fact-finding process.
In fact, there are other alternatives that are thought
to be a superior last step in public employee impasse resolution.

One of these, of course, is the strike,

(which

only a few states allow), the other processes are various
forms of interest arbitration.
Interest Arbitration
Interest arbitration has become quite widespread as the
last step in impasse resolution.

Although it may take two

forms, voluntary and compulsory, it is the compulsory form
that is utilized most often in the public sector.

This is

especially true for the essential services, such as police
and fire, where the public health and safety is paramount.
Arbitration usually occurs after efforts at mediation
and perhaps fact-finding have been exhausted.

Unlike fact-

finding, arbitration is clearly a process of adjudication,
not compromise. 84

In the case of compulsory binding arbi-

tration, the parties, after exhausting other impasse procedures, are required by law to submit their case to a neutral
for a binding decision.

lOS
Frank and Edna Elkouri cite three basic arguments in
favor of compulsory arbitration.

First, it protects citi-

zens from a strike which may endanger the health and safety
of the general public.

Second, it substitutes judicial pro-

cedures that consider the merits of a case in place of the
IIjungle warfare ll of power politics and the strike.

Third,

at times it is necessary to balance power between employer
and employee where strike is prohibited.

8S

The arguments against compulsory arbitration are fourfold.

First, it undermines good-faith bargaining because a

weaker party may have little to gain from bargaining;
furthermore, as Merton Berstein suggests, IIsince arbitrators
may treat the best disclosed offers as the permissible limits of the award, it pays for each side not to disclose how
far it is really willing to go on each issue. 1I86

However,

a counter argument is that some parties are finding that
the arbitrator's decision may not result in as positive resuIts as collective bargaining, and the possibility exists
that on non-economic issues, the arbitrator may present a
solution that is administratively unpalatable; thus the
parties are encouraged to bargain in good faith.

It is

Howlett's opinion that the U. S. experience (although not
extensive) does not reflect the pessimistic view about ar,
,
k'
,,87
b 1trat1on wea en1ng negot1at1ons.

Second, compulsory arbitration may involve an unconstitutional delegation of legislated power, as wage decisions
and resource allocations involve public policy.

Put more
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simply:

"elected officials should not delegate the duty

they owe the electorate to settle these questions."aa

This

view centers on the sovereignty of the state argument that
has been discussed in detail in the chapter regarding collective bargaining in the public sector.
Third, it is argued that arbitration decisions may have
enforcement problems, thus "divulging the impotence of government."a9

Because most arbitration decisions are accept-

able, this is not generally a problem; but "illegal strikes
have been known to occur in the event of unfavorable arbitration awards.,,90
Fourth, some are concerned that it may lead to an
economy with administered prices which would threaten the
voluntary collective bargaining process, the free market,
·
.
91
an d enterprlse
system as we k now It.

This argument is

akin to that in economics where the use of wage and price
controls involve a trade off between "economic freedom" and
macro-economic stability.

In that case the pill is bitter,

but the disease worse.
Problems such as these lead Wellington and Winter to
conclude that "compulsory and binding arbitration is no
panacea either.,,92

George W. Taylor states "Neither com-

pulsory arbitration nor strikes are appropriate in public
employment relations" and stresses that we need to develop
new procedures to deal with the dilemma.

93

Many are in

agreement with Taylor, and innovative suggestions have
resulted.
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Innovations in Arbitration
Final-offer arbitration such as instituted in Michigan
and Eugene, Oregon, is one such innovation.

In this case,

the last best offer of each party is submitted to an arbitrator who chooses one or the other.

The thought is that

the parties will be encouraged to bargain in good faith; and
in the event of impasse, if they do not move closer together, the neutral's decision may go against the less
reasonalbe of the two.

94

Charles M. Rehmus reports that in

Michigan, final-offer arbitration for protective services is
actually an extention of mediation, because the law does not
require parties to submit their final offer until the conlcusion of the hearing.

However, he does not belittle the

process, because mediation during arbitration
. is a constructive alternative to the strike
or conventional arbitration . • . . i t helps the
public interest by promoting the peaceful settlement of impasse in crucial negotiations in the public sector by the parties themselves. 95
But this much flexibility may cause other problems.
Paul Sommers, in analyzing the Massachusetts system, states
that their form of final offer is too flexible, as i t includes fact-finding and allows parties to change positions
before conclusions of the final offer hearing; thus, the
parties have a tendency to "hold back" until the bitter end,
which undermines the negotiations process.

He further

states that arbitration hearings have turned into a show
cause hearing for not accepting the fact-finders' recommendations.

In order to make final offer more' effective he
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advocates dropping the fact-finding step, having only one
neutral, and prohibiting the arbitrator from mediating dur~ng
o

t h e h ear~ng. 96
0

Peter Fenille in another recent study compares Wisconsin, Michigan, Massachusetts, and Eugene, Oregon, data.
concludes that with final offer:

He

(1) parties increase their

use of them as they gain familiarity (as in other impasse
procedures),

(2) parties use the hearings as forums for con-

tinued negotiations, and (3) mediatory efforts by arbitrators resolve many cases.

To further encourage good faith

bargaining he suggests another form of final-offer arbitration.

This has often been referred to as mediation-

arbitration (med-arb) .97
Med-arb is a situation in which the neutral has a dual
role.

He is more than a "go between" because he has in re-

serve the authority of an arbitrator.

Sam and John Kagel

explain:
He, in effect becomes a party to the negotiations
in the sense that, while negotiating, each of the
contending parties must necessarily seek to convince him that their position is reasonable and
acceptable . . . .
Each party must face up to the
merits of the particular issue under disucssion,
because if either or both do not, the med-arbiter
will make the decision. The incentive is for both
parties to settle through negotiations g~ther than
have the med-arbiter make the decision.
Med-arb is being considered seriously because it places
emphasis on negotiations, utilizes proven mediation techniques, and avoids the unpopularity of compulsory arbitration or the economic disruption and illegality of strike.

109

other Innovative Proposals
Another proposed alternative to the strike is the combination of a "nonstoppage strike" and a "graduated strike."
Briefly, in the case of the nonstoppage strike, workers
would continue to work full-time but forego a portion of
their take home pay, which the employer matches (say 10 percent) and which is put into a fund (to be used later for
publicly desirable projects).

Periodically, the union may

choose to increase the percent involved, or the employer
may decide to switch to a graduated strike.

(1) it would attract

ized to have the following benefits:
attention without a ruinous strike,

This is theor-

(2) it imposes less

hardship on workers since their fringe benefits would not
be hampered as in a strike, and also there would be no loss
of jobs for an illegal strike, and (3) both parties would be
under "strike" pressure but not to their complete detriment.
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If the non-stoppage strike is not sufficient to induce
settlement, a graduated strike could.

Graduated strike is

work stoppage in which services are successively reduced in
stages, thereby steadily increasing pressure to force settlement.

In Bernstein's opinion, both the non-stoppage and

d urn. 100
gra d uate d str1ok e wou 1 d wor k b
estO
1n tan
Another proposal, made by Sam Zagoria, is the public
referendum.

In this case if either party rejects the fact-

finders' recommendation, the issue is put on the next
election ballot.

This would provide a terminal point

110
without strike; however, it may delay new terms and conditions, and it requires educational campaigns and thus exlOl
pense to both parties.
Given the recent "tax revolt,"
one can almost predict the outcome of such an election, in
spite of the needs of public employees.
Summary
Presently in the United States there is a search for
impasse resolution procedures that fulfill the two goals of
(1) preventing strikes in the public sector (legal or illegal) and (2) encouraging good-faith bargaining within
the the voluntary collective bargaining process as we know
it in this country.
The impasse resolution procedures most often used are
various combinations and forms of mediation, fact-finding,
and interest arbitration.

Exactly which procedure and which

combination is most effective is a matter of considerable
debate.

In order to improve impasse resolution processes,

various studies in various states have been, and are being,
generated to analyze these various procedures and their effectiveness.

This dissertation's particular contribution to

the research lies in analysis of the fact-finding phase of
Oregon's impasse resolution process.

To accomplish this,

the major controversial issues surrounding the fact-finding
process which were discussed in this chapter will be considered.

The issues are:

recommendations or facts, adjudi-

cation or mediation, undermining negotiations and mediation,

III

public pressure, time, and effectiveness.

The next chapter

deals with Oregon's impasse procedure and an analysis of it.
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CHAPTER V
OREGON'S IMPASSE PROCEDURE AND
AGGREGATE DATA ANALYSIS
Oregon's impasse resolution process (as summarized in
Figure 2 may be viewed as a filtering process where each
step in the process contributes significantly to ,the orderly
resolution of impasses, reduces the possibility of strike,
and encourages the parties to settle voluntarily.

Each step

introduces a higher level of intervention by the neutral
third party -- from suggestion to recommendation to public
pressure to final determination by a third party.
The procedure follows the sequence of mediation, factfinding, and a cooling-off period.

If these steps are un-

successful they may be followed by strike for public employees other than those in the protective services (police,
fire, and institutional guards) which go to compulsory arbitration.
The purpose of this chapter is to explain and analyze
Oregon's impasse resolution procedure, with particular emphasis being placed on the fact-finding phase.

An analysis

of aggregate data is presented in order to describe the characteristics and ascertain the effectiveness of the factfinding process in Oregon.

The impasse procedure is

explained phase by phase as follows.
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If parties jointly and voluntarily agree in advance to submit
any and all unresolved issues to final and binding arbitration
immediately upon declaring impasse, then the mediation and factfinding steps above may be skipped.
See HB2263, Sections· 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22
Figure 2.
Source:

IMPASSE PROCEDURES UNDER OREGON'S PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAW

Prisim III, Inc., Training Bulletin.

(1974), p. 12.
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Mediation
Mediation services are provided at no cost to the parties by the State Conciliation Service upon notification of
an impasse by one or both of the parties, or when the Employment Relations Board (ERB) deems it appropriate.

l

The State

Conciliation Service is a division of ERB, and is staffed by
full-time mediators.

2

If ERB mediation efforts are not successful after fifteen days of mediation, fact-finding may be initiated by
either of the parties or by the mediator if it is deemed
appropriate, and in the public interest. 3
The law specifically states that if the parties wish
they may at anytime voluntarily agree to submit any or all
issues, to final and binding arbitration.

In this case the

arbitration decision will supersede any mediation and/or
fact-finding procedures.

4

Fact-Finding
The fact-finding procedure may be viewed in terms of
the follwoing phases:

selection and scheduling, the hear-

ing, the report, and the parties' actions.
The Selection Phase.

The law allows parties to mutu-

ally agree upon a fact-finder within five days of the ERB
notification that fact-finding is to be initiated; otherwise
ERB submits a list of five qualified neutrals to the parties.
Each party then alternately strikes two names from the list,
with the remaining individual designated the fact-finder.
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In the cases where parties wish to have a panel of three
fact-finders the ERB submits a list of seven qualified neutrals, the parties alternately strike two names, with the
remaining individuals designated the fact-finders. 5
If in either case the parties do not notify the board
of their choice within five days of receipt of the list, the
ERB appoints a fact-finder(s}.

If only one party fails to

notify, the ERB appoints a fact-finder from the remaining
names on the list. 6
The State Conciliation Service regulations state that
a person may not serve as a fact-finder in a case where he
has any personal interest, however, the parties may waive
this disqualification in writing.

Also the neutral is re-

quired to "disclose any circumstances likely to create a
presumption of bias," and either party may disqualify him
or waive the presumptive disqualification.
Scheduling.

7

After the appointment, the fact-finder es-

tablishes the date, time, and location of the hearing.

The

parties must submit a written list of the issues to be submitted to fact-finding to the fact-finder at least seven
days prior to the hearing.
The Hearing.

The hearing is public, and like an arbi-

tration hearing, structured.

The role of the fact-finder is

expected to be quasi-judicial by both parties and the State
Conciliation Service, which discourages mediation efforts on
the part of the fact-finder.

8
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During the hearing the fact-finder may administer oaths
and provide all parties the opportunity to examine and cross
examine all witnesses and to present any evidence pertaining
'
9
to t h e d lspute.

Any exhibits introduced by a party are

filed with the fact-finder and a copy provided to the other
party.
The Fact-Finders' Report.

The report consists of writ-

ten findings of fact and recommendations on all issues submitted.

It is to be served within thirty days from the con-

clusion of the hearings.

The report is delivered personally

or by registered mail to the parties and the ERB.

IO

The criteria of judgment used by fact-finders, although
not specified in the law, are set forth in the rules of the
State Conciliation Service to be the same as those required
by arbitrators by the law.

These criteria include:

the

ability to pay of the governmental unit; wages, hours and
conditions of employment in comparative units; the consumer
price index; and fringe benefits.
The Parties' Actions.

ll

Acceptance of the report by the

parties terminates the dispute.

Acceptance is interpreted

to mean acceptance of the recommendations on all issues
submitted.
If the fact-finders' report has not been accepted by
both parties within five working days after the parties receive the report and one or both reject the report, the ERB
publicizes the report.

However, if the parties agree to

submit the impasse to final binding arbitration, or agree
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on settlement within those five days, the ERB will not pub12
licize the report.
Publication consists of releasing the
report to the wire services rather than the home town
newspaper.
In summary, fact-finding in Oregon is a mandatory process with the parties equally bearing the cost of the factfinder.

The parties may select or be involved in the selec-

tion of the fact-finder.

The process is quasi-judicial, and

requires specific criteria of judgment to be utilized in the
findings and report.

However, fact-finding is not the final

step in Oregon's impasse resolution process.
Cooling-Off Period.

When a fact-finding report is re-

jected the cooling-off period begins.

This is the 30 day

interim after fact-finding and before strike can be initiated.

During this time it is not unusual for the Concilia-

tion Service to engage in super-mediation efforts to help
avoid a strike.

Usually the mediator is the same one in-

volved at the first step of mediation.
Strike
The strike is the final stage in Oregon's impasse resolution process (except for the protective services).

In

order to strike the mediation and fact-finding processes
must have been exhausted; the thirty day cooling-off period
must have passed; and an intent to strike notice submitted
'
t en d ays pr10r
' t0 th e s t r1'k e. 13
b y th e un10n

12S
Injunctive relief may be granted by the local circuit
court upon petition by the employer, if the potential strike
"creates a clear and present danger or threat to the health,
safety, or welfare of the public. ,,14

In this circumstance

the dispute is submitted to final binding arbitration.
Binding Interest Arbitration
Binding interest arbitration is the final step for the
protective services and in the case of a court injunction
against a strike.

This phase may be utilized only after

mediation and fact-finding efforts have been exhausted.
Selection of the arbitrator is similar to that in factfinding, where the parties may select their own or strike
names from a list provided by ERB.

IS

The arbitrator, upon selection, establishes dates,
times and location of the hearing.

The parties must have

specified the issues prior to the hearing.

The hearing is

formal and the criteria of judgment set forth in the law.

16

Within thirty days the arbitrator will issue his decision that is binding to both parties.

Enforcement of the

decision occurs through the circuit court by the insistance
of either party or the ERB.
The law also allows parties to enter "into a collective
bargaining agreement which provides for a compulsory arbitration procedure which is substantially equivalent" to the
state statute.

17
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Summary
In summary, Oregon's impasse resolution process follows
an elaborate sequence involving mediation, fact-finding, a
cooling-off period, interest arbitration for protective services, and strike for other public employees.

This sequence

may be viewed as a filtering process where each step reduces
the possibility of strike and encourages the parties to settle voluntarily.
Now with over four years experience, the fact-finding
phase of this process has become controversial, and there
are bills being prepared for presentation to the next legis18
lature that would abolish fact-finding.
The purpose of
this study is to provide systematic investigation into the
process.

In particular, the intent of this study is to

describe the nature and characteristics of Oregon's factfinding process and evaluate its effectiveness.

In the re-

mainder of this chapter aggregate data is considered and
analyzed.
METHODOLOGY FOR THE AGGREGATE DATA
As discussed in the introductory chapter, data was collected from the fact-finding records of Oregon's State Conciliation Service.

The years cover 1974 through 1977 and

involved two hundred and thirty nine cases (n

=

239).

Anal-

ysis of the aggregate data was conducted by utilizing frequency distributions and contingency tables (cross-tabulations) through the use of the SPSS Computer Program.

The
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frequency tables provided absolute and percentage distributions indicating what has transpired over the four years.
The contingency tables provide further understanding of
relationships between variables.

To aid in the judgment of

whether an association exists, lambda (asymmetric) and
Goodman-Kruskal's Tau have been utilized. 19
Because of the home rule issue, the data related to
cities and home rule counties is incomplete.

In order to

avoid a skewing of the aggregate data, home rule cases were
dropped from much of the analysis.

As a result no specific

descriptions or analysis will be able to be made about
cities; however, this should not detract from the description and analysis of the fact-finding process, which is the
purpose

0

'
study. 20
f th lS

Because this data represents the total population of
fact-finding cases between 1974-1977, observed differences
are real and therefore merit discussion.
One final note, comparative data from other states will
be introduced where i t is possible and appropriate.
ANALYSIS OF THE AGGREGATE DATA
Table XVI shows the use of each phase of Oregon's factfinding process within the context of the entire impasse
resolution procedure.

The table reflects the total fact-

finding cases from 1974-1977 and categorizes that into home
rule and all cases without home rule.

This last category

is divided into education and all other government cases.

TABLE XVI
DISPOSITION OF CASES GOING TO IMPASSE IN OREGON, 1974-1977

Mediation·

Fact
Finding
Initiated

Settled
Before
Hearing

Hearing
Held

Report
AcceEted

Settled W/O
Mediation
After FF

Settled W/
Mediation
After FF

874

239

75

153

25

12.

82

Home Rule

38

5

22

3

0

All Cases W/O
Home Rule

201

70

131

22

139

46

93

62

24

38

Total Cases

Education

526

All Other
Government

Source:

Arbitration

Strike

Missin2*

7

7

31

1

3

0

26

12

81

4

7

5

16

6

64

NA

5

2

6

6

17

4

2

3

Data collected and tabulated from the file of the Oregon State Conciliation Service Division

*Cases where disposition beyond initiation of fact-finding is unknown
-Data not available
NA

Not applicable

.....

IV
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Due to the home rule issue only brief comments will be made
about the total cases category, and most of the analysis
will center on all the cases without home rule category.
Total Cases
Between 1974 and 1977, 239 of the 874 cases going to
mediation went unresolved and resulted in a request for
fact-finding.

These 239 cases represented 27.3 percent of

the disputes going to mediation.

That is, almost 73 per-

cent of the cases going to mediation were resolved at that
stage of impasse resolution.

This is 21 percent higher ,than

Drothing and Lipsky reported in their study of New York
State's impasse procedure, where about 52 percent of the
cases going to impasse were settled in mediation.

21

This in and of itself testifies to the success of the
State Conciliation Service's mediation efforts and to the
concept that the impasse procedure acts as a filtering process.

This success is further demonstrated when one con-

siders the service's role in post-fact-finding mediation
(super-mediation) during the cooling-off period, which will
be discussed later.
Of the 239 requests for fact-finding, 75 (or 31.4 percent) had been resolved before the hearing.

This is 11 per-

cent higher than that reported by Steiber and Wolkinson in
their Michigan study, where about 20 percent of the cases
22
.
were se ttl e d b e f ore t h e h ear1ng.

In Oregon this is pro-

bably due to continuing mediation efforts, the cost of fact-
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finding, and the effort required to prepare for fact-finding.
Further analysis regarding this will be presented later in
this chapter.
In contrast, almost two-thirds of the 239 requests for
fact-finding resulted in a hearing; and 11 (4.6 percent) are
unaccounted for.

The disposition of those cases going to

hearing follows.

This data is based upon the relative fre-

quency since it is not adjusted for the missing cases.
Of the 153 cases going to hearing, 25 (or 16.3 percent)
resulted in both parties accepting the fact-finder's report.
By way of comparison, the Drothing and Lipsky study showed
about 36 percent of the fact-finder's reports in New York
.
23
. h out mo d·1 f·lcatlon.
State were accepte d Wlt

Detailed analy-

sis will be presented later in this chapter as to the cause
of such a low percentage of fact-finding reports being accepted in Oregon.
Twelve of the 153 cases (or 7.8 percent) were settled
after the hearing without further mediation assistance.
Another 7 (or 4.5 percent) went to binding arbitration and
7 (or 4.5 percent) went on to strike.

Of the 31 cases where

data is missing, 26 involve home rule cases, thus the rationale for leaving them out of the rest of the analysis.
Although this dissertation concentrates on the cases
excluding home rule, the data for the total cases suggests
that Oregon's impasse resolution procedure does significantly reduce the number of impasses at each step, and that the
process does result in very few strikes, as less than 1
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percent of the total cases going to impasse (mediation being
the first step) go on to strike.

Indications are that fact-

finding does contribute toward the reduction of strikes, as
less than 3 percent of the cases where fact-finding has been
initiated result in strike.

Further analysis cannot be ac-

complished because the home rule cities which begin the process have a strong tendency to opt out at their convenience,
as demonstrated by the missing data.
All Cases Excluding Home Rule Cases
Dropping home rule cases from Table XVI provides a
clearer basis for analysis of the impasse process.

The re-

mainder of this study will be based upon this data base.
Mediation.

Of the total non home rule cases going to

impasse, about 77 percent are solved in the first step, mediation, which again testifies to the effectiveness of the
State Conciliation Service's mediation efforts.
Fact-Finding.
201 times.
hearing.

Fact-Finding was initiated (requested)

Of these 201 cases, 70 were settled before a
As mentioned before this suggests that the threat

of fact-finding encourages a1most 35 percent of parties to
resolve their differences rather than go to the expense,
time, and uncertainty involved in the fact-finding hearing.
Table XVI shows that during the years 1974-1977, about
two-thirds of the request for fact-finding resulted in hearings and reports issued.
was as follows:

The disposition of those 131 cases
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(1)

Reports accepted:

16.8 percent of the reports

issued were accepted by both parties.

This is not as high

of a percent as theorists may like, however this is not
necessarily an indication that the process does not work.
Further analysis, including the numbers of issues involved
and the views of the parties are needed in order to ascertain the effectiveness of the process.

This will be accom-

plished in this and the following chapters.
(2)

Settled without post-fact-finding mediation:

9.2 percent of the cases going to hearing were resolved by
the parties themselves after one or both parties rejected
the report.
(3)

Settled with post-fact-finding mediation:

81 (or

62 percent) of the cases going to hearing were resolved by
post-fact-finding mediation by the State Conciliation Service.

This phase, often called "super-mediation," generates

much interest and concern for two reasons.

First, although

the cooling-off period is required by Oregon law, supermediation is not.

It has evolved of necessity as the State

Conciliation Service has interposed to protect the public
interest.

Second, over 62 percent of the cases going to a

fact-finding hearing are not resolved without supermediation by the State Conciliation Service.
The intent of the fact-finding process is for the
parties themselves, after objectively considering one
anothers case, to agree on the fact-finder's report, or at
the very least to use it as a basis for unassisted and
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voluntary resolution.
majority of the cases.

However, this is not occurring in the
Later this study will consider why

more reports are not accepted, whE:ther something can be done
to improve the acceptance ratio, and whether the heavy reliance on super-mediation means the fact-finding process is
not useful.
Arbitration.

Less than 4 percent of the cases going to

a fact-finding hearing went on to binding arbitration after
failing to resolve differences in the fact-finding stage.
These four cases involved the public safety services of
police and fire.
Strike.

Of the 131 cases that went to a fact-finding

hearing, 7 resulted in strike.

The vast majority of the

strikes (5 of 7, or 71 percent) involved the education sector.

When comparing the number of strikes to the number of

cases where fact-finding was initiated it is found that only
3.5 percent of the 201 cases where fact-finding was initiated resulted in strike.
Before engaging in further analysis of the aggregate
data, a discussion regarding the numbers and types of issues
submitted to fact-finding is warranted.
NUMBERS AND TYPES OF ISSUES
The numbers and types of issues submitted to factfinding ranged from 1 to 92.

In order to identify the aver-

age number of issues, and the issues more frequently submitted, actual fact-finding reports were analyzed.

The
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sample analyzed was based upon availability, and consisted
of 18 of 38 non teaching reports and 81 of 93 teaching reports.
Numbers of Issues
Table XVII shows that the average number of issues in
teaching cases is over twice as high as in non teaching
cases.

supporting data may be found in Appendix C.
TABLE XVII

NUMBER OF ISSUES SUBMITTED TO FACT-FINDING, 1974-1977*

Teaching

Non
Teaching

Total

Mean

17

7

15

Median

11

4

9

2

4

2

Mode

*Based upon a sample of 99 of 139 reports issued.
These averages, especially in the teaching cases, are
conservative numbers because one issue may involve several
sub-issues.

For example, the issue of salary might involve

the sub-issues of 1) the base, 2) the form of the schedule
(steps and columns), and 3) the increment between columns
and steps.

In addition, the following sub-issues may also

arise from the salary issue:

1) automatic vs merit pay in-

creases, 2) method to prove employees are to move to another
step, 3) extra pay for M.A. and Ph.D. degrees, 4) ratio from
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top to bottom of scale, and 5) teachers not on the schedule.
Thus, although salary is counted here as one issue for consistency, there are as many as eight sub-issues that might
be involved, and therefore the averages in Table XVII are
seen as conservative.
By way of comparison, Yaffe and Goldblatt found that in
New York State the average number of issues in teaching and
·
.
1 y. 24
non teac h lng
cases was 24 an d 9 respectlve

The total average number of issues in Oregon is 15,
which is high considering that acceptance of a fact-finding
report requires both parties to agree to the recommendations
on all issues submitted.

This may have much to do with the

high rejection rate in Oregon as compared to New York State
where parties could reject only part of the report rather
than the total report.
Frequency of Issues
Table XVIII and XIX show the issues most frequently
submitted to fact-finding for teaching and non teaching
cases.

Both tables show that salary and insurance are by

far the most often submitted issues.

After salary and in-

surance there are differences in the main issues between
teaching and non teaching cases.

This is to be expected

given the unique nature of the teaching field and the fact
that it is regarded as a profession, not a vocation.

It is

interesting to note that grievance procedures are an issue
in 41 percent of the teaching cases and in less than 20
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TABLE XVIII
FREQUENT ISSUES SUBMITTED IN TEACHING CASES, 1974-1977*

Rank

Issue

Percent of Cases

I.

Salary

95

2.

Insurance

86

3.

Grievance

41

4.

Duration of Contract

35

5.

Teaching Calendar

34

5.

Extra Duty Pay

34

6.

Teacher Evaluation

33

7.

Fair Share

31

7.

Personal/Academic Freedom

31

8.

Non Teaching Schedule

30

8.

Lockout/Strike Clause

30

9.

Sick Pay

29

10.

Just Cause

28

10.

Reduction in Staff

28

II.

Professional Leave

26

12.

Teaching Day

25

12.

Teaching Load

25

13.

Union Rights

24

13.

Vacancies/Transfers

24

13.

Management Rights

24

14.

Personal Leave

23

14.

Maintenance of Standards

23

14.

Tuition Reimbursement

23

15.

Classroom Control/Discipline

18

*Based upon a sample of 81 of 93 reports issued
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TABLE XIX
MOST FREQUENT ISSUES SUBMITTED IN NON TEACHING CASES*

Rank

Issue

l.

Salary

88

2.

Insurance

3.

Vacation

3.

Status of Agreement

61
44
44

4.

Sick Leave

28

4.

Holiday

28

5.

Paid Negotiating Time

22

Percent of Cases

*Based upon a sample of 18 of 38 reports issued.
percent of the non teaching cases.

It seems teachers are

having to fight hard to gain many rights that are accepted
as normal in other occupations.
In summary, the number of issues involved in Oregon's
fact-finding cases range from 1 to 92, with an average of
15 issues per case.

The impact such a high number of issues

has on the process will be discussed on occasion in the next
portion of this chapter that deals with the characteristics
of the fact-finding phase.
CHARACTERISTICS OF FACT-FINDING PHASES
Given this overview of the fact-finding process more
detailed information was obtained from frequency distributions and cross tabulations of the variables.

Although

several appr0aches are possible, this study will consider
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in sequence each phase of the fact-finding process in terms
of the parties involved and their actions.
The Initiation or Request Phase
Table XVI shows over 69 percent of the requests for
fact-finding carne from the education sector, while the re-maining 30.8 percent of the requests were made by all other
governments (special districts, county and state).

By way

of comparison Yaffe and Goldblatt found in their New York
study that about 83 percent of the fact-finding cases occurred in the education sector; also Steiber and Wolkinson
..
.
.
.
25
WlsconSln
a b out 74 percent were ln
e d ucatlon.
f oun d t h at ln

Analysis of requests for fact-finding by employee organization and type of government follows.
Requests by Employee Organization.

Table XX shows the

employee organization that accounted for the majority (57.2
percent) of fact-finding cases was the Oregon Education Association (OEA) , which represents all but a few public school
teacher bargaining units (K-12), some Intermediate Education
Districts, and a few community colleges.

This high usage is

not surprising as public school teachers have the highest
incidence of organization and number of contacts in Oregon's
public sector (see the penetration study in Chapter III).
The Oregon School Employees Association (School Employees) ,
which represents non teaching staff in many public schools
(such as secretaries, aids, cooks, bus drivers and custodians) accounts for 5.5 percent of the total cases.
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TABLE XX
OREGON FACT-FINDING REQUESTS BY EMPLOYEE
ORGANIZATIONS, 1974-1977

Employee Organization

Frequency

Percent

115

57.2

AFSCME

23

11. 4

OSEA (Education)

11

5.5

Other Teachers

6

3.0

Fire ( IAFF)

4

2.0

Police

1

0.5

Sheriff

5

2.5

ILWU

6

3.0

Labor

1

0.5

ONA

3

1.5

19

9.5

8

4.0

201

100.6

OEA

Other (Misc. )
OSEA (state)
Total
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The organization involving the second highest number of
requests is the American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME), with 11.4 percent of the requests.

The Oregon State Employee Association (State Em-

ployees) accounted for 4.0 percent of the requests, the ILWU
(Long Shoremens' union for the Port of Portland special district)
ing.

for 3.0 percent, and various others for the remainOf special interest is the reduction in the percent

of police and fire cases once the home rule cases were
dropped from the study.

Police decreased from 8 to 1 cases

and fire from 17 to 4 cases; this reflects the cities' dislike for compulsory arbitration, which is their professed
reason for using their home rule status to avoid the state
collective bargaining law.
Requests by Type of Government.

Table XXI shows the

type of government employer most involved in fact-finding
was public schools.

Public schools account for 58.7 percent

of the requests for fact-finding.

Counties account for 14.4

percent, special districts for 8.0 percent, state government
for 8.5 percent, community colleges for 7.0 percent, higher
education for 2.9 percent, and lED's for 1.5 percent of the
requests for fact-finding.
It is interesting to note that special districts have
about the same frequency of requests for fact-finding as the
state and community colleges, yet the penetration rate (see
Table XV) in special districts was very low compared to the
other two areas.

This might be a topic for further research.
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TABLE XXI
OREGON FACT-FINDING REQUESTS BY TYPE OF
GOVERNMENT (EMPLOYER), 1974-1977

Type of
Government Employer

Frequency

Percent

118

58.7

2

1.5

14

7.0

Higher Education

4

2.9

Special District

16

8.0

0

0.0

County

29

14.4

State

17

8.5

201

101. 0

Public School
lED
Community College

City

Total

Requests by Year.
requests by year.

Table XXII shows the incidence of

The change from 1974 to 1975 is 55 per-

cent, from 1975 to 1976 no change, and from 1976 to 1977 an
increase in the number of fact-finding requests of almost
65 percent.

This increasing usage reflects the newness of

the process, growing unionism and familiarity.

That is, as

more unions became certified and engaged in collective bargaining (and thus impasses) they have become more familiar
with the process and less shy of using fact-finding.
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TABLE XXII
OREGON FACT-·FINDING REQUESTS BY YEAR

Year

Frequency

Percent

1974

27

13.4

1975

49

24.4

1976

49

24.4

1977

76

37.8

201

100.0

Total

Summary of the Initiation or Request Phase.

In summar-

izing the data relating to the initiation or request phase
it has been shown that almost 70 percent of all fact-finding
requests came from the education sector.

The employee or-

ganization that accounted for the greatest share of requests
was the OEA, followed by AFSCME, with many others accounting
for less than 5 percent each.

The type of government most

involved was the public schools, followed by counties, special districts, and state government.

Furthermore, there

has been yearly percentage increases in fact-finding requests from 1974 through 1977.

All requests for fact-

finding do not result in a hearing, rather many are settled
before the hearing.

This phase is discussed next.

The Settled Before Hearing Phase
As Table XVI showed, about 35 percent of the cases were
resolved before a hearing.

The question was posed as to
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whether the organization or the type of government involved
was associated with a case being settled before the hearing;
the thought being that this might be an indication of good
faith bargaining and general belief in the collective bargaining process.
Table XXIII shows a cross tabulation of cases settled
before hearing by sector.

In this table education was col-

lapsed into one group and all other government into another.
Although education accounted for about 66 percent of the
total cases settled before hearing, the propensity to settle
before hearing was almost identical for both sectors.

It is

concluded, then, that the propensity for a case to be settled before the hearing is not a function of its mission
(e.g. education vs. other government).

Other cross tabula-

tions were run to observe any relation between particular
employee organizations and governmental types, and cases
settled before hearing.
Settled Before Hearing by Employee Organizations.
Table XXIV shows a cross tabulation between the employee organizations and the cases settled before hearing.

The table

reveals some real differences since OEA settled before hearing in about 30 percent of their cases, AFSCME in about 48
percent of their cases, the School Employees (OSEA-Ed) in
about 64 percent of their cases, and the nurses (ONA) in
67 percent of their cases (there were only 3).

Some organi-

zations had a very low settled before hearing record, for
example the IU\TU was not involved in any cases settled

144
before hearing, and the State Employees (OSEA-State) settled
before hearing in only 14 percent of their cases.
When statistical association was measured, lambda was
0.7 indicating that the employee organization and settled
before hearing actions are associated, but that the association is mild.

Whether this association is due to the leader-

ship of the employee organization, tradition, or other factors are questions that remain for further research.
TABLE XXIII
OREGON FACT-FINDING CASES SETTLED BEFORE
HEARING BY SECTOR, 1974-1977

Sector

Settled
Before Hearing

Not Settled
Before Hearing

Total

Education

46 (33.1)

93 (66.9)

139 (100)

Other
Government

24 (38.7)

38 (61.3)

62 (l00)

70 (34.8)

131 (6S.2)

TotaJ

101

Lambda (asymmetric)

=

0.00

with settled before hearing
dependent

Goodman-Kruskai Tau

=

.003

with settled before hearing
dependent

(l00)

145
TABLE XXIV
OREGON FACT-FINDING CASES SETTLED BEFORE HEARING
BY EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION, 1974-1977

Employee
Organization

Settled
Before Hearing

Not Settled
Before Hearing

Total

OEA

35

(30.4)

80

(69.6)

115 (100)

AFSCME

11

(47.8)

12

(52.2)

23 (100)

OSEA (Education)

7

(63.6)

4

(36.4)

11 (100)

Other Teachers

3

(50.0)

3

(50.0)

6 (100 )

Fire (lAFF)

1

(25.0)

3

(75.0)

4 (100)

Police

0

(0.0)

1 (100.0)

1 (100 )

Sheriff

2

(40.0)

(60.0)

5 (100 )

I.L.W.D.

0

(0 . 0 )

6.(100.0)

6 (100)

Labor

1 (100.0)

0

(0.0)

1 (100)

ONA

2

(66.7)

1

(33.3)

3 (100)

Other (Misc. )
Independent

7

(36.8)

12

(63.2)

19 (100 )

OSEA (State)

1

(14.3)

6

(85.7)

7 (100)

70

(34.8)

131

(65.2)

201 (100 )

Total

Lambda (asymmetric)

=

.071

3

with settled before hearing
dependent
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Settled Before Hearing by Type of Government.

Table XXV

provides a cross tabulation between the type of government,
and the cases settled before hearing.

Again real differences

are shown as public schools settled before hearing in 38
percent of their cases, community colleges in 36 percent,
higher education 50 percent, counties in 48 percent, and the
state in 41 percent; while special districts settled before
hearing in ab0ut 19 percent of their cases.

In spite of

these differences little statistical association was found
since lambda

=

0 and Goodman-Kruskai tau

=

.026.

Settled Before Hearing by Population and Census Type.
The question was posed as to whether the population or census type (rural, suburban, urban) had any relation to cases
being settled before hearing.

Table XXVI shows a fairly

even distribution (29-40 percent) between cases settled before hearing and population categories.

There is no appar-

ent association between population and settled before hearing as lambda = O.

Table XXVII is a cross tabulation

between settled before hearing and census type.

It shows a

similar distribution (27-34 percent) and that no significant
difference between urban, suburban and rural areas exists
with respect to their propensity to settle before hearing.
Summary of the Settled Before Hearing Phase
In summary, 35 percent of the cases were settled before
the fact-finding hearing.

There is a mild association be-

tween employee organizations and settled before hearing

147
TABLE XXV
OREGON FACT-FINDING CASES SETTLED BEFORE HEARING BY
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYER, 1974-1977

Type of
Government
Employer

Settled
Before Hearing

Not Settled
Before Hearing

Total

38 (32.2)

80 (67.8)

118 (100 )

lED

1 (33.3)

2 (66.7)

3 (100)

Community College

5 (35.7)

9 (64.3)

14 (100)

Higher Education

2 (50.0)

2 (50.0)

4 (100)

Special Districts

3 (18. 8)

13 (81.3)

16 (100 )

14 (48.3)

15 (51. 7)

29 (100 )

7 (41.2)

10 (58.8)

17 (100 )

70 (34.8)

131 (65.2)

201 (100)

Public School

County
State
Total

Lambda (asymmetric) = .000

with settled before hearing
dependent

Goodman-Kruskal tau = .026

with settled before hearing
dependent
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TABLE XXVI
OREGON FACT-FINDING CASES SETTLED BEFORE HEARING
BY POPULATION CATEGORY, 1974-1977

Population
Category

Settled
Before Hearing

Under 2,500

6 (28.6)

15 (71.4)

21 (100)

2,500-10,000

16 (40.0)

24 (60.0)

40 (100)

10,000-50,000

21 (32.8)

43 (67.2)

64 (100)

Over 50,000

15 (30.0)

35 (70.0)

50 (100)

58 (33.1)

117 (66.9)

175 (100)

Total

Not Settled
Before Hearing

Total

Lambda (asymmetric)

=

0.000

with settled before hearing
dependent

Goodman-Kruska1 tau

=

0.007

with settled before hearing
dependent

Missing observations = 26
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TABLE XXVII
OREGON FACT-FINDING CASES SETTLED BEFORE HEARING
BY CENSUS TYPE, 1974-1977

Census Type

Settled
Before Hearing

Not Settled
Before Hearing

Total

Rural

6 (27.3)

16 (22.7)

22 (100)

Suburban

7 (33.3)

14 (66.7)

21 (100)

45 (34.1)

87 (65.9)

132 (100 )

58 (33.1)

117 (66.9)

175 (100)

Urban
Total

Lambda (asymmetric)

=

0.000

with settled before hearing
dependent

Goodman-Kruskal tau

=

0.002

with settled before hearing
dependent

Missing observations = 26
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actions; of the heavy users, the School Employees and AFSCME
are more prone to settle before the hearing than the OEA or
State Employees.

Among governmental types there is little

statistical association measured, although special districts
are not as prone to settle before hearing as other government types.
The Parties' Action Phase
Given that the intent of issuance of a fact-finder's
report is its potential acceptability, much consideration is
given as to which parties accept reports and the possible
factors that may influence such actions.

Table XVI showed

that of the 131 cases going to hearing only 22 (about 17
percent) were accepted by both of the parties.

The question

then was posed, are there significant differences between
the parties' action and the parties themselves; and furthermore

what effect, if any, does population, census type,

time, and the fact-finder have on the parties' actions.
Employee and Employer Action.

Table XXVIII shows em-

ployee and employer action on fact-finding reports from
1974-1977.

It shows employees have a higher acceptance rate

and a lower rejection rate than employers.

Employees ac-

cepted reports in 48 percent of the cases, while employers
accepted in 34 percent of the cases.

Employees rejected in

24 percent of the cases while employers rejected in almost
53 percent of the cases.

These differences are partially

explained by the interviews in later chapters of this
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dissertation, which indicate that some major users of factfinding may have had particular strategies in mind before
the reports were issued.

Another explanation of such high

rejection rates lies in the large amount of issues involved
in many cases.

With a conservative average of 15 issues per

case the odds are against both parties agreeing on the recommendations on every issue, which is required for the report
to be accepted.

Further analysis will be presented with re-

spect to particular employer and employees' propensity to
accept or reject fact-finding reports.

Of immediate interest

is the No Action category.
TABLE XXVIII
EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYER ACTION ON OREGON
FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977

Action
Accept
Report
Employee

62 (48.1)

31 (24.0)

Employer

44

68

(34.1)

No
Action

Reject
Report

(52.7)

36

Total

(27.9)

131 (100)

17 (13.2)

131 (100)

No Action refers to a party not notifying ERB of their
acceptance or rejection of a fact-finders' report, or wording it in such a way as to neither accept nor reject.

Em-

ployees were involved in no action in almost 28 percent of
the cases while employers were in 13 percent of the cases.
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This category is not technically possible because the law
requires the parties to notify ERB within five working days
after receipt of the report of their acceptance or rejection.
What appears to have happened is that the parties (in
particular the employee groups) desire to bide their time,
hoping circumstances change so they might secure a more acceptable solution.

Because the ERB cannot publish a report

unless one party rejects, the parties prevent publication by
taking no action (it is not a reject and therefore the report is not made public).
ERB in the meantime has no power to punish the parties
for not meeting the requirement of the law in terms of their
notification of action.

It may be questionable whether ERB

would help the process by insisting on parties meeting this
requirement; however in this author's view such time lines
and requirements should be met as the intent of the law is
clear.

The parties have a responsibility to play by the

rules and not blatantly use the process for strategic reasons and bypass the intent of the law through a loophole, or
through lack of enforcement powers by ERB, and/or followup procedures by the State Conciliation Service Division.
Employee Action.

Table XXIX shows a cross tabulation

between education cases and all other government cases with
employee action.

This shows that employee groups in educa-

tion, compared to those in other government units, have a
higher propensity to accept fact-finders' reports

(51.1 vs.

40.5 percent), about the same tendency to reject, and a
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lower propensity for no action (26.1 vs. 32.4 percent).
though these differences are present, lambda

=

Al-

0 and there-

fore there is no apparent statistical relationship between
the sector and employee action.
TABLE XXIX
SECTOR BY EMPLOYEE ACTION ON OREGON
FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977

Employee Action
Accept
Report

Sector

Reject
Report

No
Action

Total

Education

47 (51.1)

21 (22.8)

24 (26.1)

92 (100)

Other
Government

15 (40.5)

10 (27.0)

12 (32.4)

37 (100)

Lambda (asymmetric)

=

.000

with employee action dependent

Goodman-Kruskal tau = .0054 with employee action dependent
Missing observations

=

2

In order to analyze particular employee groups' actions,
a cross tabulation between employee organizations and employee actions is provided in Table
that the education sector unions

xxx.

This table shows

(OEA, School Employees,

and other teachers) have an acceptance rate of over 50 percent, which is much higher than the ILWU with a 33 percent
acceptance, but less than State Employees with a 60 percent
acceptance rate.

An interesting observation is the state

employees no action rate which is 40 percent, and their rojection rate of zero.

OEA also demonstrated a high no action
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TABLE XXX
EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION BY EMPLOYEE ACTION ON
OREGON FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977

EmEloyee Action
Employee
Organization

Accept
Report

Reject
Report

No
Action

Total

23 (28.8)

80 ( 100)

6 (50.0)

1 (8.3)

12 (100)

2 (50.0)

2 (50.0)

0 (0.0)

4 (100)

Other
Teachers

2 (100.0)

0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)

2 (100)

Fire ( IAFF)

0 (0.0)

1 (33.3)

2 (66.7)

3 (100)

Police

0 (0.0)

1 (l00.0)

0 (0.0)

1 (100)

Sheriff

0 (0.0)

1 (33.3)

2 (66.7)

3 (100)

ILWU

2 (33.3)

3 (50.0)

1 (16.7)

6 (100)

ONA

1 (l00.0)

0 (0. 0)

0 (0.0)

1 (100)

Other

6 (50.0)

1 (8. 3)

5 (41. 7)

12 (100)

OSEA (State)

3 (60.0)

0 (0. 0 )

2 (40.0)

5 (100)

31 (24.0)

36 (27.9)

129 (100)

41 (51.3)

16 (20.0)

AFSCME

5 (41.7)

OSEA
(Education)

OEA

Total

62 (48.1)

Lambda (asymmetric)
Missing observations

=
=

0.104
2

with employee action dependent
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rate of 28.8 percent, but not nearly as high as the no action rate of the fire and sheriff groups with 67 percent.
Although Table XXVIII shows that employees overall
accept fact-finders' reports 48 percent of the time, Table
XXX shows the protective service employee groups (police,
fire and sheriff) did not accept one report.

An explanation

of this is that with binding arbitration as a final step
these organizations may view the fact-finders' report as
just another step, and may reason that they have everything
to gain and nothing to lose by going on to arbitration.
This is because they hope that the fact-finders' report will
be the minimum and not the maxirrum recommended by the arbitrator.

The following chapters of this dissertation will

deal more with this observation.
When testing for association lambda was .10 which indicates there is a mild association between employee organization and action.
Table XXXI relates employee action and employer in
order to attempt to observe whether employee action depends
on the type of government they are dealing with.

In this

case there is a relationship, however it is mild as lambda =
.06.

Table XXXI also shows that in public school cases em-

ployees accept 52 percent of the reports, in community colleges 33 percent, in county 53 percent, in state 44 percent
and in special districts 23 percent of the reports.

Of in-

terest is the higher rate of no action among the state,
county and community college cases as compared to public
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TABLE XXXI
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT BY EMPLOYEE ACTION ON
OREGON FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977

EmEloyee Action
Type of
Government

Accept
Report

Reject
Report

No
Action

41 (51. 9)

17 (21.5)

lED

1 (50.0)

1 (50.0)

0 (0.0)

2 (100)

Community
College

3 (33.3)

3 (33.3)

3 (33.3)

9 (100)

Higher
Education

2 (100.0)

0 (0.0)

0 (0.0)

2 (100)

Special
District

3 (23.1)

7 (53.8)

3 (23.1)

13 (100)

County

8 (53.3)

2 (13.3)

5 (33.3)

15 (100)

State

4 (44.4)

1 (11. 1)

4 (44.4)

9 (100 )

62 (48.1)

31 (24.0)

36 (27.9)

129 (100)

Public School

Total

Lambda (asymmetric) = 0.059
Missing observations = 2

21 (26.6)

Total
79 (100)

with employee action dependent
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schools and special districts.
Employer Action.

Table XXXII is a cross tabulation of

employer action and government sector.

Employers in the

education sector had an acceptance rate of 31.5 percent and
a rejection rate of 57.6 percent compared to other governments' identical acceptance and rejection rate of 40.5 percent.

This means the propensity for employers in the educa-

tion sector to accept fact-finding reports is 9 points lower
than other government, and their propensity to reject 17.1
points higher.

An interesting observation is that the no

action rate of other governments is 8 points higher than
that of education, which means those in the other government
category prefer no action to reject in many cases.

Neither

group used no action as much as their employee adversaries.
Although these differences exist there is no apparent association between employer action and the sector since
lambda

= O.

To analyze particular employer actions a cross tabulation between type of government and employer actions is
provided in Table XXXIII.

Of particular interest is the re-

latively low percent of acceptances by community college
employers as compared to public school, special district,
county, and state governments.

Whether this is coinciden-

tal or a result of a strategy by the OCCA (an affiliation
of community college boards and presidents) is a matter of
speculation.
but very mild.

Lambda was .03 which indicates association,
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TABLE XXXII
SECTOR BY EMPLOYER ACTION ON OREGON
FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977

EmEloyer Action
Accept
Report

Sector

Reject
Report

No
Action

Total

Education

29 (31.5)

53 (57.6)

10 (10.9)

92 (100)

Other
Government

15 (40.5)

15 (40.5)

7 (18.9)

37 (100 )

44 (34.1)

68 (52.7)

17 (13.2)

129 (100)

Total

Lambda (asymnletric)

=

0.000

with employer action dependent

Goodman-Kruskal tau

=

0.015

with employer action dependent

Missing observations
Table

XXXIV

=

2

is a cross tabulation of employer action

and the employee group they are dealing with.

It shows that

the relationship between employer action and the adversary
employee organization is among the strongest in this study.
Lambda is .21 which indicates a moderate association, thus
some particular observations warrant discussion.
First within education, public school employers rejected reports involving the OEA 58 percent of the time,
while they rejected those involving non-teaching staff
(OSEA-Ed) in 75 percent of the cases.

This may be an indi-

cation that public school boards find it even more difficult
to accept collective bargaining among non-teaching employees
than they do teachE:rs.

Thi s may be due to the previous (and

159
TABLE XXXIII
TYPE OF GOVERNMENT BY EMPLOYER ACTION ON
OREGON FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977

Employer Action
Type of
Government
Public
School

Accept
Report

Reject
Report

26 (32.9)

45 (57.0)

No
Action

Total

8 (10.1)

79 (100)

lED

2 (100.0)

0 (0.0)

0 (0. 0)

2 (100)

Community
College

1 (11.1)

6 (66.7)

2 (22.2)

9 (100)

Higher
Education

0 (0.0)

2 (100.0)

0 (0. 0)

2 (100)

Special
District

5 (38.5)

5 (38.5)

3 (23.1)

13 (100)

County

6 (40.0)

6 (40.0)

3 (20.0)

15 (100)

State

4 (44.4)

4 (44.4)

1 (11.1)

9 (100)

44 (34.1)

68 (52.7)

17 (13.2)

129 (100)

Total

Lambda (asymmetric)
Missing observations

=
=

.032
2

with employer action dependent
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TABLE XXXIV
EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION BY EMPLOYER ACTION ON OREGON
FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977

Employer Action
Employee
Organization

Accept
Report

Reject
Report

OEA

25 (31.3)

46 (57.5)

AFSCME

10 (83.3)

No
Action

Total

9 (11. 3)

80 (100 )

2 (16.7)

0 (0.0)

12 (100)

OSEA
(Education)

a

(0. 0)

3 (75.0)

1 (25. 0)

4

(loa)

Other
Teachers

a

(0. 0)

2 (100.0)

a

2

(laO)

Fire (IAFF)

a

(0.0)

1 (33.3)

2 (66.7)

3 (100)

Police

a

(0.0)

1 (100.0)

a

(0.0)

1 (10 0)

Sheriff

a

(0.0)

0 (0.0)

3 (100.0)

3 (100)

I.L.W.U.

3 (50.0)

2 (33.3)

1 (16.7)

6 (100)

aNA

a

1 (100.0)

a

(0. 0)

1 (100 )

Other

4 (33.3)

8 (66.7)

a

(0.0)

12 (100)

OSEA (State)

2 (40.0)

2 (40.0)

1 (20.0)

44 (34.1)

68 (52.7)

17 (13.2)

Total

(0.0)

Lambda (asymmetric) = 0.21
Missinq observations = 2

(0.0)

5 (100)
129

(lOO)

with employer action dependent
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traditionally unquestioned) power employers have had over
non-teaching staff, and their staffs' relatively low socioeconomic status.
Second, employer action in the protective services
resembles that of the employees.

Employers did not accept

any reports, which indicates that fact-finding (when the
final step is compulsory arbitration) may be viewed as just
another step in the process.

In this case employers have,

like employee organizations, everything to gain and nothing
to lose by going to arbitration.
Third, employers dealing with cases involving AFSCME
had a very high propensity to accept reports (83 percent)
as did the special districts, dealing with the ILWU, with
acceptance of 50 percent of the reports.
Fourth, the state has a 20 percent no action rate when
dealing with the State Employees (OSEA-State), which is only
exceeded by the no action rate among the protective services
and public schools with respect to non-teaching staff.
It is concluded then that employers' actions on factfinder's reports are associated with the employee organization they are dealing with.

Whether this is a result of

tradition, personalities of the actors, or other variables
is unknown and further research in this area might prove
very useful in understanding Oregon public employee labor
relations.
Summary of Employee and Employer Actions.

Employee

groups accept fact-finding reports more often than employers

16 4

(48 percent vs. 34 percent respectively).

Employees reject

less often than employers (24 vs. 53 percent), but have a
higher no action record (28 percent vs. 13 percent respectively) .
There is no apparent association between the parties'
actions and the sector.

There is an apparent association

between the employee organization and employee action, with
education and state employees having a higher acceptance
rate than the

IL{~

and the protective services' unions.

There is no apparent association between employer action and
the type of government, however there isan association between employer action and the union which they deal with.
In this case employers dealing with AFSCME and the ILWU have
a higher propensity to accept than those dealing with other
unions.

Of particular concern is the high no action and re-

jection rate by both employees and employers in the protective service area, which indicate fact-finding may not be
useful in these cases.
Other factors that may affect the parties' actions will
be discussed in the next section.
OTHER FACTORS AFFECTING THE PARTIES' ACTIONS
Other factors were considered that may affect the employee and employer actions on fact-finders' reports.

The

variables considered are time, population and census type,
and the fact-finder.
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Time
In Oregon law, specific time lines have been established in order to insure that the fact-finding process proceeds in an uninterrupted manner and that proposed solutions
are made without undue time lapses.

Excessive time lapses

are seen to cause frustration among parties which adds to
the problems involved, and perhaps adversely affects the
parties' decisions to accept or reject fact-finders' reports.
In this study two time phases were cross tabulated with
the parties' actions.

The two phases are:

(1) the time

lapse from the request for fact-finding to the hearing, and
(2) the time lapse from the hearing to the issuance of the
report.

These two phases are viewed as one measurement of

the efficiency of the fact-findj.ng process.
Request to Hearing.

This time lapse is viewed as a

measurement of the responsiveness and efficiency of the
selection/scheduling process that is administered by the
State Conciliation Service.

Because the selection of a

fact-finder involves the parties, it is expected that this
lapse will take longer than if the ERB selected the factfinder without the parties' involvement.
The selection/scheduling phase was broken down into
four categories.

Table XXXV shows that this process has an

almost even distribution, with 21 percent of the cases in
the less than 4 week category, 32 percent in the 4 to 6 week
category, 25 percent in the 6 to 8 week category, and 22
percent: in the over 8 week category.

TABLE XXXV
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF TIME PHASE 1 REQUEST TO HEARING
AND TIME PHASE 2 HEARING TO REPORT

Time Categories
Less than
4 weeks

4-6 weeks

6-8 weeks

Over
8 weeks

Time Phase 1
Request to Hearing

24 (21.1)

36

(31. 6)

29 (25.4)

25 (21. 9)

17

131

Time Phase 2
Hearing to Report

44

(38.6)

46

(40.4)

14 (12. 3)

10 (8.8)

17

131

Missing observations

=

Missing

Total

17, all percents adjusted for missing data

I-'
C'\

~
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Considering the amount of time involved in mailing, it
seems reasonable that this phase might take as long as one
month to accomplish, and 21 percent of the cases did take
that long.

However 79 percent of the cases took over one

month, and of those, 22 percent took over two months from
the request for fact-finding and a hearing.

In comparison,

Michigan's average number of days between the fact-finders'
appointment and the hearing was 39 days (up from 17 days in
the 60's when parties did not select the fact-finder) .26
There are reasons for Oregon's performance.

First,

because fact-finders in Oregon do not work for the State
Conciliation Service, they are not always as flexible in
scheduling their time to respond immediately to parties
requesting their services; second, good fact-finders

(in

the parties' views) are scarce, and many of the factfinders cannot respond quickly due to other
involving their fact-finding expertise.

con~itments

It is concluded

then, that because Oregon is faced with a shortaye of competent fact-finders, the selection/scheduling process

take~

longer than is desirable.
Hearing to Report.

This time phase refers to the time

lapse between the hearing and issuance of the fact-finders'
report.

This measures the efficiency of the fact-finders,

that is, how responsive the fact-finders are to the requirements that a report be issued within one month of the
hearing.
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Table XXXV shows that in 39 percent of the cases, reports were issued in less than four weeks of the hearing,
and thus within the proscribed period by the legislature.
This table also shows that in 40 percent of the cases 4-6
weeks lapsed, in 12 percent of the cases 6-8 weeks, and in
9 percent over two months lapsed between the hearing and
the issuance of the fact-finder's report.
This means that over 61 percent of the fact-finder's
reports took longer than the proscribed one month for a re·
d,. 27
port to b e lssue
factors:

Reasons for this include several

(1) in some cases post-hearing briefs are filed

that extend the process as much as two weeks,

(2) the

aforementioned shortage of fact-finders which causes an
overload on some fact-finders, and (3) some fact-finders
are inordinately slow and unresponsive to the intent of the
law and the parties' needs.

This study will make recommen-

dations as how to reduce this time lapse in the concluding
chapter.
Time and Parties' Actions.

The relationship or associ-

ation between time and the parties' actions (that is, their
propensity to accept or reject fact-finders' reports) was
considered.

Tables XXXVI and XXXVII show there appears to

be no association between the time and parties' action as
lambda was zero in both cases.

However, this does not mean

that time has no impact on parties' actions.

There is rea-

son to suspect that abnormally high time lapses may affect
parties' attitudes, which in turn may affect the parties'
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TABLE XXXVI
TIME LAPSE REQUEST TO HEARING AND HEARING TO
REPORT BY EMPLOYEE ACTION ON OREGON
FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977

Time Phase 1 - Reguest to Hearing
Time
Category

Accept
Report

Reject
Report

No
Action

Total

Less than
4 weeks

9 (37.5)

8 (33.3)

7 (29.2)

24 (100 )

4 to 6 weeks

15 (41.7)

10 (27.8)

11 (30.6)

36 (100)

6 to 8 weeks

18 (62.1)

6 (20.7)

5 (17.2)

29 (100)

Over 8 weeks

10 (40.0)

7 (28.0)

8 (32.0)

25 (100)

52 (45.6)

31 (27.2)

31 (27.2)

114 (100)

Total

Lambda (asymmetric)
Goodman-Kruska1 tau

=
=

0.00
.023

with employee action dependent
with employee action dependent

Time Phase 2 - Hearin9: to ReEort
Time
Category

Accept
Report

Reject
Report

No
Action

Total

Less than
4 weeks

20 (45.5)

11 (25.0)

13 (29.5)

44 (100)

4 to 6 weeks

22 (47.8)

12 (26.1)

12 (26.1)

46 (100 )

6 to 8 weeks

5 ( 35. 7)

5 (35.7)

4 (28.6)

14 (100)

Over 8 weeks

6 (60.0)

2 (20.0)

2 (20.0)

10 (100)

53 (46.5)

30 (26.3)

31 (27.2)

114 (100 )

Total

Lambda (asymmetric) = 0.00
Goodman-Kruska1 tau = .008
Missing observations = 17

with employee action dependent
with employee action dependent
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TABLE XXXVII
TIME LAPSE REQUEST TO HEARING AND HEARING TO
REPORT BY EMPLOYER ACTION ON OREGON
FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977

Time Phase 1 - Request to Hearing
Time
Category
Less than
4 weeks

Accept
Report

Reject
Report

No
Action

Total

7 (29.2)

12 (50.0)

5 (20.8)

24 (100)

4 to 6 weeks

15 (41.7)

17 (47.2)

4 (11.1)

36 (100)

6 to 8 weeks

7 (24.1)

19 (65.5)

3 (10.3)

29 (100)

Over 8 weeks

9 (36.0)

14 (56.0)

2 (8.0)

25 (100)

38 (33.3)

62 (54.4)

14 (12. 3)

114 (100)

Total

Lambda (asymmetric) = 0.00
Goodman-Kruskal tau = .021

with employer action dependent
with employer action dependent

-

Time Phase 2
Time
Category

Accept
Report

Reject
Report

Less than
4 weeks

14 (31. 8)

21

4 to 6 weeks

16 (34.8)

6 to 8 weeks
Over 8 weeks
Total

Hearing to Report
No
Action

Total

9 (20.5)

44 (100 )

28 (60.9)

2 ( 4 . 3)

46 (40.4)

4 (28.6)

9 (64.3)

1 (7. 1 )

14 (12.3)

4 (40.0)

5 (50.0)

1 (10.0)

10 ( 8 . 8)

38 (33.3)

63 (55.3)

13 (11. 4)

Lambda (asymmetric) = 0.00
Goodman-Kruskal tau = .018
Missing observations = 17

(47.7)

114 (l00)

with employer action dependent
with employer action dependent
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actions.

Although this study did not include attitudes as

a variable, it is an area which future research could be
directed.

In the meantime the rationale for making recom-

mendations that would reduce the time involved in the factfinding process is two-fold:

(1) compliance of the law

(and its intent) and (2) the possible adverse effects time
has on parties' attitudes toward the process.
Population and Census Type
Table XXXVIII shows data relating fact-finding to population and census type.

It reveals that requests for

fact-finding were fairly evenly distributed between small,
medium, and large cities; however, in low populated areas
the percent of requests was about half that of the cities
of all sizes.

This is not surprising as most public ser-

vices are in cities, and therefore most unions' bargaining
units and the need for fact-finding.
Table XXXVIII also shows the vast majority (74.4 percent) of the requests for fact-finding were from urban
areas (which includes all cities over 2,500 not classified
as suburban).

The percent of cases in the rural and subur-

ban areas are essentially the same with 13.7 percent and
12.0 percent respectively.

Again this makes sense when one

considers where public services are demanded and therefore
located.
Population, Census Type and Parties' Actions.

Cross

tabulation tables are provided that relate employee and
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TABLE XXXVIII
OREGON FACT-FINDING REQUESTS BY POPULATION
CATEGORY AND CENSUS TYPE, 1974-1977

Population Category

Adjusted Frequency
(percent)

Under 2,500

12.8

2,500 - 10,000

20.5

10,000 - 50,000

36.8

Over 50,000

29.9
100.00

Total

Adjusted Frequency
(percent)

Census Type
Rural

13.7

Suburban

12.0

Urban

74.4
100.0

Total

Missing observations

=

14
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action with population categories and census type.

These

tables are used to determine the effect, if any, the population and type of area may have on parties' actions.
Table XXXIX shows there appears to be a mild statistical association between population and employee action
(lambda

=

.07).

The high acceptance rate by employees in

less populated areas may be an indication of their lack of
strength and bargaining power, and thus their willingness to
accept the fact-finders' report, rather than go on to strike.
Furthermore, the under 2,500 category has a no action rate
of 33 percent which (like the 2,500 to 10,000 category) is
an indication of the lower populated areas reluctance to reject reports.

Of interest is the high (60.5 percent) employ-

ees acceptance rate in the 10,000 to 50,000 category.
Table XXXIX also shows there is no significant statistical relationship between employee action and census type,
although differences exist.

For example, suburban employee

groups accepted fact-finding reports in 64 percent of their
cases, where urban employee groups accepted in 44 percent of
their cases.
Employer data is reflected in Table XXXX.

This table

shows that although there is no statistical association between employer action and population and census type, some
interesting patterns exist.

There is a higher propensity

for highly population areas (lO,OOO and over) to accept reports than in the rural areas (under 2,500) and small towns
(2,500 - 10,000).

When comparing the census types, mild
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TABLE XXXIX
POPULATION AND CENSUS TYPE BY EMPLOYEE ACTION ON
OREGON FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977

Employee Action
population
Category

Accept
Report

Reject
Report

No
Action

Total

Under 2,500

8 (53.3)

2 (13.3)

5 (33.3)

15 (100)

2,500-10,000

7 (29.2)

7 (29.2)

10 (41. 7)

24 (100)

10,000-50.000

26 (60.5)

6 (14.0)

11 (25.6)

43 (100)

Over 50,000

14 (41.2)

15 (44.1)

5 (14.7)

34 (100)

55 (47.4)

30 (25.9)

31 (26.7)

116 (100)

Total

Lambda (asymmetric)

=

.065 with employee action dependent

Census Type
Rural

8 (50.0)

2 (12. 5)

6 (37.5)

16 (100 )

Suburban

9 (64.3)

3 (21.4)

2 (14. 3)

14 (100)

38 (44.2)

25 (29.1)

23 (26.7)

86 (100 )

55 (47.4)

30 (25.9)

31 (26.7)

116 (100 )

Urban
Total

Lambda (asymmetric)

=

.00

with employee action dependent

Goodman-Kruskal tau = .018 with employee action dependent
Missing observations = 15
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TABLE XXX X
POPULATION AND CENSUS TYPE BY EMPLOYER ACTION ON
OREGON FACT-FINDING REPORTS, 1974-1977

EmEloyer Action
Population
Category

Accept
Report

Under 2,500

4 (26.7)

2,500-10,000

4 (16. 7)

Reject
Report

No
Action

Total

(60.0)

2 (13.3)

15 (100)

16 (66.7)

4 (16.7)

24 (100)

4 (9.3)

43 (l00)

9

10,000-50,000

17 (39.5)

22

Over 50,000

14 (41.2)

14 (41. 2)

6 (17.6)

34 (100 )

39 (33.6)

61 (52.6)

16 (13.8)

116 (100)

Total

(51.2)

Lambda (asymmetric)

= 0.00

with employer action dependent

Goodman-Kruskal tau

= .034

with employer action dependent

Census Type
Rural

4 (25.0)

9 (56.3)

3 (18.8)

16 (100)

Suburban

8 (57.1)

4 (28.6)

2 (14.3)

14 (100)

27 (31.4)

48 (55.8)

11 (12.8)

86 (100)

39 (33.6)

61 (52.6)

16 (13.8)

116 (100)

Urban
Total

Lambda (asymmetric) = .073
Missing observations

=

15

with employer action dependent
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association exists (lambda

=

.07) and it is observed that

suburban areas have an acceptance rate 32 points higher than
rural areas, and 26 points higher than urban areas.

This

may be due to the fact that rural and urban areas (core
city) do not have the population and business influx that
give the suburban areas a better financial base from which
to work.
In summary, 74 percent of the requests for fact-finding
originate from urban areas.

Although mild association ex-

ists between employee action and population, and employer
action and census type, this author is reluctant to make
much of these differences as they are somewhat inconsistent
and may be due to other factors.
The Fact-Finders
In order to ascertain the impact individual factfinders have on the parties' action a cross tabulation was
made between the two variables.

The results showed the

highest statistical association in this study.

Because of

confidentiality considerations the fact-finder names and
employee/employer actions will not be presented.

However,

the following general comments are appropriate.
First, there is an association between the employee
actions and the fact-finder as the cross tabulation resulted
in a lambda

=

.22 (a moderate association).

Second, there is an equally strong association (lambda

= .22) between employer action and the fact-finder involved.
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These associations are not surprising given the comments of the parties during the interviews.

Many parties

indicated they had more faith and respect in and for some
fact-finders than others
cited or volunteered).

(although names were never soliFurther discussion about fact-

finders will occur in the next chapter, and recommendation
on how to improve their effectiveness made in the concluding chapter.

In the meantime there is evidence that the

parties' action are associated with the individual factfinder's personality and perceived competency.
SUMMARY OF AGGREGATE DATA
The aggregate data in Table XVI supports one intent of
Oregon's impasse resolution procedure; that each step significantly reduces the number of impasses and therefore the
number of potential strikes.
plishes this also.

The fact-finding phase accom-

Over 31 percent of the cases were re-

solved prior to hearing, which support.s the concept that the
cost and inconvenience of fact-finding discourages its use.
Of the cases going to hearing, few reports were accepted;
and most of the cases were settled in super-mediation, but
prior to strike.
Table XXXXI shows a summary of the fact-finding data
generated in this dissertation.

It shows that the greatest

use of the fact-finding process occurs in the education sector and in particular with public schools and involves the
OEA which represents

(K-12) teachers.

Cases most often
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'rABLE XXXXI
SUMMARY OF FACT-FINDING DATA

Phase

Unit

Unit With Highest
Percent of Cases

Requests

Sector
Employee Group
Gov1t Employer

Education - 69
OEA - 57
Public Schools - 58

Settled
Before
Hearing

Employee Group

OSEA (Ed.) - 64,
AFSCME - 48
Higher Ed - 50, County -48,
State - 41

Gov1t Employer

Parties ' Actions
Accept
Report

Employee Group*
Gov1t Employer*

OEA - 51, AFSCME - 42
State - 44, County - 40

Reject
Report

Employee Group*
Gov1t Employer*

AFSCME - 50, ILWU - 50
Community College - 67
Public Schools - 57

No
Action

Employee Group
Gov1t Employer

Fire and Sheriff - 67
Those dealing w/Fire and
Sheriff - 67 and 100
respectively

*Others are higher but only involve 1 or 2 cases
Strongest Statistical Associations
IndeEendent Variable

Dependent Variable

Lambda
(Asymmetric)

Employee Organization by Employee Action

0.104

Type of Government

by Employee Action

0.059

Employee Organization by Employer Action

0.210

Population Category

by Employee Action

0.066

Census Type

by Employer Action

0.073

Fact-Finder

by Employee Action

0.22

Fact-Finder

by Employer Action

0.22

177
settled before hearing involved the OSEA (education) and
AFSCME employee groups, and the governmental types of higher
education, county, and the state.
Fact-finding reports were most often accepted by the
OEA and the state government.

The highest rejection rate

involved AFSCME, the ILWU and the governmental units of community colleges and public schools.

The no action was high-

est among employees and employers in the protective services.
There appears to be a mild statistical relationship
between employee actions and the employee organization and
type of government involved.

Employer actions have a mod-

erate statistical relationship with the employee group they
are dealing with.
Although time has little statistical association with
parties' actions the author is reluctant to dismiss this as
unimportant.

Population and census type data reveal that

the vast majority of cases occur in urban areas, however,
association between this and parties' actions is mixed and
inclusive.
Of particular significance is the statistical association between both parties' actions and the fact-finder.
This aggregate data reveals much information about the
characteristics of the fact-finding phase of Oregon's impasse resolution process.

In order to further ascertain the

effectiveness of fact-finding, the views of the parties were
considered.

These views are explained and analyzed in the

next two chapters.

CHAPTER IV NOTES

loregon Revised Statutes, secs. 243.712 (1) and 662.
405-.455 (1977).
2This is considered by most labor relations experts
as more desirable than part-time, non professional mediators.
30regon Revised Statutes, sec. 243.712 (2b)
40RS 243.712 (2c).

(1977).

This option is rarely used.

50regon Revised Statutes, sec. 243.722 (1-2)

(1977).

60RS 243.722.
70regon State Conciliation Service Rules, 15-015.
8Nationally there is much debate on this issue.
In
Oregon the role is judicial unless both parties request
otherwise.
9 0RS 243.722 (3).
100RS 243. 722 ( 3) •
110RS 243.742 (4). Also see, State Conciliation Service Rules, 15-015, No. 15. A copy may be found in Appendix D.
l2 0RS 243.722 (3 and 5).
l30regon Revised Statutes, sec. 243.726 (a-d)

(1977).

l4 0RS 243.726 (3a).
l50regon Revised Statutes, sec. 243.746 (1 and 2)
(1977) •
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16 0RS 243.746 (4).
17 0RS 243.762.
18Foundation for Oregon Research and Education, Collective Bargaining and Tenure in Oregon Education (Portland,
Ore.: Foundation for Oregon Research and Education, 1977),
p. 51. Also see Oregon Legislative Assembly, 1979, Senate
Bill 331.
19The strength of the values of lambda (asymmetric),
which is a PRE measure, WE're interpreted by using the following scale: 60+: strong, 40-60: moderately strong,
20-40: moderate, 0-20: mild, and 0: none. GoodmanKruskal's tau (also a PRE measure) was computed when
lambda = O. This is because lambda, at times, had the property of taking on a value of zero when there may be a weak
correlation. See Huburt M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics,
2nd ed. (New York: McGraw, 1972), pp. 302-303. The existence of a strong or weak statistical correlation does not
prove that one variable causes or doesn't cause another,
rather it gives signals as to the direction of possible
future research. Also future analysis of a longer time
period may yield different results than the four year period covered in this study.
20There were 26 of the 239 cases (or about 10 percent)
that involved home rule cities and counties.
21John E. Drothing, and David E. Lipsky, "The Outcome
of Impasse Prccedures in New York Schools Under the Taylor
Law," The Arbitration Journal, 26 (1971), 91-92.
22 Jack Steiber and Benjamin Wolkinson, "Fact-Finding
Viewed by Fact-Finders: The Michigan Experience," Labor
Law Journal, 28, No. 2 (1977), 94.
23Drothing and Lipsky, pp. 91-92.
24

Byron Yaffe, and Howard Goldblatt, Fact-Finding in
Public Employment Disputes in New York State: More Promise
than Illusion (Ithaca: School of Industrial Relations,
Cornell Univ., 1971), p. 31.
25

Yaffe and Goldblatt, p. 18.
Wolkinson, p. 92.

Also see Steiber and
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CHAPTER VI
VIEWS OF THE NEUTRALS
In order to further ascertain the nature and effectiveness of fact-finding, the views of those involved in
the process were solicited.

This chapter covers the views

of the mediators and fact-finders.

The vehicle used to

translate their views into written form was a questionnaire.
The items were designed to elicit responses to pertinent
questions about the fact-finding process.

Many of the items

resemble the types of questions asked in studies done in
other states, and comparative information will be provided
where appropriate.

l

The format of the questionnaires may

be found in Appendix B.
The questionnaire was administered during a personal
interview situation, in order to provide more candor and a
higher response rate than a mail or phone interview might.
Furthermore, the interview was seen as a way to gain insight
into the fact-finding process that the aggregate statistics
and methods could not provide.
The sampling technique employed in the interview schedule was non-random because the universe of cases was the
topic of the study.

Furthermore, not all persons and/or

categories of experts are equally experienced and important;
and indeed, some have more insight into the process and much
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more impact on policy-formation than others.
methodological details see Appendix A.

2

For further

The number of par-

ticipants interviewed from each subsample of mediators and
fact-finders are as follows:
(1)

Mediators -- nine were interviewed; these nine
account for about 90 percent of all non-home
rule fact-finding cases requiring post-factfinding mediation.

A list of those mediators

interviewed is provided in Appendix B.
(2)

Fact-finders -- ten were interviewed; these ten
account for over 64 percent of the non-home rule
fact-finding cases going to hearing.

A list of

those fact-finders interviewed is provided in
Appendix B.
Both mediators' and fact-finders' views are discussed separately in the following order:

first, the mediators; and

second, the fact-finders.
VIEWS OF THE MEDIATORS
Mediators in Oregon are full-time employees of the
State Conciliation Service.
but one were men.
lows:

Of the nine interviewed all

Their educational background is as fol-

1 attorney, 2 with Bachelors Degrees, 2 with Masters

Degrees, and 2 with Doctorate Degrees.
lege.

All have some col-

They all have had practical experience in labor rela-

tions, some in the public sector, and some in the private
sector.

3

Over two thirds of the mediators interviewed were
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involved in both pre-fact-finding and post-fact-finding
mediation (super-mediation).

Because of this experience

they are able to evaluate the impact of fact-finding from
a unique position.
Reasons for Fact-Finding
The mediators were asked to rank the five most important reasons that cause fact-finding.

The reasons should

not be confused with the issues, which are the items to be
settled.

Although no one mediator came up with five rea-

sons, their rankings did fall into seven basic categories:
(1) inexperience,
determination,

(2) face-saving,

(4) personal venting of feelings,

out and delay tactics,
bargaining.

(3) demonstration of
(5) hold

(6) outside pressure, and (7) hard

Each of these is discussed in detail as fol-

lows:
(I)

Inexperience.

This was ranked by mediators as

the most important cause of fact-finding.

It refers to the

purties' lack of expertise in bargaining and inability to
strike a bargain.

Inexperience also refers to the parties'

lack of understanding or sympathy with the philosophy of
the collective bargaining process and its purpose.

It is

partially responsible for the large number of issues going
to fact-finding.

Given the newness of the law, it seems

reasonable to expect a period where both parties adjust to
their new relationship and learn by experience.
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Several mediators mentioned that inexperience is a particular problem in the education sector, where the idealism
of the teachers and the authoritarian and paternalistic
background of school boards have clashed.

It was suggested

that as both parties learn more about the collective bargaining process, inexperience will be less of a cause of
fact-finding.
(2)

This might be a topic for future research.

Face-saving.

This was ranked by mediators as the

second highest cause of fact-finding.

It refers to the in-

ability of the parties' representatives to compromise because of their constituents' firm positions on a particular
issue or issues.

Fact-finding provides a neutral's view

and recommendations, which are utilized as a rationale to
settle or strike a bargain.

The fact-finder in this case

becomes the "scape goat" or the "per-diem fall guy," as the
representative of each party can blame the fact-finder for
the reSUlting compromise.
This author views this cause as a positive sign that
shows that in Oregon fact-finding does provide an avenue
for compromise that allows the parties to save face.

This

role is particularly important during the adjustment phase
of collective bargaining where the bitterness of a loss of
power by one party and the eagerness of a newly gained
power by the other party are both soothed.
(3)

Demonstration of Determination.

Mediators ranked

this as the third highest cause of fact-finding.

This re-

fers to the propensity of the parties' representatives to

185
demonstrate to their constituents that they are working
their hardest to represent the parties' interest.

By not

compromising prior to fact-finding, some negotiators feel
that the employers or employee group will have clear evidence of the negotiators' firmness and commitment to the
parties' goals.

Of course, once the fact-finders' report is

issued, they then have a "scape goat"

for further compromise

(as do the parties themselves).
(4)

Personal Venting of Feelings.

Mediators ranked

this fourth, but very close to the previously discussed
cause.

This refers to a tendency of some negotiations to

be marred by personal vendettas or unpleasant past relationships between certain participants of each party.

Evidently

this does not just apply to the parties, but occasionally
applies to the professional representatives (who ironically
enough are hired because of their expertise and objectiveity).
Again fact-finding serves a positive function that the
aggregate statistics cannot show, that being a stage or forum for the parties to vent their feelings to their groups
and the public in a controlled environment.

Such a forum

is of great help in allowing the actors to have their say,
which is seen equally as important as any recommendations
that result from the fact-finders' report.
(5)

Holdout or Delay Tactics.

This ranked close to

number four and refers to some parties' tendency to use
fact-finding as a tactic to stall or holdout offers that
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might result in a settlement.

The thought by management is

that they have everything to gain and nothing to lose by going to fact-finding, as they know their bottom line, and
perhaps the fact-finder will recommend something less than
that.

Some unions on the other hand, may have not been able

to secure what they want and hope the fact-finder may recommend something above what the employer offered.

In both

cases, the parties hope to use the fact-finders' report as
an instrument of pressure against the other party in order
to gain more favorable terms.
Furthermore, fact-finding is used as a way of securing
a time schedule as part of a strategy based upon budget
deadlines or strike effectiveness.

For example, a teachers'

union may want to strike and use the required fact-finding
process as a convenient way to pass the time during summer,
thus ending fact-finding and instituting strike in September
when school is in and strike is more meaningful.

More spe-

cific questions relating to this will be covered later in
this chapter.
(6)

Outside Pressure.

This was not mentioned too

often but warrants brief discussion.

Some mediators feel

that the state level of the union or employer groups indirectly (or directly) put pressure on the parties to negotiate an "ideal" contract.

Associated with this is the

tendency toward idealism by both the rank and file, and the
employers.

This idealism leads them to expect that an

"ideal" contract can be achieved in short order.

Thus,

187
both parties have been known to be very inflexible at the
bargaining table because they expect, or are expected, to
secure a contract that a central body such as the Oregon
School Boards Association (OSBA) or the Oregon Education
Association (OEA) suggests is desirable.

Although it is

difficult to determine the extent of such pressure, it is
perceived as important by some experienced mediators as a
reason for fact-finding.
(7)

Hard Bargaining.

As a category this ranked last,

but very close to number 5 and 6.

As perceived by the med-

iators, some parties go to fact-finding because they have
reached an impasse due to their differences in what they
perceive as their final bargaining position.

Again, fact-

finding provides a cooling-off period that gives the parties time to re-evaluate their positions and gives a neutral's view of what is reasonable and fair, thus increasing
the chances of settlement without strike.
In summary, the mediators essentially attributed the
cause of fact-finding to seven reasons.

These reasons are

interrelated, and for one to suggest one or two are the
cause of fact-finding would be misleading.
demonstrate what we already know:

The interviews

that the causes of im-

passe are very complex and vary from case to case.

It

further indicates that fact-finding is a process that has
the potential to accommodate a variety of party needs.
Further information from the questionnaires will reveal this
fact.
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The Effectiveness of Fact-Finding
In order to obtain the mediators' views as to the effectiveness of fact-finding in Oregon, eleven questions
were asked.

These questions and the mediators' responses

are shown in Table XXXXII.

Each question will be discussed

along with additional comments obtained in the interview.
(1)

The Parties Generally Bargain in Good Faith

Through Mediation and Fact-Finding.

A sizeable majority of

the mediators thought parties do generally bargain in good
faith through mediation and fact-finding.

Although 78 per-

cent of their responses to item one were in the agree portion of the scale, they almost uniformly made comments such
as "what is good faith," or "do you mean technically good
faith or reasonable good faith?"

In several instances med-

iators said most parties do bargain in good faith, but some
consistently do not bargain in good faith.

There was gen-

eral agreement that time and experience on the part of the
parties might produce an atmosphere where the intent as
well as the legal requirements for good faith bargaining
will occur with increased frequency and consistency.

The

reasoning is that familiarity with bargaining contributes
to the socialization of the parties to the process.

This

internalizing of the intellectual basis of the process leads
to more effective bargaining; fact-finding is seen as contributing to this socialization.
(2)
Impasse.

Fact-Finding Significantly Reduces Issues Causing
The majority of the mediators thought that fact-

TABLE XXXXII
~EDIATORS'

VIEWS OF OREGON'S PACT-FINDING PROCESS

Percent
>, 'Q) •
.-IQ)
tTl 1-1
~tTI

o1-1 IlStI)
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finding does significantly reduce the issues causing impasse.

Sixty-six percent responded to item two in the agree

portion of the scale.

However, this can be interpreted dif-

ferently because 44 percent of that group hedged by only
somewhat agreeing, and because of added comments during the
interview.

Such comments included "they were ready to get

together anY\\lay," II some do, some don't, II and "minor issues
fallout, leaving the major ones. II
Still, overall, two-thirds of the mediators do agree
that fact-finding significantly reduces the number of issues
causing impasse, even if a few major ones are left to be
settled in post-fact-finding mediation (or after strike) .
(3)

Fact-Finders Are a Positive Factor in Impasse

Resolution.

Mediators, by a sizeable majority, felt that

the fact-finders themselves are a positive factor in impasse
resolution.

Over 78 percent of the@ responded in the agree

portion of the scale to question three.

Specific comments

about the positive role include, "the fact-finder listens
to their arguement without interruption,1I "he moves them
toward settlement," "for new groups he helps educate them.1I
However all comments were not positive.

Negative comments

were made such as, IIhe can escalate problems if there is
confusion over his report," and "they split issues to keep
their jobs."

rrhis type of comment may also be an indication

of professional jealousy.

This reference to possible pro-

fessional jealousy refers to the mediators' role and salary
as compared to the fact-finders'.

The mediators work long
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hard hours for the State and do not receive excessive payments for their services.

Fact-finders (who are free agents)

charge what the market will bear, and work at their convenience.

Also mediators generally picture themselves as having

superior knowledge and intuitive feel for the parties' positions and hidden agendas.
Overall, mediators generally think fact-finders playa
positive role in the process, but there are circumstances
where the fact-finder may not be a positive factor.
(4)
tions.

Fact-Finders Are Innovative In Their RecommendaOver 55 percent of the mediators felt that fact-

finders are not innovative in their recommendations.
Further comments suggested that several mediators felt the
fact-finders split the issues, rather than suggest innovative solutions to the impasse.

This response may be due to

the fact that mediators have to, and can, be innovative in
their suggestions, but for practical purposes the factfinders only have a range in which to recommend, and that
range is stipulated by the parties.

Thus, when mediators

compare their own experience with the fact-finders' they
conclude (and perhaps rightfully so) that fact-finders are
not innovativE in their recommendations.
(5)
Mediation.

Fact-Finding Causes Parties to Hold Back Offers in
Of great importance is the impact fact-finding

may have on bargaining.

Over 77 percent of the mediators

felt that parties hold back offers in bargaining and mediation in anticipation of fact-finding.

The reasons for this
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will be discussed when the parties' views are analyzed.

The

implication from the mediators is that fact-finding makes
their job harder, as parties may hold back in spite of the
quality of the mediator's effort.

Again this will be ex-

plored in greater detail later in this and the next chapter.
(6)

Fact-Finding is a Tool for Negotiation Strategy.

The purpose of this question is to further ascertain the effect the presence of fact-finding may hnve on the bargaining
process.

Over 88 percent of the mediators thought that fact-

finding is used by the parties as a tool for negotiation
strategy.

Specific comments include:

"the third party de-

flates high proposals," "fact-finding creates a sense of impatience and to get it over with," "parties know they will
not get much less than the fact-finders'

recommendation,"

"fact-finding used according to budget time lines and elections," "used to hold back and pressure other party due to
time lapse," "a delay tactic that costs money and brings in
an unwelcome outsider," and "every phase used is strategy."
These comments show that the ways in which fact-finding may
bE: used as a tool for negotiation strategy vary considerably, but further comment will be withheld until all participants' views are discussed.
(7)

The Fact-Finders' Report is the Basis for Post-

Fact-Finding Settlement.

A sizeable majority (about 78

percent) of the mediators responded in the agree portion of
the scale to item seven.

This is a strong indication that

although the fact-finders' reports are not accepted, they
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are very useful in impasse resolution.

In Chapter V the

more general aggregate data showed that both parties accepted the fact-finding reports in only 17 percent of the
fact-finding cases.

This, on the surface, makes the pro-

cess seem unsuccessful.

However, consider two factors:

(1) the large number of issues involved in the average factfinding case, and (2) the use of the report after factfinding.
finders'

First, in spite of the quality of the factreport, the large numbers of issues make it

improbable that both parties will accept the report in total.
Second, mediator responses to the questionnaire show
that acceptance of the fact-finders'

report, although de-

sirable, is not necessary for the fact-finders' recommendations to be taken seriously by both parties.
It appears that parties use the fact-finders' report
as a basis for settlement for some issues, to clarify positions on other issues, and as a reference point in postfact-finding negotiations and super-mediation.

Perhaps the

report's usefulness could be more adequately measured if
the parties had to accept or reject on an issue by issue
basis, rather than on the entire package (the thought being
that many of the recommendations may be acceptable, and only
a few need further negotiation).
In summary, the acceptance or rejection of an entire
fact-finder's report is not an indication that the process
has been unsuccessful in bringing the parties closer together and fostering a peaceful resolution of impasse.
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And, over three-fourths of the medi&tors thought the reports
are the basis for post-fact-finding settlement.
(8)

One Party is More Prone to Reject than the Other.

This question was posed to check whether mediators had a
clear idea of the parties' actions on fact-finding reports.
Over 44 percent of the mediators had no opinion, which is an
indication that the question is not a good one.

For what

it's worth, 55 percent of the mediators agree that employers
between 1974 and 1977, were more prone to reject factfinders' reports.

The aggregate data substantiates their

opinions.
However, of considerable interest is the mediators'
views as to why employers rejected reports more often than
employee groups.

The comments include:

"a deliberate

strategy [by management] to opt out of negotiations," and
"school boards feel they are in control--they are paternalistic."

These comments imply that employers rejected more

fact-finding reports due to a strategy, a demonstration of
power, and dislike for the collective bargaining process.
Their comments also implied that employee groups accepted
more reports because of a strategy of appearing reasonable
and cooperative, plus the fact that most employee groups did
not want to, or were not powerful enough to successfully engage in a 3trike.

Several mediators suggested their recent

experiences indicated a change in attitude or strategy by
employee groups, and that the rejection rates by both parties may become more equal in the future.
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The implications drawn from these comments are that the
high rate of rejections by employers is more due to attitudinal problems than problems inherent in the fact-finding
process or the fact-finders' reports.

Further comment will

be withheld until the parties' views are considered.
(9)

Fact-Finding Aids in Settlement.

A large majority

of mediators (77 percent) thought that fact-finding does aid
in settlement.

However, 44 percent did so in a mild way

(that is, they somewhat agreed).

Their explanations as to

why it aids are summarized as follows:
ties an opportunity to

publicly

"it gives the par-

vent their feelings,"

"fact-finding forces the parties to re-evaluate their positions in a rational way," "fact-finding provides time to
cool off," lithe parties' political needs are satisfied,"
and "fact-finding gives a neutral's views and recommendations."

Thus, according to the state mediators, fact-

finding does aid in settlement in several ways, however, it
also detracts from settlement as the next question shows.
(10) Fact-Finding Detracts From Settlement.

A slim

majority of mediators felt fact-finding does detract from
settlement as 55 percent responded to item ten in the agree
portion of the scale.

However, over 33 percent hedged by

somewhat agreeing, which is an indication that, overall,
fact-finding detracts to a mild degree.
given for such agreement are:

Specific reasons

"there is sometimes confu-

sion over the fact-finders' recommendations," "fact-finding
caLlses a hold back of offers, and delay tactics," "it
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lengthens the process," "fact-fincH ng makes it more difficult to mE":diate," and "it can cause complications with
recorrunendations that are not realistic."
It is interesting to note that some of the aspects that
make fact-finding an aid to settlement also can make factfinding a detraction from settlement.

For example, the

time lapse involved is viewed as a positive factor in that
it gives the parties time to cool off and reassess their
positions.

However, that same time lapse can run into bud-

get and election deadlines, or be used as a delay tactic to
cause frustration.
The fact-finders' recommendations are also viewed from
two ways.

ThE:Y provide a neutral's views which can help the

parties understand what is reasonable; on the other hand, if
the recommendations are vague or unrealistic, further problems can result.
The two questions relating to fact-finding aiding or
detracting from settlement are not mutually exclusive.

They

show that the mediators are torn themselves between whether
the benefits outweigh the problems of fact-finding, and
that fact-finding (like most things in life) is a doubleedged sword.
In order to corne to grips of whether the process should
be retained, the next statement was posed.
(11) Fact-Finding Should be Abolished.
group are divided on this issue.

Mediators as a

About 44 percent fall in

the agree, and 44 percent in the disagree portion of the
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scale; 11 percent had no opinion.

Table XXXXII shows that

those who disagree with this statement feel stronger than
those who agree (none somewhat disagree, where 11 percent
somewhat agree).
It must be emphasized that this statement is not a
simple yes or no question; this was indicated by responses
to the question:
finding?"

"should anything take the place of fact-

Of those who thought fact-finding should be

abolished, half felt that the impasse process should consist of mediation only; that is, if mediation were to fail,
the parties would go directly to strike.

It is interesting

to note that all mediators so responding have private sector experience.

The other half who favored abolishing

fact-finding suggested substitutes for fact-finding, such as
a thirty day cooling-off period, or binding arbitration.
This shows that those mediators who favor abolishing factfinding differ significantly as to what should take its
place.

One reason for this may be that they put emphasis

on different problems of the process.

In short, only a few

mediators suggested abolishing fact-finding with no replacement, and 44 percent would not abolish it al all.
Problems Perceived by Mediators
Although mediators did not form a clear consensus on
retention of fact-finding, most had definite thoughts about
what problems exist with respect to the process.

Possible

solutions to the following problems will be discussed in
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the final chapter.
Too Many Issues.

Table XVII in Chapter V showed the

average number of issues per case is 15.
mated an average between 25-30.

Mediators esti-

The difference is whether

the subissues are counted or not.

In either case, with

large numbers of issues it makes it all but impossible for
a fact~finding report to be accepted, or for mediation to
be successful.

This is because the parties have been un-

able to accomplish much by themselves anyway.

The reason

for so many issues lies with the parties themselves and
their unfamiliarity of, and lack of experience with, the
collective bargaining process.

Many mediators said time,

and increased socialization in the

proces~,

will solve

this problem; in the meantime, it will have to be dealt
with as best as possible.
Delay Problems.

The amount of time involved in fact-

finding, as shown by the aggregate data, is excessive and
runs the impasse process past budget and election deadlines, and adds to the frustration levels of some parties.
This is of particular concern to parties who go to
interest arbitration as the law limits retroactive pay increases by requiring that interest arbitration be requested
prior to the budget deadline of July first.

Therefore, if

fact-finding has not been concluded before July first, any
pay increases awarded in arbitration will be for the following year, not that present fiscal year.

One mediator sees
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time as taking steam out of the institutions, which may stop
strike, but does not contribute to equity.

He stated that

public employees in many groups are represented by low budget representatives, whereas public employers have the money
to afford 'pros' that get hired to buy time.
Fact-Finder Problem.
several mediators.

This problem was mentioned by

It refers to the expertise of the fact-

finders and their ability to communicate findings in written
form.

Some mediators thought that fact-finders need to

write more clearly and in a similar form.

Furthermore,

cases should be handled in a similar manner, and more uniform fees charged.

In the opinion of one mediator, many

fact-finders are trained in the private sector and are unfamiliar with the uniqueness of public sector labor
relations.
Fact-Finding Too Intellectual.

The success of fact-

finding rests upon the parties internalizing the intellectual basis of the process.

Several mediators stated that

the law is more intelligent than the people using it; that
is, public employee collective bargaining at this stage is
largely politics and emotion, and therefore, fact-finding
is used to those ends rather than used properly.

The case

is made that until the fact-finding phase is intellectualized among the institutions i t will not be as useful as
the law intends.
Miscellaneous.

Other problems mentioned by the media-

tors include the thought that fact-finding is great for the
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fact-finders as they make lots of money for writing reports
that are not published or that the PQblic can't understand.
Whether such comments are a result of professional jealousy
rather than objectivity, remains for further analysis.
Another mediator mentioned that fact-finding is a process where the parties talk issues to death, and in essence
expect the fact-finders to write the contract that the parties were unwilling to write themselves.
Finally, two mediators suggested that we ought to have
a few more strikes in order to clear the air, to educate
the parties on the seriousness of the process, and get them
down to good faith bargaining (the aggregate data showed
Oregon has had only seven strikes from 1974-1977).
Post-Fact-Finding Mediation
Lastly, the question was posed as to why so many cases
are settled after rejection of the report, but before the
strike.

Almost to the person, mediators thought that both

unions and employers don't want a strike and it is not until after fact-finding that "push gets to shove;" that is,
only after fact-finding does the pressure for parties to
settle become strong.
Another explanation is that after fact-finding the
parties have had similar views from two neutrals, thus are
more able to compromise and save face.

Lastly, many cases

are settled in post-fact-finding mediation through the
hard work of the mediator.
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Summary of Mediator Views
Table XXXXIII shows a summary of the mediators' views.
TABLE XXXXIII
SUMMARY OF MEDIATOR VIEWS ON FACT-FINDING

Item

Percent
Agree

Percent
Disagree

Percent
No Opinion

I.

Good Faith Bargaining

78

22

0

2.

Reduces Issues

66

22

11

3.

Positive Factor

88

22

0

4.

Innovative

55

33

11

5.

Hold Back

77

22

0

6.

Tool for Strategy

88

11

0

7.

Basis for Settlement

78

11

11

8.

One Party Rejects More

55

0

44

9.

Aids in Settlement

77

22

0

10.

Detracts from Settlement

55

33

11

II.

Abolish Fact-Finding

44

44

11

It shows that the mediators' overall assessment of factfinding is both positive and negative.

A strong majority

think the parties bargain in good faith according to the
technical meaning, but question whether they bargain toward
settlement.

A majority feel fact-finding reduces the issues

causing impasse.

The vast majority some what agree that

fact-finders are a positive factor in impasse resolution;
and a slim majority do not think fact-finders make innova-
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tive recommendaticns.

Mediators, by a good majority, think

fact-finding causes parties to hold back offers in negotiations and mediation, and that the parties use the process as
part of their overall bargaining strategy.

A sizeable ma-

jority thinks fact-finding aids in settlement, and a slim
majority thinks it detracts from settlement.

Mediators are

divided as to whether fact-finding should be abolished.
Those who think it should be abolished differ considerably
on what should replace the process.
The next section will relate the views of the factfinders, and conclude with a comparison of mediator and
fact-finder views.
THE FACT-FINDERS' VIEWS
The educational level, occupational status and experience of the fact-finders interviewed reveals that they are
not average in any respect.

Over 80 percent of the fact-

finders have a Ph.D. or law degree, and the remaining have
some college.

The occupational background is as follows:

attorney, 20 percent; educator, 50 percent; and mediatorarbitrator, 30 percent.

4

The number of years experience

in fact-finding ranged from four to ten, with an average
of six and one-half years.

It is interesting to note that

although there were 33 fact-finders involved in cases from
1974-1977, the ten interviewed account for about 64 percent
of the total cases.
parties.

This is due to re-selection by the
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Rea~.ons

for

Fact-:~il!?ing

Fact-finders attributed the cause of fact-finding to
the same reasons as the mediators.

In order not to be

repetitious, these will not be discussed in detail but
listed according to the frequency of response.
are:

(1) hold-back strategy,

the bargaining process,

The causes

(2) use as an extension of

(3) face-saving,

(4) lack of good

faith bargaining, and (5) miscellaneous items such as the
mediator was not trusted, or the parties need more time.
Issues
When responding to the questions regarding the issues,
the fact-finders indicated that most of the problems
surrounding the issues involved in fact-finding center
about the numbers and types of issues.
Numbers of Issues.

The number of issues going to fact-

finding is of great concern to neutrals, because they indicate the degree of lack of bargaining by the parties involved.

The average number of issues per case, according

to the fact-finders' estimates, ranged from 15 to 50 with
an overall average of 25.

The aggregate data in Table XVII

showed the average number of issues was 15, however, it was
pointed out that some issues had as many as eight subissues.

This accounts for the fact-finders' range in esti-

mation.

The greatest number of issues reported ranged be-

tween 28 and 100, and the least number of issues ranged between one and 20.

Fifty percent of the fact-finders
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reported cases with over 50 issues.

It should also be

noted that the public schools were mentioned as the source
of most of the cases involving large numbers of issues.
According to the fact-finders there are several reasons for this unmanageable number of issues.

First, during

the period 1974-1977, the collective bargaining law was new,
and both parties were not very sophisticated in the art of
collective bargaining.

This lack of experience, as men-

tioned by the mediators, causes problems that result in
impasse and eventually fact-finding.

Second, there were

certain areas in Oregon wheLe the public school employers
deliberately would not bargain on many issues in order to
force the Employment Relaticns Board (via an unfair labor
practice) to clarify what were mandatory and permissive
items. 5

Also many issues were taken to fact-finding in

order to test the system, and the unions' strength.

Third,

some parties (again mainly in the public schools) were not
willing to bargain and literally took the issues to factfinding in order to secure a contract; that is, they had
the fact-finder write a contract by default.
In any case, the number of issues has declined recently and it is expected by all concerned that in the future
the average number of issues per case will not be so extraordinary because of the parties' newly gained experience,
particular ERB rulings, and past negotiations.

If the

number of issues decreases substantially, it may well be
that the acceptance rate of fact-finding reports will
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increase, as the parties have fewer points on which to
disagree.
Types of Issues.
cern to neutrals.

ThE: type of issues is another con-

Fact-finders were asked to rank the most

important issues that cause fact-finding.
salary and fringe benefits,
union rights and security,
rights, and (6) leaves.

They are:

(2) grievance procedures,
(4)

just cause,

(1)
(3)

(5) management

Several of these items only per-

tain to the education sector, which is expected given the
majority of the fact-finding cases involved public schools.
ThE: aggregate data from Tables XVIII and XIX in Chapter V
show these issues are among the ten most frequent issues
submitted to fact-finding.
Issues (2),

(3), and (4) show the attempt for labor

to establish the same long--standing benefits that most
unions have in the private sector.
mentioned issues that cause

The most frequently

fact-finding were the economic

issues (salary and fringe benefits); this may reflect the
public employers' concern over increased expenditures in
an atmosphere of tax revolt.

One can conclude that this

will remain the major cause of fact-finding for some time
to come given the recent public concern in Oregon that
clearly reflects an intolerance of increased public budgets and taxes.

On the other hand, if the unions respond

to this public concern they may change their priorities
and 'put non-economic issues at the top of their bargaining list.

Thus, the issues causing fact-finding could
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shift to the non-economic arena (such as just cause) in the
near future.
Related to his, is the dilemma fact-finders face as
a result of the ERB guidelines regarding mandatory, permis,
S1ve
an d pro h'b'
1 1te d 'lssues. 6

As it now stands, the ERE

guidelines are meant to assist the fact-finder in determining in which category a particular issue falls; and the
fact-finder has tremendous discretion on how to handle permissive issues.

As a result, three basic approaches are

taken by fact-finders.

First, a minority of fact-finders

will not hear evidence on what they as individuals perceive as permissive issues.

Second, a majority will hear

evidence on all the issues submitted, and after looking at
the ERB guidelines, only make recommendations on those
which are mandatory.

Third, a minority will hear evidence

and make recommendations on all issues submitted.

This

later group thinks that the parties should sort these
things out themselves or take them to the ERB for decision.

In short, fact-finders may handle issues in one of

several ways, depending on the wording of the proposed language and the fact-finders' personal view of this role.
Further comment on this topic will occur in the final
chapter.
The Effectiveness of Fact-Finding
To obtain the fact-finders' views as to the effectiveness of fact-finding in Oregon, 12 questions were asked.
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These questions and the fact-finders' responses are shown
in Table XXXXIV.

Each item will be discussed along with

comments obtained in the interview.

Because the reader is

familiar with the items, a shortened form is used when
titling the items.
(1)

Good Faith Bargaining.

Fact-finders are divided

as to whether parties bargain in good faith through mediation and fact-finding.

Of the responses to item one, 30

percent fall in the disagree categories, and 40 percent
into the agree categories.

Of interest is the fact that

30 percent had no opinion.

This may be due to their lack

of previous involvement in the impasse.

Several said

generalizing about the parties' conduct is difficult because the circumstances surrounding a case are varied, and
therefore, sometimes parties bargain in good faith and sometimes they do not.

It was pointed out that parties may

have bargained in good faith and have been near settlement
when an external event occurred that may have had an adverse
impact on the bargaining, and thus, the case ends up in
fact-finding.

Or some parties know months before negotia-

tion that they would most likely go to fact-finding.
The indication is that fact-finders are divided as to
whether good faith bargaining occurs because, in their
opinion, it depends upon the parties and the circumstances
involved.
(2)

An Effective Step.

Not surprisingly, 80 percent

TABLE XXXXIV
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of the fact-finders reported that fact-finding is an effective step in imvasse resolution.

This indicates that the

fact-finders think the process is useful and worthwhile,
although none mentioned that fact-finding is also a lucrative business for those involved.

Ten percent had no opin-

ion and 10 percent felt fact-finding was not effective.
In comparison, Yaffe and Goldblatt reported in their
New York State study that 72 percent of the fact-finders
thought fact-finding was effective; 15 percent had no opinion, and 13 percent thought it ineffective.
(3)

7

Issues Discussed Before Fact-Finding.

Fact-

finders generally agreed that the parties discuss all issues
before

fact-find~ng.

portion of the scale.

Sixty percent responded in the agree
However, 40 percent responded in

the disagree portion of the scale, indicating that in some
cases parties have not seriously bargained on all issues,
yet they expect the fact-finder to propose a reasonable
solution.

Again this problem reflects the inexperience of

those parties, the unfavorable attitudes of some public employers toward the collective bargaining process, and ERB
scope of bargaining decisions.

Still, the majority did

agree that all issues are discussed prior to fact-finding.
This is one indication of good faith bargaining prior to
fact-finding.
(4)

Courting Public Opinion.

Fact-finders were di-

vided in their opinions of whether parties used fact-finding
to court favorable public opinion.

Some fact-finders
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suggested that the pari .. es do not care about public opinion
or are not worried abom:.:. the impact public opinion has on
settlement because it does not exist.

Others thought par-

ties used the hearing as a forum to express themselves and
educate the public as to the parties' reasons for particular
positions.

It appears that in some areas public opinion is

taken more seriously than in others, and therefore the parties' use of fact-finding as a way to educate the public
varies.
(5)

Publication of the Report.

A majority of fact-

finders (70 percent) think that publication of the factfinders' report encourages resolution.

However, this

agreement is mild as 30 percent of that group only somewhat
agree; 20 percent strongly disagree with the statement.
Fact-finders believe publication does affect public opinion, and that the threat of adverse public opinion causes
parties to settle.

It is important to note that publication

consists of releasing the report to the wire service, not to
the hometown newspaper.

This topic will be discussed under

the parties' views.
(6)

Effect on Mediation.

When questioned as to

whether the fact-finding process reduces the effectiveness
of mediation, 50 percent of the fact-finders agreed.

How-

ever, 40 percent of that group hedged by only somewhat
agreeing, and 40 percent had no opinion.

The point was made

by several fact-finders that the answer to this questions is
"it depends."

For example, if parties are too far apart for
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a mediator to be of much service, he will put parties into
fact-finding.

After fact-finding the mediator becomes more

effective in resolving the impasse during the cooling-off
period where post-fact-finding mediation is so often used.
In other cases the parties hold back in mediation knowing
that fact-finding exists, thus using fact-finding as an
extension of the bargaining process.

In short, fact-finding

may help or hinder mediation efforts depending on the parties involved and the circumstances, but there is no strong
feeling by fact-finders that the process generally hinders
mediation efforts.
(7)

Cost As a Deterent to Use.

Fact-finding theorists

suggest that if the parties bear the cost of fact-finding
it will serve as a deterent to its use.

Oregon fact-finders

generally disagree on this subject as 50 percent responded
in the disagree portion of the scale, 30 percent in the
agree portion, and 20 percent had no opinion.

Several fact-

finders stated that the cost did deter use of fact-finding
in smaller bargaining units.

However, in larger units costs

were not seen as an important consideration in going to
fact-finding.

In the case of a small unit these costs might

be so burdensome that they could not afford to take legitimate issues to fact-finding.

In such cases they may have

to accept a contract that was a result of their lack of economic power rather than as a result of good faith bargaining by both parties.
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One fact-finder suggested that the costs were too high,
but added that they are evidently fair as the market forces
of supply and demand dictate the prices.

Presently the cost

of a fact-finder ranges between $200 and $300 per day (the
average is $225) plus travel and secretarial expense.

Be-

cause the average number of issues is high, it is not unusual for a case to cost several thousand dollars.

(One

was reported to cost nine thousand dollars.)
One might seriously question whether these uncontrolled
market forces of supply and demand act in the interest of
the parties, to say nothing of the cost to the taxpayer.
Further discussion about the cost of fact-finding will occur in later chapters of this dissertation.
(8)

Fact-Finders as Mediators.

One area of contro-

versy among labor relation theorists is whether factfinders

jhould mediate.

In Oregon the ERB discourages

mediation efforts by fact-finders.

However, individual

fact-finders have their own opinions about this subject.
Eighty percent of the fact-finders generally agreed with
the statement that fact-finders should not engage in mediation, which is consistent with ERB policy and state law.
It is interesting to note that 10 percent strongly disagreed.

One fact-finder suggested a fact-finder should be

willing to assume the role of a mediator in the event that
both parties request the fact-finder to mediate.
By comparison, in Michigan (where fact-finders are also
not supposed to mediate)over two-thirds of the fact-finders
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considered mediation appropriate and only one-third thought
it inappropriate.

8

In the next chapter the parties' views

will be compared to the fact-finders and further comments
made.
(9)

Positions in Mediation.

Fact-finders had mixed

feelings about the statement that generally parties make
the fact-finder aware of their position in mediation.
Fifty percent responded in the disagree portion of the
scale.

But 30 percent hedged by responding in the some-

what agree portion of the scale.

Their comments suggested

that parties do sometimes directly or indirectly present
the other parties (or their own) position taken in mediation to the fact-finder.

The reason for this is an attempt

by the parties to show how unreasonable the other is, or
to hope that the fact-finder will not make a recommendation
less than the other parties offer in mediation.
The problem posed by such information, and the reason
for the question, is that such information may bias the
fact-finder.

Also such information could be construed by

the other party as a breach of confidence (as discussion
during mediation is intended to be confidential).
As a result of experiences reSUlting in such consequences, some public school employer representatives have
insisted that the union representative sign a letter of
understanding stating that all positions taken in mediation
remain confidential.

According to these representatives

this document must be signed by the other party before
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mediation begins or the party will not cooperate.
of such a document may be found in Appendix D.

A sample

Further dis-

cussion regarding this letter will occur in the chapter on
the views of the parties.
(10) Mediation Positions Influence the Fact-Finder.
The statement that positions taken in mediation (if known)
influence the fact-finders' position was presented in order
to determine whether the concerns demonstrated in question
nine are realistic.

The fact-finders were evenly divided

(50-50) in their responses in the agree and disagree portion of the scale.

However, there was greater strength in

the disagreement area (20 percent strongly disagreed, 20
percent disagreed and 10 percent somewhat disagreed) •
This is in comparison to the 50 percent who hedged by only
somewhat agreeing.
This question asks a lot of fact-finders in that it
requires they admit that information that is supposed to be
confidential actually biases their recommendations.

The

impressive thing is that 50 percent do admit they are somewhat biased by this information.

One fact-finder summed it

up by suggesting that it is impossible to disregard such
information, just as it is impossible for a jury to completely disregard the judge's direction to forget about a
damaging comment that was made out of order in a court room.
Given this problem, it is understandable that some employers have insisted that the letter of understanding be signed
before the process begins.
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(11)

Split the Issues?

Fact-finders were asked to

react to the statement that fact-finders should, as expressed in the jargon, "call them as they see them," and
not split the issues.

Splitting of the issues refers to a

report that is favorable in fairly equal amounts to both
parties.

The intent of this question was to find Oregon

fact-finders' attitude about the controversial subject of
whether fact-finders should write reports that represent
what the fact-finder thinks is just, or write a report that
is acceptable to both parties.
Their reaction was the most unified in the survey as
100 percent fell into the agree side of the scale.

In com-

parison, Yaffe and Goldblatts' New York State study showed
acceptability (where the power relationship is considered)
and compromise (splitting the difference) were the most important criteria in development of fact-finder recommenda.
9
tlons.
The ramifications of the question are considerable,
and the key word is "should" as opposed to "do."

A few

comments implied that, of course, the fact-finder should
look for the most reasonable recommendations and put ec.ch
case into perspective; that is, consider what is realistic in terms of parties accepting or rejecting, and the
parties' future attitude toward that fact-finder.

ThE di-

lemma is that if the fact-finder report favors one party too
much, the other party may not select that fact-finder in the
future.

In this case, honesty is not the best policy
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because a fact-finder risks losing future business.

How-

ever, there is the view that most parties do not pick factfinders solely on their decisions, but by their logic.
The claim is that if the fact-finders' reasoning is clear,
the parties do not fault the fact-finder, although the
recommendation may not be to the parties' liking.

Further

discussion about this issue will occur in the next chapter
where the parties' views are considered.
(12) Abolish Fact-Finding?

The vast majority of fact-

finders in Oregon are strongly opposed to the idea of abolishing fact-finding.

Eighty percent of the responses were

in the strongly disagree and disagree portion of the scale.
In spite of the problems involved, fact-finders think the
benefits outweigh those problems.

The benefits they mention

are similar to those mentioned by mediators.

In the mean-

time, fact-finders are very aware of some serious problems
involved in the process.
Problems Perceived by Fact-Finders
The following problems are perceived by fact-finders
as serious impediments to the success of Oregon's factfinding process.

Although they will be discussed below,

possible solutions will be presented in the final chapter.
Time.

The amount of time that the process involves is

too extensive.

It results in additional expense and allows

the parties to establish their own time frame in order to
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strike at the most effective time, or to purposely go past
budget deadlines, and to frustrate the other party.

This

type of strategic use of fact-finding undermines its
purpose.
Costs.

Some fact-finders say the costs that profes-

sionals have to charge are higher than "moonlighters" because of overhead.

Therefore, a more competent and desir-

able fact-finder may not be chosen by the parties due to
cost considerations.

Related to costs is the problem that

parties are often not prepared when they go to hearing, and
fact-finders then are forced to use extensive time studying materials; which is reflected in the expense of the
process.
Too Many Issues.

Parties take too many issues to

fact-finding which increases the time involved considerably.
Some parties bring issues to fact-finding that had been
tentatively agreed to.

They do this because they believe

the fact-finder may split the issues and they may be able
to gain by submitting issues already "lost" by tentative
agreement.

This again distorts the intended purpose of

fact-finding.
Another related problem mentioned was that of the inexperience of some fact-finders that results in inlproper
handling of the hearing and/or reports.

This problem can

result in the neutral adding to the parties' problems and
further complicating the issues, thus, reducing the possibility of settlement.
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Research Data.

Some fact-finders think that there is

a need of a research service provided by ERB to further aid
the fact-finder in his recommendations.

While one might

sympathize with this, the intent of the law is for the
parties to do the research and present the facts in a hearing.

Such research is seen as a way to force the parties

to view their situation more seriously.
in a quasi-judicial position.

The fact-finder is

If parties were aware that

ERB would provide a research service, they may be less prone
to do their own homework and be even less prepared and less
objective than they are at the present time.
On the other hand, there is a need for a better indexing system of fact-finders' opinions.

This would allow

fact-finders to share their experiences and reasoning with
one another and the parties, which could aid in more consistent and understandable recommendations and more sophistication by the parties effected.
Scope of Bargaining.

Of considerable interest is the

problem posed by the Employment Relations Board's handling
of the "scope of bargaining."

Their decisions which have

deemed some issues permissive, rather than mandatory, has
led to a situation that prevents the parties from discussing important issues during collective bargaining and mediation.

In some cases, parties (especially the OEA) will take

such issues to fact-finding in order to have their position aired, knowing full well the fact-finder may not give
a recommendation about such permissive issues.

This will
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be discussed further in later chapters.
Personalities.

Another problem rests upon various

personalities among the parties and their negative views
about public sector collective bargaining, one another, and
the neutrals.

Time, suggests one fact-finder, will take

care of this problem.
Structural.

Others feel that time is not enough;

that there are structural problems built into the process.
For example, because the protective services go to binding
arbitration, fact-finding becomes a waste of time.

Also

in requiring all impasses to go to fact-finding, excessive
time and monies are wasted, as parties know what they want
(e.g. strike).

The view here is that fact-finding should

not be abolished totally (except for the protective services) but instituted upon the mediators' or parties' request.

The call here is for more flexibility.

Summary of Fact-Finder Views
Table XXXXV is a summary of fact-finders' views.

It

shows that fact-finders are divided as to whether parties
bargain in good faith prior to fact-finding.

They general-

ly agree that all issues are discussed before fact-finding.
They are divided as to whether parties use the process to
court public opinion.

A majority think publication of the

report encourages resolution.

Fact-finders mildly agree

that the process reduces the efforts of mediation.
do not think cost is a deterrent to its use.

They

There is
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agreement that fact-finders should not mediate.

They are

divided as to whether parties advise them of positions
taken in mediation, and whether such knowledge bias their
judgment.

They are to the person in agreement that the

fact-finder should recommend what is just, rather than what
is acceptable to the parties.

Because of the benefits de-

rived from fact-finding, they are strongly opposed to the
idea of abolishing the process.

However, they are aware

of some problems that need to be resolved before it can be
as effective as was originally hoped by the legislature.
TABLE XXXXV
SUMMARY OF FACT-FINDERS' VIEWS ON FACT-FINDING

Percent
Agree

Item

Percent
Disagree

Percent
No Opinion

1.

Good Faith Bargaining

40

30

30

2.

Effective Step

80

10

10

3.

Discuss Issues

60

40

o

4.

Court Public Opinion

50

40

10

5.

Publication Encourages
Resolution

70

20

10

6.

Harms Mediation

50

10

40

7.
8.

30
Cost Deters Use
Fact-Finders do not Mediate 80

50

20

20

o

9.

Positions in Mediation
Known

40

50

10

10.

#9 Influences Report

50

50

11.

Shouldn't Split Issues

100

o

12.

Abolish Fact-Finding

20

80

o
o
o

221
By way of comparison and sUWiiary the mediators and
fact-finders' views will be presented.
SUMMARY OF THE NEUTRALS'VIEWS
Tables XXXXIII and XXXXV provided a summary of mediator
and fact-finder responses to questions regarding the factfinding process.

From the tables and the previous discus-

sion the following general observations are made.
Both mediator and fact-finders generally agree that
good faith bargaining (in a legal, not a practical sense)
occurs thr0ugh mediation and fact-finding.

The majority

also agree that fact-finding is an effective step because
it reduces the number of issues causing impasse, and the
report is the basis for settlement.
Both neutrals indicate mediation efforts can be somewhat reduced since the parties may be prone to hold back
offers and use fact-finding as a part of an overall bargaining strategy.

They are also in agreement as to the

basic reasons that cause fact-finding.

These are inexperi-

ence, face-saving, hold back strategy, and hard bargaining
(although other reasons may be present).
The basic problem confronting the process, as perceived
by both neutrals, is that of too many issues.

Other prob-

lems seen by mediators are delay, the fact-finders themselves, and the parties' lack of socialization in the process.

Fact-finders saw the major problems as the lack of
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research data, ERB scope of bargaining decisions, the personalities involved, and structural aspects.
Although these problems exist, the combined opinion of
the neutrals was in opposition to abolishing fact-finding,
with the fact-finders feeling more strongly than the mediators.

In short, it was implied that the process has more

positive than negative aspects.

The positive aspects are

that fact-finding allows parties to save-face thrc,ugh third
party views and recommendations, it provides a forum to vent
feelings, an opportunity to re-evaluate positions, and time
for emotions to ebbe.
Conclusions and recommendations regarding those views
and problems will be presented in the final chapter, which
follows the next chapter that deals with the views of the
parties.
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CHAPTER VII
VIEWS OF THE PARTIES
This chapter of the dissertation will complete the
analysis of fact-finding in Oregon.

Its purpose is to

discuss the views of the parties involved in the procese.
A questionnaire similar to that given to the neutrals was
administered to both employee and employer representatives
during a personal interview situation.

In order to avoid

repetition, the reader is referred to the discussion in
Chapter VI concerning the interviews and questionnaires,
and to Appendix A where the methodological notes are provided.
(1)

The following is the subsample of the parties:
Employee Groups -- eight

repr~sentatives

of five

unions were interviewed -- these unions account for almost
71 percent of all requests for fact-finding and over 80
percent of all non home rule cases going to hearing.

It

is assumed that the state level of these unions represent
the general views of the locals and also formulate general
union policy.

A list of those interviewed is provided in

Appendix B.
(2)

Employers -- eight employer representatives were

interviewed -- these representatives are from a cross-section
of governments and include public schools, state, city and
counties, special districts, and protective

services~

thus
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the areas of concern are represented.

A list of those in-

terviewed is provided in Appendix B.
The approach taken here is to discuss both parties'
views, question by question.

The comparative data intro-

duced is for information and is not intended to provide a
comparative analysis.
Reasons for Fact-Finding
Those interviewed were asked to rank the five most important reasons that cause fact-finding.

They listed many

causes similar to those listed by mediators and factfinders; they also added their own.

Details of those re-

sponses may be found in Appendix B.

Although no one reason

stood out as a single cause of fact-finding, there were
several that were

m~ntioned

more frequently.

It became

clear upon analysis that several of the reasons are interrelated and not separable into neat categories.

An attempt

has been made in the following presentation to incorporate
the parties' comments into the discussion of the causes.
Lack of Experience.

Both parties mentioned this most

frequently as a cause of fact-finding, although union representatives ranked it higher than did management representatives.
were:

Union representatives' comments relating to this
"som~

negotiators don't know how to cut a deal," and

"there's a lacy of understanding the issues and collective
bargaining process."
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Union representatives also mentioned that at times personality conflicts become entwined in the negotiations, thus
causing confusion and obstinance among parties.

This also

reflects lack of experience among the laymen on both sides
who sometimes attempt to negotiate or involve themselves in
some type of complex strategy.
Employer representatives' comments relating to inexperience were that "parties use fact-finding to do collective
bargaining," and "the union believes it will get more by going to fact-finding."
In short, both groups think lack of experience is an
important cause of fact-finding;

the implication being that

with more experience and socialization the parties will be
less likely to go to fact-finding.

However, other causes

may make this wishful thinking, in particular the at,titudes of the parties.
Attitudes.

Although only a few respondents from each

group specifically mentioned attitude as a cause of factfinding, there were several responses such as "unreasonable
board or union" which are indications of an attitudinal
problem.

The union representatives' responses indicate that

they think many employers do not really bargain.

They claim

this is especially true with school boards who are seen as
paternalistic, unfamiliar, and even hostile to the collective bargaining process.

One union representative suggested

many of the school boards follow the Oregon School Board Association guidelines, whether they are reasonable or not.
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In the meantime, the OEA claims to have spent more than onehalf million dollars over the last five years to train negotiators in order to reduce the problems caused by lack of
experience.
Employer representatives mention that employee groups I
attitude is one of "wanting their cake and eating it too,"
that the unions have unrealistically high expectations and
therefore bring on fact-finding.
These comments support the neutrals' position that inexperience and unfamiliarity with the collective bargaining
process has been the cause of many fact-finding cases.
At Impasse.

Employer representatives suggested more

often than employee representatives that a major cause of
fact-finding is that the parties are really at impasse, that
they really disagree on certain issues and therefore do not
easily compromise on these issues.

It seems then, that

what may be construed by the employees to be a poor attitude, is merely hard bargaining in the eyes of the employers.

Further examples of important reasons that are inter-

related with experience and attitudes follow.
Strategy.

Both parties mentioned in equal frequencies

that a major cause of fact-finding is strategy by one or
both parties.

This includes parties holding back offers in

anticipation that the fact-finder will "split the baby" and
recommend a compromise of the parties' final offer, whether
reasonable or not.

There also exists a strategy of stalling

in order to run past budget deadlines and special elections,
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or to just wear down the other party.

There is not much one

can say about the parties using fact-finding as part of a
strategy, except that such pragmatism makes the procedure
much less effective than it would be if this were not the
practice.
ERB Rulings.

Both parties expressed the view that cer-

tain ERB rulings that separate mandatory and permissive issues in collective bargaining have been the cause of factfinding.

This is especially true in education where employ-

ee representatives claim that some very important issues
have been declared permissive.

The employee representatives

feel that in order to air opinion and show the importance of
collective bargaining on such issues, they must take these
issues to fact-finding, even though a fact-finder may not
rule on permissive issues.

Employer representatives see

the ERB rulings as an upholding of management perogatives,
and that unions taking such issues to fact-finding are encroaching upon management rights.
In short, one cause of fact-finding centers about the
serious debate among the parties over the ERB rulings as
to what is bargainable under the law.

Only a change in ERB

rulings or consistence in upholding these rulings can reduce
such use of fact-finding in the future.
Other Reasons.

Other reasons mentioned were saving

face, complex issues, mediators, and the parties' representatives showing they are working.

To avoid repetition these

causes will not be discussed here, and the reader is
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referred to the previous chapter for more detailed discus-·
sion.
Summary of Reasons
In summary, the reasons that cause fact-finding, as
listed by the parties, are often interrelated and therefore
do not fall into neat categories.

However, analysis of the

parties' responses indicates that the major causes of factfinding are (or are related to) inexperience and attitudes.
The unions' representatives are particularly critical of the
bargaining technique, and the purported unsophisticated and
paternalistic view taken by the employers (especially
school baords).

Employer representatives think unions have

unrealistically high eXf:ectations, and that fact-finding
comes about because of hard biirgaining and the employees
trying to get more by going to fact-finding, rather than
by employer attitudes.
Both parties point out that strategy, ERB rulings, and
saving face are also important causes of fact-finding.
The Effectiveness of Fact-Finding
In order to ascertain the parties' views regarding the
effectiveness of Oregon's fact-finding process, questions
pertaining to that were asked.

Tables XXXXVI, XXXXVII, and

XXXXVIII show a summary of the questions and the parties'
individual and combined responses in percentage terms.

Each

question will be discussed separately and all data presented
are in reference to these tables.

TABLE XXXXVI
EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES' VIEWS OF OREGON'S FACTo-FINDING PROCESS
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TABLE XXXXVII
EMPLOYER REPRESENTATIVES' VIEWS OF OREGON'S FACT-FINDING PROCESS
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(1)

Fact-Finding is Useful in Impasse Resolution.

Why or Why Not?

This question was asked in order to obtain

the general thoughts of the parties regarding the process.
A majority of both union and management responses fell into
the agree side of the scale.

Unions had 64 percent in the

agree side, and of that, 38 percent in the strongly agree
column indicating strong feelings.

However, a strong minor-

ity of 38 percent of the union responses were in the disagree portion of the scale.

Employer responses were 60

percent in the agree side and 40 percent in the disagree
side, with a 20 percent distribution in all categories except strongly disagree.

This reflects a lack of strong

consensus of employer representatives with respect to this
statement
By way of comparison, Yaffe and Goldblatt reported in
their New York State study that 51 percent of the parties
l
found fact-finding very effective in impasse resolution.
In Oregon, the majority from both parties who think
fact-finding is useful (in one degree or another) made the
follmving comments:

"it brings parties to reality and

separates the wishbook issues from important issues," "it
gives a new basis for bargaining through the third party
influence," "it gives the super-mediator a report as a
basis," "it is an educational tool in the backwater areas,"
"it allows parties to save face," "it provides a coolingoff period," "it helps to prevent strikes," and "it introduces more gentlemanly conduct into the collective
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bargaining process."
The sizeable minority from both sides criticize factfinding's usefulness by suggesting that:

"it is not useful

when both parties are experienced, informed and rational,"
"it is a waste of time for the protective services that go
to binding arbitration," "it is too easy for parties who
are insecure to leave the bargaining to a third party,"
"professionals are using fact-finding as a strategy," "it
doesn't resolve anything the parties couldn't do at the
table," "it causes holdback that undermines the negotiation
process," "its benefits are over-shadowed by the substantial costs and time involved," "it doesn't get to the real
issues that keep parties apart," and "fact-finders often
try to be mediators or arbitrators."
In sum, a majority of both union and management representatives generally think fact-finding is useful, with the
unions more positive than management.

However, a strong

minority on both sides (unions more negative than management) point out some serious problems that lead them to
think it is not too useful.

Suggestions on how some prob-

lems might be resolved will be presented in the last chapter of this study.
(2)

Generally We Have Confidence in Fact-Finders.

The intent of this

question and the next question (# 3) was

to obtain a general feeling of the parties about the factfinders themselves.

The purpose was to obtain more informa-

tion that relates to the hi']h correlation between the
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fact-finders and the acceptance rate that was shown by the
aggregate data in Chapter

v.

Both unions and management responses indicate a general confidence in fact-finders as 63 percent of unions and
70 percent of management responded in the agree portion of
the scale.
In comparison, Word reported that in Wisconsin 100 percent of the employers and 79 percent of the employees had a
moderate to substantial degree of confidence in the factfinder; and in New York it was 83 percent and 85 percent

. 1y. 2
respectlve
In Oregon, only 26 percent of union and 30 percent of
management responses fell into the disagree portion of the
scale, with management indicating more negative thoughts as
10 percent strongly disagreed and 20 percent disagreed.

How-

ever, this should not be construed as a feeling of great
confidence in fact-finders by both parties.

A sizeable ma-

jority of both parties hedged by responding in the somewhat
agree column (25 percent of union and 30 percent of management respcnses).

This suggests that although both sides

have confidence in fact-finders, it is a reserved confidence.
Furthermore, it was mentioned by several individuals on both
sides that they have more confidence in some fact-finders
than others, and that the ones they deemed more competent
were always busy and difficult to get.

Still, 68 percent

of the combined responses were in the agree portion of
the scale, indicating a general confidence in fact-
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finders by both parties.
(3)

Fact-Finders Are a Positive Factor in Impasse

Resolution.

Again, like question two, this question is

intended to obtain the parties' overall view of the factfinders' role.

Seventy-five percent of the union responses

fell into the agree portion of the scale, indicating a
strong feeling as to the positiveness of the fact-finders'
role.

Management views deviated from question two, as 40

percent responded on the agree side, and 50 percent on the
disagree side of the scale.

An explanation for this change

may be that employer representatives have a general confidence in the fact-finders' capabilities, but do not feel
the fact-finder can do much good, as the problems have to
be worked out by the parties themselves.
In short, 75 percent of the unions, compared to 40
percent of management responses, indicate agreement that
fact-finders are a positive factor.

Management, by a slim

majority does not view the fact-finders as a positive
factor.
(4)

The Cost of Fact-Finding Serves As a Deterrent

to Its Use.

The intent of this question is to ascertain

whether the parties consider cost a serious deterrent to
fact-finding.

A very strong majority by both parties dis-

agreed with the statement.

Of the union responses, 88

percent, and of the management responses 80 percent were
in the strongly disagree and disagree columns of the
scale.
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By comparison, Word reported that in Wisconsin 56 percent of the parties said cost was not a deterrent to use,
and in New York over three-fourths said if they had to pay
it would not even moderately deter them from using fact" d"long. 3
f lon

There was one qualification regarding smaller bargaining units (say,

under 50).

In this case, the cost of

fact-finding may be a serious burden.

The claim was made

that employers could take advantage of the situation in
that a union, because it could not afford fact-finding,
might agree to a contract that was not a real compromise
rather than face the financial problems caused by factfinding.

It was also mentioned that if fact-finding were

free, more cases would result.

In short, in Oregon cost

is not a deterrent to either parties' use, except perhaps
under circumstances involving a small bargaining unit.
(5)
Request?

Fact-Finders Engage in Mediation.

If So, At Whose

The purpose of this question is to find whether

fact-finders assume a mediation or judgmental role; and
therefore whether they are consistent with the law and ERB
guidelines that expect the role to be that of adjudicator.
A majority of both union and management representatives disagreed to question five.

Sixty-one percent of their com-

bined responses were in the disagree portion of scale, which
indicates that mediation by the fact-finder usually does not
occur.

Of the union responses 38 percent somewhat agreed,

indicating that sometimes it does occur.

Union
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representatives

I

comments regarding this show that they do

not approve of fact-finders who attempt to mediate.

In

fact, in several instances they evidently let the factfinder know that his mediation efforts were "not on. II
Although the majority (60 percent) of management representatives also disagree to the statement, they do not
to the same intensity as unions.

Of the management re-

sponses there were zero responses in the strongly disagree,
20 percent in the disagree, and 40 percent in the somewhat
disagree columns.

Furthermore, 40 percent did fall into

the agree portion of the scale.

Several comments by manage-

ment representatives suggest that most fact-finders do not
mediate, but some do and it's usually their (the factfinders ' ) idea.

Said one interviewee, IISome think they

should -- you know shot putters always envy discus
throwers. II
A unique problem has occurred when parties from Oregon
have a fact-finder from the neighboring state of Washington.
In Washington, fact-finders are encouraged to mediate, and
some have attempted this practice in Oregon, only to find
a cool reception by those involved.

However, this is evi-

dently not a serious problem at the present time.
By way of comparison, New York, like Washington, does
not discourage mediation by the fact-finder;

therefore

Word's study showed two-thirds of the parties perceived
mediation by the fact-finder.

In Wisconsin, where mediation

by fact-finders is discouraged, three-fourths of the parties

239

reported only a little mediation.

In both cases the parties

prefer the judicial rather than mediator approach. 4
In summary, the combined views of both parties show a
majority (61 percent) think fact-finders do not generally
mediate.

However, a strong minority (40 percent) did fall

into the agree portion of the scale indicating that some do,
in spite of ERB guidelines and the state law.

This evi-

dently is not a serious problem as the parties usually discourage such action on the spot.

This and the general com-

ments indicate that the parties support the concept that
fact-finding should be more adjudicatory rather than
mediatory.
(6)

Fact-Finders' Recommendations Are Neutral (Given

the Facts).

This question is intended to obtain the gen-

eral views of the parties regarding the neutrality and fairness of fact-finders.
finders

as

Overall the parties see the fact-

neutral, as 61 percent of the combined responses

were in the agree portion of the scale.

Of the union repre-

sentatives' responses, 64 percent were in the agree portion
of the scale and 38 percent of those strongly agreed.

Man-

agement responses were equally as positive as 60 percent
fell in the agree portion of the scale (of which 50 percent
were in the agree column).
From this question arose the question of what type of
recommendations should the fact-finder make?

That is,

should the fact-finder recommend what he thinks is reasonable and fair, or recommend what he thinks is acceptable to
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both parties?
Both parties overwhelmingly preferred recommendations
that are fair over recorrmendations that are based upon
acceptance.

Of the union responses, 100 percent, and of

the management responses, 80 percent, said fact-finders
should "call them as they see them"

(recommend what he

thinks is reasonable) and not "split the baby"
what is acceptable).

(recommend

Furthermore, 75 percent of the union

and 50 percent of the employer responses indicated factfinders usually do "split the baby. 115

What the parties

prefer and what they get appear to be quite different.
Their comments indicated that parties are prone to be
more firm in negotiations, and to take weaker and greater
numbers of issues to fact-finding due to the fact-finders'
reports following the acceptability doctrine.

This is be-

cause in order to get what they consider a fair settlement,
parties throw in some "losers" so the fact-finder can have
something to take away from them as he splits the issues.
Both sides further indicated that it would be a great
service to all concerned if fact-finders really did make
recommendations that they thought were fair, rather than
recommend what is acceptable.

It is difficult to say

whether the parties are kidding themselves, however, their
enthusiasm indicates that further research in this area
could prove very valuable.

The concluding chapter of this

study has some of this author's thoughts on the subject.
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(7)

The Other Party Generally Bargains in Good Faith

Prior to Fact-Finding.

This question is intended to pro-

vide an indication of whether good faith bargaining precedes
fact-finding, the implication being that the presence of
fact-finding may have a negative effect on the bargaining
process.

There is disagreement among union and management

as to whether one-another bargains in good faith prior to
fact-finding.

A majority of union representatives did not

think employers generally bargain in good faith, as 63 percent of their responses were in the disagree portion of the
scale.

The intensity of their feeling is shown by the 38

percent who strongly disagreed with the statement.
ment representatives thought the opposite.

Manage-

Seventy percent

felt the unions do generally bargain in good faith.

Rea-

sons for the differences may be that the union responses
may refer to good faith bargaining from a practical view,
and management from a legalistic view.

Also, certain pub-

lic employers in Oregon have a reputation of being very
difficult, and at times unreasonable at the bargaining
table.

Public schools and state government were often

mentioned by neutrals and labor as falling into this
category.
It is interesting to compare the conflicting responses
in a recent Oregon survey that showed the majority of union
and management speakers felt the presence of fact-finding
did not have a substantially detrimental effect upon negotiations prior to fact-finding.

5

This may be interpreted
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as supportive of the concept above; that is, particular
parties' attitudes, not fact-finding itself, are the major
causes of lack of good faith bargaining.
It is expected that both sides will have occasion to
state limy side is always reasonable," however when 63 percent of a cross-section of union representatives suggest
there is generally bad faith bargaining, it becomes of
great concern with respect to the effectiveness of factfinding.

That is, it is questionable if fact-finding can

be as effective as theorists believe if either or both of
the parties do not bargain toward settlement in the first
place.

Further research might be directed to the reasons

labor and management so strongly disagree about this
statement.
(8)

Fact-Finding Causes Parties to Hold Back Offers

In Mediation.

The intent of this question is to further

ascertain the impact fact-finding has on good faith bargaining.
ently.

The parties perceive their actions much differAbout 63 percent of the union responses were in the

disagree portion of the scale, compared to 70 percent of
management responses that were in the agree portion of the
scale.

Party responses showed that while 70 percent of

employer representatives admit to hold back, only 26 percent
of the union representatives do so.
By way of comparison, Wolkinson and Steiber reported
in their Michigan study that 27 percent of the employers and
16 percent of the unions said they did hold back in
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anticipation of fact-finding.

7

The Oregon data may be interpreted in one of two ways.
First, it may be viewed as supportive of the union representatives' feeling that employers often do not bargain in
good faith (from a practical view, not a legalistic view);
this sustains the concept that the parties' attituee, not
fact-finding, causes bad faith bargaining.

Or, second, the

employers do hold back offers in anticipation of factfinding, not because of uncooperative attitudes.

One ex-

planation for such action is that when the offers made in
mediation are not confidential, a party may hold back
offers because they think the fact-finder will use such
information as a basis for the fact-finding report.

This

explains employer concern over confidentiality in mediation,
and the use of the letter of understanding that was discussed earlier.
However, there is another way to view this, considering the comments made by the mediators, and the managementmediator consensus regarding hold back.

It is possible that

the unions do in fact hold back but do not perceive their
actions in this way.

An explanation for the unions' repre-

sentatives not agreeing that they hold back is that unions
may not know where their final position really is.

The re-

sult is that at anyone time they think they are not holding
back, when in reality (after heavy negotiations, mediation
and fact-finding)

they settle well below what they thought

their final position was.

In other words, they may have
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fooled themselves.
It is reasonable that all of these factors are present
in different degrees depending upon the circumstances and
the parties involved.

Furthermore, it is of great concern

to all involved that such a high percentage of management
representatives admit to a hold back strategy because of
its impact on the negotiation process.

Further research

into the causes of, and circumstances surrounding hold
back could be very useful to policy-makers.
(9)

All Issues Are Discussed Before Fact-Finding.

The intent of this statement is to obtain parties' responses relating to their ability to bargain on issues
prior to fact-finding in order to further ascertain the
effect fact-finding has on negotiations.

A sizeable major-

ity of union representatives indicated that they think all
issues are discussed at the bargaining table prior to factfinding (76 percent are in the agree portion of the scale).
Employer re.presentatives are split on this issue, as 50 percent are in the agree and 50 percent in the disagree portion
of the scale.

One possible reason that management deviates

from the union fact-finder consensus regarding this statement is that in management's opinion, some issues are not
discussed thoroughly at the table (rather than not discussed
at all).
In comparison, the Michigan study showed that 80 percent of the parties concurred that all proposals and counter-proposals had'been discussed before fact-finding;8 in a

245
New York study about 75 percent concurred that this was
the case.

9

In summary, collectively the parties agree (61 percent
agree and strongly agree)

that all issues are discussed

prior to fact-finding, however, management agrees to a
lesser extent than labor.
(10) Fact-Finding Reopens Some Issues.

This statement

is intended to reveal parties' thoughts concerning factfinding's impact on prior tentative agreements made during
negotiation.

The parties' views differ.

A majority (76

percent) of union representative responses were in the disagree portion of the scale, indicating that they do not
think issues are reopened in fact-finding.

Management, on

the other hand, generally agree that fact-finding does reopen some issues (60 percent were in the agree portion of
the scale).
By way of comparison, the Michigan study showed that
in 93 percent of the cases the parties indicated that factfinding did not have the effect of reopening previously
.
10
sett 1 e d lssues.
The disagreement among Oregon parties may be explained
by the fact that sometimes several issues are related to one
another and if one is not settled then they all are sent to
fact-finding.
tegic reasons.

Also issues may be reopened because of straFor example, a party may feel they have

everything to gain and nothing to lose by taking a tentatively settled issue to fact-finding.

It has also been
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suggested that one employer's settlement may hinge on other
employers settling also (e.g. school districts).

In this

case a tentative settlement may go to fact-finding because
of a situation in another district.
However, the comments made here are made from a general
perspective provided by the study, and it is not exactly
clear why union and management representatives disagree as
to whether fact-finding reopens some issues, given the information collected in the questionnaire.
(11) The Publication of a Fact-Finders' Report
Encourages Impasse Resolution.

The intent of this question

is to find whether parties agree with the theory that publication of the report brings about public pressure which encourages the parties toward settlement.

Contrary to fact-

finders' opinions, it is clear that both parties do not
think publication encourages settlement to a significant
degree.

A majority of union representatives (63 percent in

the disagree portion of the scale) and a majority of management representatives (70 percent in the disagree portion of
the scale) discount the importance of publication of the
report.

Comments by both parties indicate that the public

is really not interested and not able to understand many
complicated issues.
In comparison, the studies done in Michigan, Wisconsin,
and New York State also indicate that publication of the
report and public pressure does not significantly encourage
·
t h e partles
to sett 1 e. 11
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However, there are several reasons that parties in
Oregon may be less concerned than they would be otherwise.
First, many of the reports are not published because one or
both parties take no action on the report (this was discussed in the previous chapter).

Second, although the ERB

gives the report to the wire service, that does not guarantee the local paper will pick it up or understand or
clarify issues.

Under circumstances such as these, it is

not possible to really know what impact adequate publication would have on impasse resolution.

Additional comments

concerning publication will be made in the concluding chapter of the study.
(12) Fact-Finding Should Be Abolished.

Again, the in-

tent of this question is to find whether, on balance, the
parties prefer to abolish fact-finding.

The majority of

the combined responses were against the abolishment of fact·finding.

However, the parties differed.

The unions strongly disagree with the idea of abolishing the fact-finding process as 76 percent of the responses
were in the strongly disagree and disagree portion of the
scale.

Employers, on the other hand, were divided with 50

percent in

the~ree

portion and 50 percent in the disagree

portion of the scale.

However, the strength of employer

disagreement was greater than those agreeing (40 percent
strongly disagreed and 50 percent only somewhat agreed).
This indicates that one-half of management

repr~sentatives

hedged as to whether to abolish fact-finding; and none
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agreed or strongly agreed to the statement.
The combined percentages were 62 percent against
abolishing and 38 percent for abolishing fact-finding.

In

addition, one-half of those against abolishing fact-finding
strongly di.sagreed to such a proposal.

Reasons for the

positions are the same as those under question one.

When

the 38 percent who would see fact-finding abolished were
queried as to what should replace fact-finding, their responses were considerably varied.

One suggestion was that

the process should go from mediation directly to strike;
another that fact-finding should be dropped if binding arbitration is present; another to replace fact-finding with a
30 day cooling-off period, then super-mediation before
strike.

It was noticed that those individuals who have had

private sector experience were most prone to favor abolishing fact-finding and not replacing it with anything (an
emulation of the private sector).

This is ironic given

the recent serious discussion in the private sector about
using fact-finding and arbitration to a greater extent in
order to avoid costly strikes.
In short, a majority of union representatives and 50
percent of management would not abolish fact-finding.

This

however, does not suggest that serious problems do not exist.

On the contrary, when asked about the problems of

fact-finding in Oregon, parties' responses were numerous.
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Problems Perceived By Parties
The parties perceived some problems similar to those
perceived by the neutrals.

To avoid repetition only those

problems which are dissimilar will be discussed in detail
in the following order:

lack of preparation, non-binding

recommendations, protective services, cost, fact-finders,
time, inexperience, and others.
Lack of Preparation.

Union representatives in the ed-

ucation sector suggest there is a lack of preparation on the
part of some school districts who have a tendency to not
take fact-finding seriously.

This puts the fact-finder in

the position of having to do his own research.

Also it is

claimed that management in such cases does not take what the
fact-finder recommends seriously, thus the purpose of factfinding is thwarted.
Non-Binding Recommendations.

Because the recommenda-

tions are not-binding, either party can use the process for
strategic reasons and not suffer any dire consequences.
Says one union representative, "fact-finding eliminates
strikes, but slows the process to the benefit of the employer;" this statement is made because if either party will
not compromise after the report is issued, strike is the
only weapon left to resolve the impasse--which unions are
reluctant to do.
Protective Service.

Several representatives from both

sides thought fact-finding for police and fire is a waste
of time and money.

They pointed out that in this case,
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fact-finding merely served as a trial or practice run for
binding arbitration.
Cost.

High and vague costs were mentioned more often

by union representatives as being a problem.

This is be-

cause tax monies are used by public employees to cover factfinding costs, whereas unions cover their cost from a very
limited base of union dues.

Furthermore, there have been

instances where the fact-finder fees changed from that reflected on the Conciliation Service resume sent to the
parties.

One union representative suggested state limits

on fact-finders' fees be instituted.
Fact-Finders.

Both sides are concerned about the fact-

finders themselves as a problem with the process.

Some

fact-finders have had less experience than the parties, and
have been unfamiliar with the problems involved.

They claim

there is too much variety among approaches, use of criteria
of judgment, and overall competency.

They think that the

ERB screening process, training, guidelines, and feedback
mechanisms are inadequate.
Time.

Both sides emphc,size how the time involved in

the process poses serious problems with respect to budget
deadlines, arbitration award rules, and frustration levels.
Inexperience.

Several union representatives suggested

the major problem with fact-finding is that the parties
themselves are inexperienced, immature, and don't really
want to bargain.

As a result the process is used as a ve-

hicle for stalling.

One management representative
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supported this concept by pointing out that critics are in
the way of the process; that they do not try to use it effectively and therefore it doesn't work well many times.
Miscellaneous Problems.

Complications in bargaining

caused by the inherent conflict between Civil Service regulations and collective bargaining was mentioned as a reason
that fact-finding is not so successful.

Also, ERB rulings

have complicated, in the view of some parties, the entire
collective bargaining process, which of course includes
fact-finding.
Summary of Parties' Views
The data from Tables XXXXVI-XXXXVIII show that both
union and management representatives generally agree that
fact-finding is useful in impasse resolution.
general confidence in the fact-finders, but

They have

d~sagree

as to

whether the fact-finder can bE: a positive factor, given the
state of the art.

Both union and management agree that the

cost is not a deterrent to its use, except under unusual
circumstances.

Both sides also generally agree that fact-

finders do not often attempt to mediate, and that the parties like it that way.

The parties view the fact-finders'

recommendations as neutral, but complain that fact-finders
more often split the issues than not.

The parties disagree

as to whether one another bargain in good faith; the union
representatives indicating management does not, and management indicating that unions do, generally bargain in good
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faith.
Both disagree as to whether fact-finding causes parties to hold back during negotiations and mediation, with
the unions indicating they do not hold back and management
admitting they do.

Both generally agree that all issues

are discussed before fact-finding, but they disagree as to
whether fact-finding reopens issues.

According to both

parties, publication of the report does not seem to encourage resolution.

Union representatives strongly oppose

abolishing fact-finding, where employer representatives
are divided on the issue.

They both point out serious

problems with the process, although overall they would not
like to see it abolished.
The views of the parties and those of the neutrals will
be contrasted in the following chapter, which presents a
summary, conclusions and recoIlU1l2ndations.
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CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the
characteristics and effectiveness of Oregon's fact-finding
process.

This was accomplished through a review of rele-

vant literature and Oregon law, analysis of aggregate data
pertaining to fact-finding, and by structured interviews
of participants engaged in fact-finding.
Review of the literature demonstrated that public sector collective bargaining is recent and occurs at all levels
of government and in all states.

It has as its objectives

the bringing of order into public sector labor relations.
The present and potential impact this recent phenomenon has
for our traditional political and economic power structure
is considerable.

These changes have, and will continue to

have, a significant impact on urban areas, where most of the
population resides and union membership exists.

Of particu-

lar concern is the impact this has on the allocation of
limited resources in the budgetary process, and the threat
of work stoppages (strikes) that interrupt the provision of
vital public services.

Of paramount importance has been the

development of impasse resolution procedures which are intended to protect the public from strikes, while encouraging
voluntary collective bargaining in the public sector.

The

255

Oregon Legislature's response to this challenge was the passage of a very progressive and comprehensive public sector
labor law in 1973.
Oregon Public Sector Law
The intent of Oregon's 1973 public employee bargaining
law was to establish uniform procedures for labor relations
in the public sector.

It embraces the philosophy that it is

in the public interest to have harmonious relations between
governmental units and their employees, and that collective
bargaining is a vehicle that can accomplish this.

The law

extends bargaining rights to public employees that are similar to those granted the private sector in the 1930's.

The

law grants the right to strike to all but those employees in
the protective services.

In order to protect the public

from public employee strikes, the law established a mUltistep impasse resolution procedure should collective negotiations break down.
Oregon's impasse resolution procedure may be viewed as
a filtering process with each step significantly contributing to the orderly resolution of disputes, reducing the possibility of public employee strikes, and encouraging the
parties to settle voluntarily.

Figure 3 is a flow chart

showing the basic steps in the process.

Each step introduces

a higher level of intervention by the neutral third party.
It is the fact-finding process that is most controversial
and the topic of this dissertation.
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Oregon's Impasse Resolution Process

Oregon's Public Sector
The present and potential impact of public sector collective bargaining in Oregon was couched in terms of an impact or penetration study.
It showed that there are almost 1,600 governmental
units in Oregon (including school and special districts)
that could be potentially involved in collective bargaining;
furthermore there are over 1,000 bargaining units that are
currently involved in collective bargaining and/or meet-andconfer discussions.
The study also provided estimates of the percent of the
total governmental units in each sector that are involved in
collective bargaining.

The most conservative estimates of

penetration are as follows:

public schools - 95 percent,

corrIDunity colleges - 100 percent, state - 77 percent, counties - 56 percent, cities - 41 percent, and special districts - 10 percent.
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The potential impact could result in some 150,000 public employees being organized, and involve over 2,400 separate bargaining contracts.
Given this high level of activity, it is of great concern that the impasse resolution process be an effective way
to avoid public sector strikes while encouraging voluntary
collective bargaining.
The Concept of Fact-Finding
The concept of fact-finding is that the issuance of a
neutral's findings and recommendations, along with public
pressure, will encourage the parties to drop extreme positions and to settle voluntarily.

Oregon law requires the

parties to bear the cost of fact-finding as an inducement to
settle in mediation prior to fact-finding.

Furthermore,

publication of a rejected report is thought to be a way to
place public pressure on the parties to settle.

This dis-

sertation generated information to describe the characteristics and ascertain the effectiveness of this process.
Summary of the Aggregate Data
The aggregate data reported shows that one intention of
Oregon's impasse resolution procedure is working:

that is,

each step significantly reduces the number of impasses and
therefore the number of potential strikes.

The fact-

finding phase accomplishes this also as almost 35 percent of
the fact-finding cases were settled prior to the hearing,
and only 5 percent of the cases going to hearing resulted in
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a strike.
The aggregate data further shows that the greatest use
of fact-finding occurs in the education sector, and in particular, involves public schools and the OEA which represents (K-12) teachers.

There appears to be a mild statis-

tical association between employee actions and the employee
organization and type of government involved.

Employer ac-

tions have a mild statistical association with the employee
group they are dealing with.
Although time has little statistical association with
the parties' actions, the author is reluctant to dismiss
this as unimportant because of information provided by the
interviews and questionnaires.

Population and census type

data reveal that the vast majority of cases occur in urban
areas; however, statistical association between census type
and parties' actions is mixed and inconclusive.

Of partic-

ular interest is the moderate statistical association between both parties' actions and the fact-finder himself.
Even though the statistical measures indicated only
mild association between most of the variables, it may be
that future research will yield different results as longer
time periods are studied, and as the parties gain more experience with the process.
Furthermore, the fact that only 17 percent of the factfinding reports are accepted should not be construed to mean
the process is ineffective in encouraging the parties to
settle voluntarily; evidence from the interviews suggest
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the contrary.
Summary of the Participants' Views
The information gained from the interviews and questionnaires indicate that there is a tremendous range of
viewpoints among the categories of participants and within
each category.

The information shows that some assumptions

about fact-finding are confirmed, while others are not.
It also shows that while fact-finding in Oregon does fulfill
some particular needs, it also results in certain problems.
Both the problems and benefits will be discussed after the
participants' views are summarized.

Their views are covered

as follows:
Usefulness.

A majority of the parties and the neutrals

agree that fact-finding is useful in impasse resolution because it allows parties to save face through third party
recommendations, it provides the opportunity for parties to
reassess their positions, it acts as a forum to vent feelings under controlled conditions, it gives time for emotions to ebb, and it is a vehicle to socialize or educate
the parties in the collective bargaining process.
Cost.

Both parties and neutrals agree that the cost

of fact-finding does not serve as a deterrent to its use.
The only exception might be those small units (under 50)
where there are not enough members to offset the factfinding costs without undue burdens.

Their comments indi-

cated, however, that if it were free there probably would
be a higher usage of fact-finding.
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Hold Back.

Mediators and management concur that fact-

finding causes hold backs during negotiation and mediation.
Unions view this as not the case.

However, there is evi-

dence that anti-collective bargaining attitudes, not just
presence of fact-finding, also cause hold-backs.
Publication.

The parties do not see publication of the

report as encouraging resolution.

Although fact-finders

disagree with the parties, it is concluded that public pressure due to publication is not regarded as a viable force
toward settlement.
Issues Discussed.

Fact-finders and both parties agree

that generally all issues are discussed prior to factfinding.

This indicates that the presence of fact-finding

does not significantly affect the number of issues going to
fact-finding.

The large average number of issues per case

are attributed mainly to the parties' inexperience and
attitud~s.

Mediation.

The parties and the fact-finders agree that

the role of the fact-finder should be adjudicatory, and mediation efforts should not be made by the fact-finder.

This

is supportive of the philosophy embodied in Oregon law.
Confidence.

The parties and mediators have a guarded

general confidence in fact-finding, but disagree whether
fact-finders can be very effective.
Neutrality.

Both parties perceive the fact-finders as

neutral but think recommendations should be based upon fairness not acceptability.

Fact-finders agree to the person
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with this philosophy.
Good Faith Bargaining.

Mediators and management concur

that the parties bargain in good faith prior to factfinding, while the fact-finders are divided, and the unions
disagree.

The key to this disagreement is whether good

faith bargaining has occurred in a legalistic or practical
sense.

There is evidence that some employees, in

pa~ticular

the public school and state sectors, often do not bargain
toward settlement prior to fact-finding.
Abolish Fact-Finding?

The unions and fact-finders

strongly oppose this suggestion, while mediators and management are divided in their opinions.

The overall opinion of

the participants is to retain the fact-finding process.

The

majority, who oppose abolishing the process see the benefits
as outweighing the problems.

The minority see the opposite.

"

A brief summary of the benefits and problems listed by those
interviewed follows.
Benefits of Oregon's Fact-Finding Process
The items discussed below are generally perceived by
various participants as being beneficial.

Of course several

items are also the source of some problems.
Neutral's Recommendation.

Many are convinced (in par-

ticular the neutrals) that a neutral's recommendations are
necessary in order to help the parties put the issues into
perspective, and provide the parties and the public with a
relatively unbiased view.

The report is seen as being in
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the interest of both the parties and the public.

For ex-

ample, in this age of "tax revolt," the fact-finder can tell
the public what is fair and reasonable, thus making it easier for employers to make decisions regarding increased
expenditures.
Face-Saving.

Both the parties and the neutrals are

convinced that the fact-finding phase provides an avenue
for compromise that allows the

pa~ties

to save face.

This

has been particularly important during the first years under
the law, where both parties have been adjusting to their new
relationship.

Its potential usefulness could be consider-

able if the home rule issue is settled in favor of the state
law.
Education of the Parties.

Although many of the parties

disagree, the neutrals see fact-finding as a way to educate
the parties in the collective bargaining process and impasse
resolution, especially during the first years under the new
law.
Time.

The time involved in the process is seen as a

period in which the parties have the opportunity to cool off
and re-assess their positions.
Vent Feelings.

The neutrals point out that the hear-

ings serve a psychological function as parties can publicly
vent their feelings under controlled conditions.

In this

case a party may be ready to settle once they have "had
their say."
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Fewer Issues.

According to mediators, fact-finding

does contribute to reducing the number of issues leading
to impasse, making settlement easier in super-mediation, in
spite of the fact that the vast majority of the reports are
not accepted in total.
Few Strikes.

Only five percent of the cases going to

hearing result in strike.

This implies that the fact-

finding process contributes significantly to the reduction
of impasses going to strike.
Problems of Oregon's Fact-Finding Process
Inexperience.

The most often mentioned problem is the

parties' inexperience with the philosophy and techniques of
collective bargaining.
Attitude.

Related to inexperience are the attitudes

of parties who are immature and allow personal feelings and
past practice to interfere with collective bargaining and
the usefulness of fact-finding.

This is reflected in the

number of issues taken to fact-finding.
Fact-Finders.
enced.

Some fact-finders have been inexperi-

Generally, there is lack of consistency in format

and criteria of judgment on permissive issues.
Structural Problems.

Fact-finding has not been effec-

tive in cases that go to binding arbitration.
Time.

The excessive length of time involved poses many

conflicts with budget and interest arbitration deadlines.
Furthermore, it is seen as causing frustration among parties.
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Costs.

Excessive and non-standardized fact-finder fees

are seen as a impediment to obtaining the most competent
fact-finders.
Summary
In summary, the aggregate data and interviews show that
the fact-finding process in Oregon's impasse resolution procedure does accomplish its purposes in that (I) it contributes significantly to the reduction of impasses, and thus
the potential number of strikes, and (2) it encourages the
parties to settle voluntarily as it provides a way for parties to re-assess their position, an opportunity to saveface, and to publicly vent their feelings, and a vehicle to
socialize the parties in the collective bargaining process.
Because of these advantages the majority of the participants do not want to abolish Oregon's fact-finding process;
rather they view it as a double-edged sword that provides
many problems as well as benefits.

The final section of this

chapter will propose various recommendations that are intended to reduce the severity of many of these problems,
and thus, improve Oregon's fact-finding process.
PROBLEMS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
It is recommended that the fact-finding process be
retained because of its overall effectiveness in reducing
the possibility of strikes and encouraging the parties to
settle voluntarily.

Many of its problems can be partially
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legislative action would not result in any serious negative
aspects.
Quality of

Fact~Finder~

The interviews indicated that the parties and neutrals
alike felt that serious problems exist with respect to the
competency of some fact-finders.

This was further demon-

strated by the aggregate data that showed that although over
30 fact-finders were on the list, about 65 percent of all
cases went to 10 fact-finders.

Re-selection of those 10 is

due to tDe parties not knowing some, and finding others
incompetent.
Most of the problems relating to the quality of factfinders could be alleviated by the Conciliation Service
placing and retaining only the most qualified on the factfinders' list.

This would require a more careful training

and screening process.

To accomplish this, the following

is recommended:
(1)

Fact-Finder Training.

It is recommended that both

pre-entry and post-entry training be required of fact-finders
on the list.
Pre-Entry Fact-Finding Apprenticeship.

It is re-

commended that the State Conciliation Service institute and
supervise a fact-finding apprenticeship program.

The intent

of such an apprenticeship would be to insure a reasonable
and consistent quality and quantity of fact-finders.

In-

terested individuals, who are identified by the service to
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solved, or at least curbed, by administrative directions
from the ERB and the State Conciliation Service Division.
Other problems can only be dealt with effectively by an act
of the legislature.

The following problem areas and

mendations are not discussed in order of importance.
are discussed in the following order:

recom~

They

protective services,

quality of fact-finders, issuance of reports, number of issues, parties' action on reports, pUblication of reports,
fact-finder fees, scope of bargaining, attitudes, and budget deadlines.
Protective Services
The aggregate data and interviews showed that those
groups required by law to use binding arbitration as the
final stage of impasse resolution do not find fact-finding
useful.

Neutrals agree that in this case, fact-finding is

little more than a trial run for the arbitration hearing,
and that it uses up precious time causing some cases to go
past the July first budgetary deadline for arbitration requests.

In short, fact-finding for protective services

wastes time and money (about two months and 2,000 dollars
per case).

It also adds to the frustration of the parties

involved, and thus, is counterproductive.
Therefore, i t is recommended that fact-finding for the
protective services be instituted only when the ERB deems it
is in the public interest, or when both parties voluntarily,
and mutually, request such services.

In my opinion, such
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be potentially successful, would work with experienced factfinders that have a reputation for their expertise in the
field.

Because fact-finding involves many skills that can-

not be totally learned from a book, an apprenticeship would
smooth the rough edges, just as a student teacher learns
the "tricks of the trade" from a master teacher, so would
an apprentice fact-finder learn from a master fact-finder.
Post-Entry Inservice Training.

It is recommended

that the State Conciliation Service continue and expand its
efforts to update and train present fact-finders in the
areas of writing format, use of consistent criteria of judgment, other fact-finders' finding, and fact-finding techniques.

The purpose of such training would be to cultivate

consistency throughout the process, from the hearing to the
written reports.

Such training could occur in workshop form

several times a year, and attendance of a certain amount required in order for a fact-finder to remain on the list.
(2)

Evaluation of Fact-Finders.

It is recommended

that some type of a formal evaluation system be developed
by the State Conciliation Service in order to become aware
of any consistent problems the parties may be having with
particular fact-finders.

Presently the parties have no

formal way of sharing their "fact-finder" problems and only
learn by trial and error; this is not too effective and imposes great costs of the parties, and indeed, the public.
It also reduces confidence in the system.

The proposed

evaluation would give ERB administration a relatively fast
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and objective way to help improve the quality of factfinders and the level of confidence the parties have in the
service.
(3)

The Fact-Finder List and Fees.

It is recommended

that the State Conciliation Service's fact-finders' list reflect the fees of all fact-finders on that list.

Further-

more, it is recommended that fact-finders be required to
submit a written notice to the Service 60 days prior to a
change in fees; and be prevented from changing the fees
after the selection process.

This would allow the Service

to update the list prior to any selection, and protect the
parties from unanticipated fee changes.
Issuance of the Report
It is recommended that the State Conciliation Service
take serious action to encourage fact-finders to issue their
reports within the thirty day period as required by law.
Obviously, some situations, such as cases requiring posthearing briefs, warrant as much as a two week extension.
However, as the aggregate data indicated, over 60 percent
of the reports take over one month to be issued, and of
that over 20 percent take over six weeks, which, except for
extraordinary circumstances, is far too long.

It does not

seem unreasonable that the ERB enforce the thirty day limit
to a practical degree given the law, the high fees parties
pay, and the frustrations caused by excessive time lapses.
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Parties' Actions on Reports
It is recommended that the ERB require parties to
either accept or reject a report within the five day period
as proscribed by law.

It is also recommended that the par-

ties be required to take action on an issue by issue basis,
rather than on the total report.
In the first instance, ERB would merely be helping to
enforce the law, with the side effects of being able to release to the press the fact-finders' report for publication.
The aggregate data showed employee groups were involved in
no action in 28 percent, and employers in 13 percent of the
cases going to hearing.

Presently, in cases where one party

accepts and one takes no action, ERB cannot release the report for publication, thus relieving the parties of potential public pressure.
In the second instance, if parties were required to
take action on an issue by issue basis, it would allow them
to immediately determine the areas of agreement, narrow any
unresolved issues, and identify the major issues.

Further-

more, this would make it easier for both parties and neutrals to formally and consciously see the usefulness of
fact-finding reports, and could further any super-mediation
efforts.
Publication of Reports
It is recommended that the ERB release fact-finding reports to the local hometown newspapers in order to encourage
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the intent of the law and the philosophy behind publication
of the report.

The parties indicated in the interviews

that pUblication of the report does not, in their view,
serve to encourage impasse resolution to a significant degree.

However, considering that as many as 28 percent of

the reports are not published due to no action by parties,
and considering that ERB releases the reports to the wire
service, not the local papers, it is difficult to tell to
what extent pUblication might encourage resolution.

It is

realized that pUblication still may not serve its intended
purpose.

However, such action by ERB would, at least, re-

sult in the public having the opportunity to become aware
and express their opinions concerning a particular case.
Fact-Finders' Fees
It is recommended that consideration be given to a
state-wide fee system.
are two-fold.

The reasons for such consideration

First, the interviews showed that many of the

parties, particularly the unions, were concerned about the
high fees that fact-finders charge.

High fees are a par-

ticular burden to smaller units and the unions (who pay from
dues), and much less so for the public employer who derives
its income from taxes.

Second, because the parties are ob-

ligated to use the process under law, there is justification to not allow the unrestrained market to set the price.
This is especially so where demand is excessive (due to government requirements) and supply limited (and not encouraged
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by government aid) .
Related to this are the unusual circumstances where
parties have refused to pay a fact-finder for one reason
or another.

Perhaps the ERB should consider a partial pre-

payment system as well to relieve this problem.
Again, it was also recommended that fact-finders be required to give the State Conciliation Service a 60 day notice of any fee change.

This would allow the Service to

update the list with regard to any change in fact-finder
fees prior to the selection process.

Furthermore, it is

recommended that once selected, the fact-finder could not
charge a fee greater than that reflected on the list provided to the parties involved.
Scope of Bargaining
It is recommended that the ERB make some decision regarding the discretion of fact-finders in order to add consistency in hearings and reports.

Both neutrals and parties

have indicated that a major problem in the fact-finding process is the uncertainty on what are permissive and mandatory
issues, and whether a fact-finder will hear and/or make
recommendations on such issues.

It is realized that such

action might place further burdens on the ERB.

However,

only ERB, and not the fact-finders, are equipped to deal
with such problems.
Attitudes
It is recommended that ERB conduct workshops to social-
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ize or educate the parties in the overall concepts and philosophy underlying collective bargaining and impasse resolution under Oregon law.

These workshops would include both

parties and be held on neutral territory such as university
and/or community college campuses.

They would be conducted

by recognized and qualified experts in public section labor
relations.
The reasoning behind such a recommendation is that the
aggregate data and the interviews indicate the parties' attitudes (in particular public school employers) are anticollective bargaining; these attitudes subvert the intent
of negotiations and thus the fact-finding process.

Many

suggest that time and experience will take care of some of
these problems; however, it is suggested here that an effort by ERB to help educate and socialize the parties is
appropriate.

The parties need to be reminded about the

positive aspects of Oregon law, its intent, and philosophy.
Workshops such as these would certainly not hurt, and could
prove very beneficial to the parties' use of the process,
and the public interest.
Budget Deadlines
It is recommended that the legislature enact some type
of negotiations-impasse deadline in order that fact-finding
does not run past budget deadlines.

The interviews indi-

cated that a major problem with fact-finding is that it
takes many cases past budget deadlines, thus making it
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difficult to institute the agreement into the budget.

A

deadline would force parties to bargain earlier and finish
the process before the budget was due.

This could be ac-

complished by any of the following ways:
(1)

Copy the old meet-and-confer law; that is, fact-

finding would have to be finished by, say, March or April,
thus the parties are obliged to bargain earlier (say late
fall)

in order to finish by the June budget deadline.

The

advantages are that bargaining would be tied to the budget
period, adding some fiscal sense to the situation (if employers have to guess what to allocate employees in their
budget they have essentially determined their top line before conclusion of negotiations).

Presently, the fact-

finders' recommendations may not be feasible without a
special election.

Also such a deadline encourages both par-

ties to get to the nitty-gritty and to not stall; that is,
it would encourage more serious bargaining during negotiations.
(2)

Change the fiscal year for schools (where most of

the problems exist) from July 1 - June 31, to Septelooer 1 August 31.

This has proven reasonably successful in the

State of Washington, where even if bargaining begins late,
say March, the parties have all summer to finish factfinding and sign a contract.

Of course if labor decides to

strike it would be much less effective in mid summer than
near the end of a term.

Such a change would also spread

out the burden on the Conciliation Service and on fact-
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finders, as all public employees are now on a July 1 - June
31 fiscal year and under this proposal they would be staggered

(education September 1 - August 31, all others July 1

- June 31).
Summary
In summary, these recommendations are intended to reduce the severity of many of the problems with Oregon's
fact-finding process.

Fact-finding for most public sector

impasse cases has more positive than negative aspects, and
provided the problems are alleviated, the process can go a
long way toward accomplishment of its purported goal.
AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The aggregate data and interviews generated certain
questions to which future research could be guided with interesting and potentially useful results.

First, the aggre-

gate data suggested that employer actions on fact-finders'
reports are associated with the employee organization involved.

Further TPsearch might address the question whether

this is a result of tradition, personalities of the actors,
or other variables.

Such research might prove very useful

in future understanding of public employee labor relations
on a national scale.

Second, research might be conducted

that measured parties' attitudes in relation to time lapse.
This could give the legislature an idea of how to build
realistic time deadlines.

Third, more research could be
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directed to the relationship between exogenous factors

(such

as population, unemployment, etc.) of the areas involved and
the parties' actions on fact-finder reports.

Fourth, and of

particular interest, would be research into what attributes
the parties consider important for a successful fact-finder,
and furthermore if the parties really want fact-finders to
recommend what they consider fair, rather than acceptable.
Fifth, research is needed in the general area of the collective bargain model, to direct the employer-employee relationship in more positive directions.
THE FUTURE
This study has shown that fact-finding in Oregon is successful in reducing impasses and thus the potential number of
strikes.

This has also shown that the process is more suc-

cessful than not in reducing the issues causing impasse,
educating or socializing the parties in the collective bargaining process, and encouraging good faith bargaining.

Be-

cause of its effectiveness it is recommended the process be
refined rather than abolished.
numerous and serious.

The problems, however, are

Some of the problems can be alle-

viated by instituting recommendations like those presented
in this study; others will take dramatic institutional
changes before they are significantly reduced.
I specifically refer to the attitudes of the parties in
an adversary collective bargaining model such as that which
exists in U. S. labor relations.

The best impasse resolu-
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tion procedure will not be successful unless the parties
bargain in good faith.

In order to bargain in good faith,

the parties have to be socialized toward a common goal and
commitment that is beyond their immediate self interest
(for example, "good" education).

Furthermore, the adminis-

trators of public services have to reflect a common commitment by including all persons, to some
decision-making process.

de~ree,

in the

What is being suggested here is

that participatory, or democratic management, is a vehicle
through which labor problems can be avoided in the first
place, and common goals reached.
The real problem with Oregon's fact-finding process is
the problem with most aspects of U. S. labor relations:

a

lack of sense of control and fair play by one or both parties.

It is to this end that future efforts might prove

invaluable.
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APPENDIX A
METHODOLOGICAL NOTES
Multiple operationism is employed in this dissertation in that different methods of data collection are used.
According to Cambell, et ale the value of this procedure is
that "it diminishes the slippage between the conceptual and
operative specifications," because more than one method of
measurement is utilized.

a

The procedures used and related problems involved in
the general aggregate data and the elite or authoritative
survey are discussed as follows.
I.

General Aggregate Data.

The general aggregate data

provide the first accurate and comprehensive data base available in Oregon from which to describe and analyze this
state's fact-finding process.

It also provides a starting

point for exploration of the possible association between
variables and the generation testable hypotheses.
The data was produced from the files of the Oregon
State Conciliation Service and the population of 239 cases
that occurred from 1974 through 1977.

Data were analyzed

with the Statistical Program for the Social Sciences (SPSS).
The 19 variables involved are:
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(1)

Year.

This variable provided information as to

the frequency and rate of change in fact-finding cases
from 1974 through 1975.
(2)

Fact-Finder.

This information allowed identifica-

tion of those fact-finders most involved in the process,
which was useful in determining who to interview.

Also

it was possible to compare the fact-finder and the parties' actions on their reports in order to find whether
any association exists.

It proved very valuable in

terms of suggesting directions for future research and
substantiating some of the parties' concerns.
(3)

Type.

This variable measured possible differences

between the education and the non-education sectors.
(4) and (5)

Employee Organization and Employer.

These

variables provided data on unions and governmental participation and actions in each phase of the process.
Cross tabulations were used to determine possible associations between actors and other variables.
(6)

Home Rule Status.

Because the home rule issue

caused confusion and inconsistant use of the process
it was dropped from the aggregate data.

This variable

accounts for the major source of missing data.
(7)

Settled-Before Hearing.

This variable was used

to isolate those cases where a request for fact-finding occurred but where the parties settled prior to a
hearing.

It provided a means to compare the part.ici-

pants' actions in this phase and provided information
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that led to insights as to the filtering concept of
the impasse process.
(8) and (9)

Employee and Employer Actions.

These var-

iables refer to the parties' action taken on the factfinding report.

Three actions were possible:

reject, and no action.

accept,

This provided frequency dis-

tributions and allowed for cross tabulations between
action and employee and employer categories.

This was

paramount in describing the effectiveness of the process and pointing to the direction of further questioning and problems.
(10) and (11)
Report.

Time Request to Hearing, and Hearing to

These variables provided measurement of the

time involved in the process.
categories:
8 weeks.

There were four time

0-4 weeks, 4-6 weeks, 6-8 weeks, and over

This provided information relating to the

time schedule required by the law, and allowed for
cross tabulations between time and the parties' actions.

The data generated

wer~

interesting, and

useful in that many other questions arose from that
data.

In future research it will be more useful to

measure time in days rather than intervals.

This

would allow averages to be obtained and more rigorous
statistical analysis to be applied.
(12)

Reports Published.

This va.riable is important

because of the idea that publishing the report will
put pressure on the parties to settle.

Unfortunately,
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the lack of consistent record keeping made this varj,able so nnreliable that it was not utilized in the
analysis.

But in the process of attempting to collect

this data, important weaknesses in the process were
sighted.

These weaknesses were the way it was pub-

lished, and the parties' use of no action as a way to
avoid publication.
(13)

Strike Notice.

This variable was used to gen-

erate the frequency of strike notices as required
under Oregon law.
(14) and (15)

Settled With and Without Mediation.

These variables allowed identification of those cases
where reports were rejected and super-mediation was
required, as opposed to those cases where the parties
settled themselves without further assistance by a
neutral third party.

It proved valuable in recogniz-

ing super-mediation as a very important step in the
impasse process.
(16)

Arbj,trated.

This provided the frequency of cases

going to arbitration and added information on the filtering

conc~pt

of the imp3sse process.

It also allowed

an understanding of the usefulness of fact-finding when
it is integrated with binding arbitration.
(17)

Strike.

The purpose of the impasse process is to

prevent public sector strikes.

This variable was use-

ful in generating the frequency of strikes among various
sectors and the percentage of cases going to fact-
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finding that went on to strike.
(18) and (19)

Population and Census Type.

These vari-

ables were utilized to gain information on the relation
of cases and action to population and census type.
population categories were:

The

under 2,500; 2,500 -

10,000; 10,000 - 50,000; and over 50,000.

The census

type definitions were based upon Bureau of Census definitions.

They are:

rural (under 2,500); suburban

(contiguous to a central city, incorporated, larger
than 2,500 -- in the "urban fringe"); and urban (over
2,500 and not suburban).

These variables allowed some

description and analysis as to where most fact-finding
cases occurred, and allowed cross tabulations with parties' actions.
Problems with the Aggregate Data.

Some data were miss-

ing because not all fact-finding records are complete.

How-

ever, much of the missing data on records was compensated
for through interviews of key people at the Service.

Infor-

mation not recalled by them was reported as missing.
Most of the missing data involved home rule cities and
counties; thus the reason for dropping them the analysis.
This meant that although generalizations about the factfinding process could be done, analysis pertaining to home
rule cities and counties was not possible.
II.

Elite or Authoritative Survey.

This type of survey pro-

vided a systematic basis (for the first time in Oregon) to
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obtain and evaluate the views of representatives from all
four categories of participants involved in Oregon's factfinding process

mediators, fact-finders, unions, and

government employers.
In using the elite survey method it is assumed that all
persons and/or categories of experts are not equally important, and that some have more insight into the process and
much more impact on policy formation than others.

b

The data were collected through a questionnaire administered in a personal interview situation.

This format

allowed for candor and higher response rates compared to a
mail or phone interview format. c

Respondents were guaran-

teed complete anonymity.
A scaling technique was employed to allow the parties
to express full intensity of their feelings and provide for
more in-depth analysis.

The scale was intentially designed

to prevent the parties from taking a neutral stand, thus
forcing them to scale their level of agreement or disagreement.

Most of the questions were closed-ended.
The personal interview situation allowed parties to

explain the reasons they felt as they did, and to provide
additional information beyond their choice on the scale -thus, giving the analysis a frame-work of measured opinions
about which further interpretation could occur given the
comments during the interviews.
The length of the questionnaire was designed so the
interview would take between 30-45 minutes.

As a result,

292

the questions were limited to those perceived to be most important.
A non-random sampling technique was employed and those
interviewed were selected on the basis of information provided in the aggregate data and discussion with practitioners in the field.
The subsamples were as follows:

Fact-finders -- ten

were interviewed and these ten account for over 64 percent
of the total fact-finding cases going to hearing.

Mediators

nine were interviewed and they account for 95 percent of
all non-home rule fact-finding cases requiring post-factfinding m-diation.

Employees -- representatives of five

unions were interviewed; these five unions account for over
80 percent of the total non-home rule fact-finding cases going to hearing.

It was assumed the state level of these

unions represent the general views of the locals and also
formulate general union policy.

Employers -- ten were in-

terviewed; seven from the education sector (which accounts
for 70 percent of all non-home rule fact-finding cases going to hearing), and three others representing state, county
and municipal, and special district units of government;
thus all major types of governments were represented.
This technique made it possible to interview those who
are in especially good positions to supply information; and
share useful insights.

However, it does not provide an ade-

quate enough base from which to test for statistical significance.

Generalizations derived from the interviews about
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the fact-finding process are made based upon the author's
judgement and the known facts about the subsample described
above.

d

One important advantage of the survey was the pro-

visions of information that the aggregate statistics could
not show, and the revelation of many problems and benefits
of the process that could not be found by the aggregate
analysis or a mailed questionnare.
In doing further research it would be useful to design
the questionnaire so that each category was answering the
same questions.

In this study this could not be accomp-

lished because there was no data base from which to work,
and the time for interviews had to be limited.

aDonald T. Cambell, Richard D. Schwartz, and Lee
Sechrest, Unobtrusive Measures (Chicago: Rand McNally,
1971), pp. 1-34.
bLewis A. Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 7-8.
CHerbert F. Weisberg, and Bruce D. Bowen, Survey Research and Data Analysis (San Francisco: Freeman, 1977),
p. 59.
dHubert M. Blalock, Jr., Social Statistics, 2nd ed.
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 528.

APPENDIX B
SUPPORT INFORMATION ON INTERVIEWS
The following may be found in this appendix:
Title
List of Neutrals Interviewed
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List of Parties Interviewed

296

Questionnaire for Mediators

298

Questionnaire for Fact-Finders .

300

Questionnaire for Parties

302

Neutrals' Ranking of Reasons
That Cause Fact-Finding . .
Parties' Ranking of Reasons
That Cause Fact-Finding

.

304
305
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LIST OF NEUTRALS INTERVIEWED

Mediators
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

John Abernathy
Lowell Ashbaugh
Robert Bell
Ken Brown
Hugh Lovell
Robert Hipps
Kathy Mistler
Alton Smedstad
John Vale

Fact-Finders
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

John Abernathy
William Hammond
Lafayette Harter
Hugh Lovell
R. W. Nahstoll
Leroy Smith
Carlton Snow
Roger Tilbury
Timothy D. Williams
Ron Loew
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LIST OF PARTIES INTERVIEWED

Government Employer Representatives
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Andrew Alexander, Director of Employee Relations,
Beaverton School District, #15
John Bodilly, Negotiator, Medford Area
Michael Cunningham, Employee Relations Manager,
Port of Portland
Jerry Martin, Director of Field Service and Labor
Relations, Oregon School Boards Association
Richard Miller, Attorney, Negotiator, Springfield,
Eugene Area
Lon Mills, President, Mills and Associates, Inc.,
Negotiators, Eugene Area
Bryan Mullen, Attorney, Negotiator, Medford Area
Edward P. Rosenlund, Supervisor, Employee Relations,
Personnel Division, State of Oregon
H. Kenneth Zinger, Attorney, Negotiator, Hillsboro Area
Donald W. Scott, Labor Consultant, Local Government
Personnel Institute

Public Employee Labor Organization Representatives
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Robert Crumpton, Executive Secretary, Oregon Education
Association (OEA)
Roy Dancer, OEA Uniserve Consultant, Clackamas
Jerry Dodge, American Federation of Teachers
Robert Ellis, Field Representative, Oregon School
Employees Association
William Greer, Jr., Attorney, represents public sector
labor organizations
Dick Hoit, Executive Director, American Federation of
State, County and Municipal Employees
Charlene Sherwood, Attorney, Oregon State Employees
Association
Steve Straugham, OEA Uniserve Consultant, Medford
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Others
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Melvin Cleveland, Chairperson, Employment Relations
Board, State of Oregon
Roy Edwards, Senior Hearings Officer, Employment Relations Board, State of Oregon
Jorge Haynes, Program Analyst, Public Employment Relations Board, State of California
Dr. Paul Kleinsorge, Professor of Economics, University
of Oregon
John P. McCarthy, Presiding Conciliator, California
State Conciliation Service, State of California
Karen Norton, Public Employment Relations Reporter,
CaliforLia Research, Inc.
James Redden, Attorney General, State of Oregon
Marvin L. Schurke, Executive Director, Public Employment Relations Commission, State of Washington
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR MEDIATORS

The purpose of this research is to study the factfinding
process. The intent of Oregon's impasse procedure is to act as
a filtering process where 'each step reduces the number of impasses
and brings the parties closer to resolution, thus encouraging
good faith bargaining and reducing possible strikes.
Please respond to the following questions. If you have
any additional comments or explanations you may wish to make,
they would be appreciated; you may use the back of this sheet
for that purpose.

Educational Background

Name

1.

Generally, have you been the mediator before and after
factfinding?
Yes_____

2.

Rank the five most important reasons that cause factfinding.
1. ____________________ 2. _________________ 30 ________________

No_____

4.____________________ 5. ________________
3. Why are so many cases settled after rejection of the report,
but before strike?

Rate the following statements aeording to the scale at the right.
Mark your responses in the space provided.
n~

no
opinion

-3

strongly
disagree

-2
disa~ree

-1

somewhat
disagree

+1
somewhat
agree

4. The parties generally engage in good faith
mediation and factfinding.

+2

agree

bargai~ing

+3

strongly
agree

through

5.

Factfinding significantly reduces issues causing impasse.

6.

Factfinders are a positive factor in impasse resolution.
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7. The factfinders are innovative in their recommendations.
8.

Factfinding cau:;es parties to hold back oi'fers in mediation.

9.

Factfinding is a tool for negotiation
(If so, in what way?)

strate~y.

10.

The i'actfinder's report is the basis for post-facti'inding
settlement.

11.

One party is more prone to reject reports than the other.
(If so, who and why?)

12.

Factfinding aids in settlement.
(Explain)

13.

Factfinding detracts from settlement.
(I~xplain )

14.

tolhat are the problems \oTt th Orcgo!1' s factfinciing process
and how could the process be improved?

15.

Factfindin~

16.

Other comments:

should be abolished.
take its place?)

(If so, should anything
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FACTFINDERS

The purpose of this research is to study the factfinding
process. The intent of Oregon's impasse procedure is to act as
a filtering process where each step reduces the number of impasses
and brings the parties closer to resolution, thus encouraging
good faith bargaining and reducing possible strikes.
Please resnond to the following quest tons. If you have
any additional comments or explanations you may wish to make,
they would be appreciated; you may use the back of this sheet
for that purpose.

Profession

Name

Educational Background

1.

How many years have you been serving as a factfinder in Oregon?

2.

What has been the average number of issues per case?

3.

What is the most number of issues in one case?

4.

What is the least number of issues in one case?

5.

What are the four most important issues that cause factfindine?
1. _________________________ 2. _________________________

3, _________________________ 4. _______________________
6.

Rank the five most important reasons that parties ,go to factfinding.
1. ____________________ 2.
3. ________________

4. ____________________

----------------

5. ________________

Rate the following statements according to the scale at the right.
Mark your responses in the space provided.

nh

no
opinion

-3

strongly
disagree

-2
disagree

-1

somewhat
disagree

+1
somewhat
agree

+2

agree

+3
strongly
agree

7.

Factfinding is an effective step in the impasse resolution
process in Oregon.

8.

The parties generally bargain in good faith prior to factfinding.
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Questionnaire for Factfinders
9.

-2-

The parties discuss all issues before factfinding.

10.

Parties use factfinding to court favorable public opinion.

11.

Publication of the factfinding report encourages resolution.

12.

The

13.

The cost of factfinding serves as a deterrent to its use.

14.

Factfinders should not engage in mediation.

15.

The fact finder should 'call them as he sees them', and not
'split the issues'.

16.

Generally parties make the factfinder aware of their
positions in mediation.

17.

Positions taken in mediation (if known) influence the
factfinder's position.

IS.

\oJhat are the problems with Oregon's factfindine process
and how could the process be improved?

19.

Factfindinp, should be abolished.
take its place?)

20.

Other comments:

factfindin~

process reduces the effectiveness of mediation.

(If so, should anything

302

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PARTIES

The purpose of this research is to study the factfinding
process. The intent of Oregon's impasse procedure is to act as
a filtering process where each step reduces the number of impasses
and brings the parties closer to resolution, thus encouraging
good faith bargaining and reducing possible strikes.
Please respond to the following questions. If you have
any additional comments or explanations you may wish to make,
they would be appreciated; you may use the back of this sheet
for that purpose.

Name

1.

Organization

Title

Rank the five most important reasons that cause factfinding.
2. ______________ 3-__________
1. _ _ _ _ _ __
4-_______

5. _________

Rate the following statements according to the scale at the right.
Mark your responses in the space provided.
n/9no
opinion

-3

strongly
disagree

-2

disagree

-1

somewhat
disagree

+1

somewhat
agree

2.

Factfinding is useful in impasse resolution.
Why or why not?

).

Generally we have confidence in factfinders.

+2

agree

+)

strungly
agree

4. Factfinders are a positive factor in impasse resolution.
5. The cost of factfinding serves as a deterrent to its use.
6. Factfinders engage in mediation (if so, at whose request?)
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Questionnaire for Parties
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7.

Factfinders' recommendations are neutral (given the facts).

8.

The other party
factfinding.

9.

Factfinding causes parties to hold back offers in mediation.

general~y

bargains in good faith prior to·

10.

All issues are discussed before factfinding.

11.

Factfinding reopens some issues.

12.

The publication of a factfinder's report encourages
impasse resolution.

13.

What are the problems "~th Ore~on's factfindin~ process
and how could the process be improved?

14.

Factfinding should be abolished.
take its place?)

15.

Other comments: _________________________________________________

(If so, should anything
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NEUTRALS' RANKING OF REASONS THAT CAUSE FACT-FINDING

Fact-Finders' Ranking
Reason

1

2

Another step
At impasse
Strategy
Lack of good faith bargaining
Need more time
Mediator not trusted
Face saving

3
1
3

1

3

4

5

1
1

1
1

1
2

Reason

1

Show they are working
Inexperience
Hard bargaining
Strategy
Lack of good faith bargaining
Vent feelings
Hidden adjenda
Face-saving
Outside pressure

1
2
1

Mediators' Ranking
2
3
4
1
2
1

1
1
3

1
1
2

5
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PARTIES I RANKING OF REASONS THAT CAUSE FACT-FINDING

Unions I Ranking
Reason
Attitudes of parties
Unreasonable board
Lack of experience
Pace-saving
Parties at impasse
Stall tactics
Don't bargain
Complex issues
ERB

1

Reason

1

1
1
2
1
1
1

2

3

2
1
1

3

4

5

1
1
2
2

Management's Ranking

Attitudes of parties
Unreasonable union
Lack of experience
Face-saving
At impasse
Stall tactics
Don't bargain
Complex issues
ERB
Have to
High expectations

2

3

4

5

2

1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1

1
4
2
2

1

1

APPENDIX C
SUPPORT DATA ON FACT-FINDING REPORTS
The following may be found in this appendix:
Title
List of Fact-Finding Reports Analyzed
Teaching Cases .

.

307

Non-Teaching Cases .

309

Number of Issues Submitted to
Fact-Finding, 1974-1977

310

Types of Issues Submitted to Fact-Finding
1974-1977
Teaching Cases
Non-Teaching Cases .

311
.

313

307

LIST OF FACT-FINDING REPORTS ANALYZED,
TEACHING CASES, 1974-1977

Union

I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

B.

9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.
17.

lB.
19.
20.
2l.
22.
23.
24.
25.

26.
27.

2B.

29.
30.
3l.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

School District

Year

Oregon City
Beaverton
North Clackamas
West Linn
Lake Oswego
Central Point
Gervais
Salem
Clackamas Community College
Ontario
Scappoose
Adrian

'74
'74
'74
'74
'74
'74
'74
'74
'74
'74
'74
'74

AFT

Albany
Corbett
Springfield
Southwestern Community College

'74
'74
'74
'74

Association of
ProfessorE'
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA

Southern Oregon College
Eagle Point
Coquille
Molalla
MCMinnville
Eugene
Lake Oswego
Umpqua
Jackson County
South Lane
Clatsop Community College
Springfield
Pleasant Valley
Chemeketa Community College
Coos Bay
Willamina
Central Point
Klamath County
Roseburg
Pine Eagle

'74
'74

OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
G:..--eai:er Albany
Educators
OEA
OEA

'75
'75
'75
'75
'75
'75
'75
'75
'75
'75
'75
'75
'75
'75
'75
'75
'75
'76
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Union
37.
38.
39.
40.
4l.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
5l.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
6l.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
7l.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
8l.

School District

OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA

Jefferson County
Crook County
Oregon City
Jefferson
Corvallis
Eugene
Albany
Salem
Stayton
Woodburn
Clackamas Community College
Albany
Coos Bay
Gervais

OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
OEA
AFT

Astoria
Carlton
Warrenton
West Linn
Scappoose
Roseburg
Baker
Tigard
Bandon
Klamath County
South Umpqua
Reynolds
Reedsport
Dallas
Bethel
Redmond
Estacada
Riddle
Salem
Powers
Pleasant Hill
Clackamas Community College
Ashland
Woodburn
Cascade
Corbett
Lane Community College

OEA

West Linn

-Indicates parties are unknown

Year
'76
'76
'76
'76
'76
'76
'76
'76
'76
'76
'76
'76
'76
'76
'76
'76
'76
'76
'76
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
'77
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LIST OF FACT-FINDING REPORTS ANALYZED,
NON-TEACHING CASES, 1974-1977

Union
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9'.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

ILWU, Local 40
Oregon Nurses Assn.
Jackson Co. Employees
Assn.
Coalition of Employees
OSEA
AFSCME, Local 1995
School Patrol Assn.
ILWU, Local 40
AFSCME, Local 2753
Communication Workers,
Local 9255
School Patrol Assn.
ILWU, Local 40
Airfield Emergency
Assn., Local 1062
AFSCME, Local 1847
OSEA
OSEA
OSEA
OSEA

Employer

Year

Port of Portland
Marion County

'74
'74

Jackson County
State of Oregon
State of Oregon
Multnomah Co. IED
Portland School Dist. #1
State of Oregon
Wasco County

'74
'75
'75
'75
'75
'76
'76

Lincoln County
Portland School Dist. #1
Port of Portland

'76
'76
'76

Port of Portland
Port of Portland
Springfield School Dist.
Hood River County
South Lane School Dist.
Reedsport School Dist.

'76
'76

'77
'77
'77
'77
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NUMBER OF ISSUES SUBMITTED TO FACT-FINDING, 1974-1977

No. of
Issues
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
2I.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
3I.

Frequency
Non
Teach. Teach.
2
13
5
4
5
3
4
1
3
2

2
4
4
2
1

3

3
2
3
2
1
1
4
2
2
·1

1
1
1
1
1

Total
2
15
9
8
5
5
5
1
3
2
3
1
4
3
3
3
1
1
4
2
2
1

1
2

1

2

2

- Denotes zero

2

No. of
Issues
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
43.
57.
90.
Total

Frequency
Non
Teach. Teach.

Total

1

1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1
2
2

1
1
2
2

81

18

99
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TYPES OF ISSUES SUBMITTED TO FACT-FINDING,
TEACHING CASES, 1974-1977*

Issue
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Frequency
Salary
Insurance
Grievance procedure
Duration of agreement
Fair share
Prep. period
X-duty pay
X-duty schedule
Lockout/strike clause
Management rights
Funding
Just cause
Teaching day
Teaching load
Teaching calendar
Class size
Contract services
Specialists
Aides
Vacancy & transfer
Teacher evaluation
Teacher files
Complaint procedure
Leave, sick
Leave, maternity
Leave, parental
Leave, emergency
Leave, personal
Leave, professional
Leave, bereavement
Leave, unpaid absence
Leave, association
Retirement pay
Auto allowance
Summer pay
Union rights
Substitutes

79
71
34
29
26
15
28
25
25
20
15
23
21
21
28
11
6
6
9
20
27
8
73
24
10
5
5
19
22
7
11
12
4
5
4
20
15

Issue
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Frequency

Extended contract
Student fund
Pay schedule level to level
Teacher-adm. liaison
Personal/academic
freedom
Evaluation of
Administration
Modification
agreement
Sucessor agreement
Affirmative Action
Tuition reimbursement
Classroom discipline
Reduction in staff
Dues/payroll deductions
Separability clause
School closure
Contract language
Disciplinary action
procedure
Special children
Adequate facilities
Staffing
Personnel policies
Textbooks
Meal allowance
Maintenance of
standards
Instructional
program
Required meetings
Contract compliance

10
1
13
4
26
6
9
6
4
19
23
23
16
7
3
2
3
2
8
3
2
7
1
19
9
5
1
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Frequency

Issue
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
.70.
7l.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Job description
Curriculum development
Prior practice clause
Use of equipment
Tenure
College governance
Teaching assignments
Division organization
Secretarial assistance
Professional growth
Emergency clause

1

6

Issue
76.
77.

1

2
3
2
9
1
1

7
1

78.
79.
80.
8l.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Frequency
Unit determination
Compliance w/master
contract
Severance pay
Assault & battery
Grading
Tuition waiver
Teaching apparel
Telephone calls
Recognition
Teaching conditions

*Based upon a sample of 81 of 93 reports issued; because some
issues were consolidated only 86 issues appear on this list

2
7
3
1
1

3
1
1

2

6
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TYPES OF ISSUES SUBMITTED TO FACT-FINDING
NON-TEACHING CASES, 1974-1977*

Issue
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
II.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
2I.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
3l.
32.

Frequency

Salary
Insurance
Management rights
Permanent status
Workload
Paid negotiation time
Union security
Maternity leave
Vacation
Holiday
Ed. incentive pay
Union rights
Personnel records
Severance pay
Sick leave
Emergency leave
Probation
Dismissal
Termination
Vacancies
Reclassification
Reimbursable expenses
Status of agreement
Grievance
Recognition
Sen'iori ty
Medical leave
Retirement
Hours
Successor clause
Fair share
Discipline.

16
11
1
1
2
4
3
2
8
5
1
2
1
1
5
2
1
2
2
2
3
2
8
3
1
3
1
1
1
2
2
1

Frequency

Issue
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Ed. leave
Duties
Supervisor
Relocation allowance
Parking
Rules
Shift differential
Uniform allowance

*Based upon a sample of 18 of 38 reports issued.

1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1

APPENDIX D
STATUTES AND RELATED INFORMATION
The following may be found in this appendix:
Title
State Statutes: Negotiation Impasse
Procedures in 1972 . . . .

315

State Conciliation Service FactFinding Rcles
• . . . . . . .

316

Sample Letter of Understanding
Regarding Mediation . • . .
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STATE STATUTES:

NEGOTIATION IMPASSE PROCEDURES IN 1972

State

Covera~e

Alaska
California
Connectucut

Teachers
Municipal
Municipal
Teachers
State , Municipal
Teachers
Public Transit
Teachers
Firefighters
Firefighters
1
Public Employees

Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Iowa

lCanSliS

Louisiana
Maine
Maryland

Massachusetts

Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

Vermont
Was"~ngton

Wisconsin
Wyoming

Fllctfinding

Up to
the
Parties

X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X

Teachcr5

Teachers

Nonprofi t 1J0spitals
Firefighters
Teachers
Public Employees
Teachers
Municipal , Nurses
State
Publi c f:mployees 1
Puhlic 1:l1lployecs
Public Employees
Teachers
Police , Firefighters
State & Municipal
Police & Firefighters

X
X

'X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X

_X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X2
X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

procedures noted.
2If the municipality accepts the advisory dccioion, it is binding on the parties.

31~ rulode Island, procedures may be n~90tiated by the parties but law seto out no proccdure8

4FireCiqhlers only.

X4

X
X

Iprocedure may be nrgotialed by the parties in lieu of procedures noted or including

proce~ures

X

X
X

Source, Gilroy, Thomas P. and Sincropi, Anthony V. pg"p~!£.~tt1eme.!'..L!n the Public Sector:
The State of the Art, Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972.

that muat be included or

X
X

X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

Police
Firefighters
1
Puhlic Employees
X
Police' Firefighters
St" te t:mployees
X
Municipal Employees
X

conununi ty College
Ac"demic /':mployees
Municipal t:mployees
'I'eachers
Public Utility
Districts 1
State Employees
Municipal r.mployees
Firefighters

X

J(

Municipal
PubUc ,'ransit.
Police & Firefighter~
State & Municipal
State & Municipal

'l'eachers

X
X

X

State

Public Employees
Public Transi t
Stale Employees)
Municipal r.mployees

Arbitration
--Conlpu 1 sc.ry
Voluntary
Advisory flinding Advisory Cindill'.!

X

Fircfighters
Firefiyhters
Public Transit
Firefighters
1
Public Employees
P •• blic 1'ransit
Municipal
Teachers

Teachers

South Dakota

Hc(liation

to be used in lieu of a negotiated procedure.

X
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STATE CONCILIATION SERVICE FACT-FINDING RULES

15-015 Factfindi~g If the di.spute has not been settled after 15 days of
mediation, either party may r'~quest the board to initiate factfinding, or
the board, on its own motiop, may initiate such factfinding if it deems it
appropriate and in the public interest.
1.

Selection of Factfinder(s) If the board decides to initiate
factfinding, it shall so notify the parties and they shall
have five days after receipt of such notice in which to mutually
select their own factfinder. If they fail to do so, the board
will submit to them a list of five qualified factfinders. From
that list each party shall alternately strike two names, with
the order of striking being determined by lot. The remaining
individual shall be the fact finder.
If both parties should desire a panel of three factfinders, they
shall so notify the board and the t )ard will then submit a list
of seven factfinders. From that list each party shall alternately
str1.ke two names, with the order of striking being determined by
lot. The remaining three persc...s shall be the factfinders.
The parties shall advise the board of their choice within five
days after receipt of the list. If they fail to do so, the
board shall appoint the factfinder{s) from the list.
If, however, one of the parties strikes the names as provided
above and the other party fails to do so, the board shall appoint
the fact finder only from the names remaining on the list. If
the factfinder so selected is unable to accept his appointment,
the parties shall so notify the board and the board shall then
submit another list of names.

2.

Qualifications of Factfinder No person shall serve as a factfinder in any factfinding in which he has any financial or
personal in~erest in the result of the factfinding, unless the
parties, in writing, waive such disqualification.

3.

Notice of A~!.ntment Upon selection of the factfinder, the
parties shall notify the board and the fact finder of his selection.

4.

Disclosure ~ Factfinder of Disqualifj .~ation Prior to accepting
his appointment, the prospective fact finder shall disclose any
circumstances likely to create a presumption of bias or which
he believes might disqualify him as an impartial factfinder.
Upon receipt of such information, the board shall immediately
disclose it to the parties. If either party declines to waive
the presumptive disqualification, the vacancy thus created shall
be filled in the same manner as that governing the making of
the original appointment.

5.

Vacancies If any fact finder should resign, die, withdraw,
refuse or be unable to or disqualified to perform the duties
of his office, the board shall, upon proof satisfactory to it,
declare the office vacant. Vacancies shall be filled in the
same manner as that governing the making of the original appointment, and the matter shall be reheard by the new factfinder.
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6.

Time and Place.. EL.li-earing
place for each hearing.

The fact finder shall fix the time and

7.

B£P.resentation by Counsel Any party lIIay be represented by counsel
or by other authorized representative.

8.

List of Issues Each party shall submit a written list of the
issues it intends to submit to factfinding to the factfinder
and to the other party at least seven days before the date of
the fact finding hearing.

9.

Subpo~
If the parties wish subpoenas, they may request them
of the Public Employe Relations Board not less than five days
prior to the c1ate set for the fact finding hearing.

10.

Attendance at Hearings TIle factfinding hearing shall be open to
the public unless otherwise mutually agreed to by the parties.

11.

Adjournments The factfinder, for good cause shown, may adjourn the
hearing upon the reques't of a party or upon his own initia,tive,
and shall adjourn when all parties agree thereto.

12.

Oaths In the discretion of the factfinder, all witnesses who
testify at the hearing may be sworn or make an affirmance.

13.

Order of Proceedinr~ The order of presentation at the hearing
shal,! be as mutually agreed between the parties or as determined
by the fact finder.

14.

Exhibits Each exhibit introduced by a' party shall be filed with
the factfinder and a copy shall be provided to the other party.
The exhibits filed with the factfinder shall be retained by him
unless the parties otherwise agree, or unless the factfinder
otherwise permits.

15.

Evidence The parties may offer such evidence as they desire and
shall produce such additional evidence as the factfinder may deem
necessary to an understanding and determination of the dispute.
The factfinder shall be the judge of the relevancy and materiality
of the evidence offered and conformity to legal rules of evidence
shall not be necessary. All evidence shall be taken in the presence of all of the parties except where any of the parties is
absent in default or has waived his right to be present. In
making his findinGs of fact and rccommcndations, the factfinder
shall consider the factors set forth in ORS 243.746(4).
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16.

Factfinding in the Absence of a Party The fa'ctfinder may proceed
in the absence of any party, who, after due notice. fails to be
present or fails to obtain an adjournment. Findings of fact and
recommendations shall not be made solely on the default of a party.
The fact finder shall require the other party to submit such evidence as he may require for the making of findings of fact and
recommendations.

17.

Closing of Hearings The fact finder shall inquire of all parties
whether they have any further proofs to offer or witnesses to
be heard. Upon receiving negative replies, the factfinder shall
declare the hearings closed and the time thereof shall be recorded.
If briefs of other documents are to be filed, the hearings shall
be declared closed as of the final date set by the factfinder for
filing of the briefs.

18.

Reopening of Hearings The hearings may be reopened by the factfinder on his own motion, or on the motion of either party for good
cause shown, at any time before the findings of fact and recommendations are made, but if the reopening of the hearing wou~d prevent
the making of the findings of fact and recommendations within the
specific time provided by law, the matter may not be reopened,
unless both parties agree upon an extension of such time limit.

19.

Waiver of Rules Any party who proceeds with the factfinding after
knowledge that any prOVision or requirement of these rules has
not been complied with and who fails to state his objection thereto
in writing, shall be deemed to have waived his right to object.

20.

Waiver of Oral Hearing The parties may provide, by written agreemen~ for the waiver 6f oral hearings.

21.

Serving of Notices Any papers, notices or process necessary or
proper for the initiation or continuation of factfinding under
these rules may be served upon a party (a) by mail addressed to
such party or his attorney at his last knQwn address, or (b) by
personal service.

22.

Time of Findings of Fact and Recommendations Not more than 30
days from the date of conclusion of the hearings, the fact finder
shall make written findil1gs of fact and recommendations for resolution of the dispute and shall serve such findings and recommendations upon the parties and upon the board. Service may be personal
or by registered or certified mail.

23.

Form of Find~of Fact and Recommendations The findings of fact
and recommendations shall be in writing and shall be signed either
by the factfinder or by a concurring majority, if there be more
than one factfinder.

24.

Expenses The expenses of witnesses for either side shall be paid
by the party producing such witnesses. Expenses of the factfinding,
including required traveling and other expense of the fact finder
and the expenses of any witnesses or the cost of any proofs produced at the direct request of the factfinder, shall be borne
equally by the parties.
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25.· !ntcIjl..I£.!~i0I!.._~!.lc:L~'pp..!.!..catig.!!.._~___RlI}.!!~ The factfinder shall
interpret and apply these rules insofar as they relate to his
powers and duties. ~len there·is more than one factfinder and
a difference arises anlong them concerning the meaning or application of any such rules, it shall be decided by majority vote.
26.

~arties'

Respon~!bility after Factfin~ Not more than five
working days after the findings and recommendations have been
sent. the parties shall notify the board and each other whether
or 1I0t they accept the recommendations of the factfinder.
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SAMPLE LETTER OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING MEDIATION

LINCOLN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT
and
LINCOLN COUNTY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
-----------

, 1978

UNDERSTANDING REGARDING MEDIATION
The mediation process in confidential.
The agreements made during mediation are tentative.
No evidence may be introduced by either party at the
fact-finding about tentative agreements made, nor even proposals advanced during mediation by either party on items
which go to the factfinder for recommendation.
If final agreement of an entire contract is not reached
during mediation, only the items tentatively agreed upon
during negotiations and mediation that the parties, after
mediation, mutually agree will not go to the factfinding for
recommendation shall be left out of factfinding.
LINCOLN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT

By ________________________________

LINCOLN COUNTY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

By _____________________________________

